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Abstract 
 
Charles S. Peirce’s critique of epistemic individualism, the attempt to make the individual the 
locus of knowledge, is a dominant theme in his writings. While scholars often mention this 
critique, there is, surprisingly, a lack of research on the topic. However, it is necessary to know 
what motivates Peirce’s critique of epistemic individualism to know why he aims to turn 
philosophy into a communal study. In this dissertation, I defend the claim that Peirce’s 
communal inferentialism allows us to assess the rational merits of his critique of epistemic 
individualism and to grasp his insights into why philosophy must change its course. The 
questions that have guided the research are the following. What are the central reasons that 
support Peirce’s verdict that epistemic individualism is a dead-end for philosophy? What roles 
do Peirce’s fundamental commitments concerning the notion of the community of inquirers and 
the patterns of correct inference play in his critique? I defend the central claim in four chapters. 
In Chapter One, I reinvestigate Peirce’s critique in relation to Cartesianism, while in Chapter 
Two I take up Peirce’s case against nominalism. I begin with these topics since Peirce claims 
that these two positions in the history of philosophy are prime examples of epistemic 
individualism. In Chapter Three and Chapter Four, I show that the problem of epistemic 
individualism crops up again in Peirce’s two most influential papers, “The Fixation of Belief” 
and “How to Make Our Ideas Clear.” I provide a communal inferentialist reading of both papers. 
In this dissertation, I further show why, according to Peirce, our key epistemic notions, including 
knowledge and truth, cannot be individualistic but must be communal notions. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
We individually cannot reasonably hope to attain the ultimate philosophy which we 
pursue; we can only seek it, therefore, for the community of philosophers (original 
emphasis; “Some Consequences of Four Incapacities,” 1868).1 
 
Beginning in the late 1860s, Charles S. Peirce aims to turn philosophy away from its 
individualistic tradition, dominant in the early modern period, and toward a communal study, 
which he sees as opening the way to progress. The individualistic approach is a dead-end for 
philosophy, according to Peirce, since the goals of reaching the truth and knowledge are 
communal ones. In the secondary literature, scholars are quite aware of Peirce’s attempt to make 
philosophy communal. However, there is the fundamental but more neglected question of why 
the study cannot be individualistic. Following the lead of other commentators, I take epistemic 
individualism to be the view that the individual is the locus of knowledge.2 In this dissertation, 
the claim I shall defend is the following. That an explanatory framework that combines Peirce’s 
inferential commitments with his notion of the community of inquirers (or inferential beings) 
provides us with the most illuminating way to appreciate the reasons and arguments that drive 
his critique of epistemic individualism. I shall refer to this framework by the term communal 
inferentialism (a term that Peirce does not use, but one that I find apt, as I will explain in due 
course).  
Although many scholars have mentioned Peirce’s critique of epistemic individualism, 
there is no comprehensive study of the topic yet.3 However, there is a growing interest in it, as 
                                               
1 W2: 212. 
2 Buchler, 1939; Murphey, 1961; Bernstein, 1964; Gallie, 1966; Scheffler, 1974, Haack, 1983; Forster, 1992, 2011. 
3 While there are some brief accounts of Peirce’s reaction to epistemic individualism, there are no book-length 
treatments of it. Some scholars that mention the significance of Peirce’s reaction to epistemic individualism include 
the following: Buchler, 1939; Murphey, 1961; Bernstein, 1964; Gallie, 1966; Scheffler, 1974; Haack, 1983; Forster, 
1992, 2011.  
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we can tell from the accounts that we do have. The most prominent accounts are from Susan 
Haack’s “Peirce, Descartes, and the Cognitive Community” (1983) and from Paul Forster’s 
“Peirce and the Threat of Nominalism: Foundations of Community” (1992) and his book Peirce 
and the Threat of Nominalism (2011). As we can tell from the titles of these works, these 
scholars focus on a key part of Peirce’s critique of epistemic individualism: his notion of the 
community.4  
Peirce’s notion of the community reflects the social dimension of inquiry or inferential 
activity. He argues that this dimension is crucial for our cognitive development. By contrast, 
Peirce likens our situation as individuals to being in the following scenario, where a blind person 
and a deaf person witness a murder. Consider the following example of these two people: “One 
hears a man declare he means to kill another, hears the report of the pistol, and hears the victim 
cry; the other sees the murder done” (W2: 468). According to Peirce, as individuals, we can only 
gain so much information and overcome so many obstacles to knowledge. As individuals, we 
face severe epistemic limitations. However, by a social and epistemic process, by which we pool 
together our information and raise real doubts in one another, we have a much better chance to 
know both sides, overcome individual differences, and arrive at a true conclusion. Thus, Peirce 
attempts to propose and spell out the right methods or procedures for reaching the conclusion 
that the community of inquirers would settle on; that is, the state that would result if they were to 
push the process of investigation as far as it could go. According to Peirce, such thinking offers a 
valuable philosophical lesson: we must clarify what we mean by knowledge, truth, and reality by 
relating these notions to the conclusion of such a communal process. Peirce’s insight is that, 
since these concepts must relate to communal accomplishments, the concepts themselves are 
                                               
4 Peirce seems to use the word notion deliberately to indicate that he is referring to a growing community and s 
community that is potentially unlimited (see: W2: 239).  
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communal notions. As I seek to make clear in this dissertation, Peirce’s insight further rests on 
his reasons for why the individual cannot reach our epistemic goals. 
Haack and Forster, in their accounts of Peirce’s critique of epistemic individualism, tend 
to concentrate on such an epistemic and communal process as the one just described. As we can 
tell from the titles of their works, both scholars look closely at how Peirce’s critique of epistemic 
individualism relates to his critical reactions to significant positions in the history of philosophy. 
Haack concentrates on Cartesianism, while Forster focuses on nominalism (roughly, the view 
that only concrete individual things are real, so that anything said to be general or universal is 
merely a name or nomina). Peirce maintains that both positions are chief examples of epistemic 
individualism. In her essay, Haack is quite critical of Peirce, as she claims that he misreads 
Descartes in several respects that bear on his case against Cartesian individualism. Essentially, 
Haack maintains that Peirce fails to understand Descartes’ method of doubt, the main instrument 
that Descartes claims the individual must rely on to gain knowledge. Despite these criticisms, 
Haack believes that Peirce’s notion of the community offers a new, anti-individualistic pattern of 
inquiry, which she regards as a virtue of his position. Although I should mention that Haack is 
wary of the effectiveness of Peirce’s communal form of investigation, since she is unsure of what 
the notion of the community entails (Haack, 1983: 256). In his book, Forster aims to account for 
Peirce’s opposition to nominalism by presenting us with a picture of the nominalistic worldview 
that Peirce mentions but does not articulate. One part of the worldview is the nominalist’s view 
of knowledge, which assumes the truth of epistemic individualism. Forster examines how the 
nominalist’s epistemic claims end up leading to a form of skepticism about the external world. 
Forster argues that Peirce’s critique of epistemic individualism exposes this problem as well as 
other difficulties with the nominalist’s view of knowledge. 
4 
 
Far from entirely rejecting the accounts that Haack and Forster provide, the account I 
offer of Peirce’s critique builds on theirs in several respects that relate primarily to Peirce’s 
notion of the community.5 In the first two chapters, I will take up the work of these scholars and 
investigate the cases that Peirce makes against Cartesianism and nominalism. However, 
concerning their accounts, what I claim requires due attention is the connection between Peirce’s 
notion of the community and his inferential commitments. It is quite significant that, when Peirce 
introduces the notion of the community, he does so in the context of the inferential model he 
proposes for gathering information and arriving at knowledge (W2: 239-241; W2: 252). Since I 
am focusing on Peirce’s critique of epistemic individualism, where the concern is about how 
Peirce believes we acquire knowledge and reach our main epistemic ends, the inferential moves 
matter. For, above all, the inferential moves are the means for gaining knowledge, according to 
Peirce. When Peirce articulates his notion of the community, it is equally significant that he does 
so in the context of his argument that the mind is fundamentally inferential. Linking these ideas 
offers an in-depth insight: Peirce argues that, since the mind is fundamentally inferential, the 
community consists of inferential minds. The connection opens an illuminating window on some 
of Peirce’s significant epistemic commitments that closely bear on his critique of epistemic 
individualism. Unlike the current accounts that we have, the project I take up focuses on the 
consequences of what I shall refer to as Peirce’s communal inferentialism. While it takes a few 
steps to build the framework, I hold that my account provides us with a way to see the central 
reasons that convinced Peirce that epistemic individualism must be a dead-end. 
  Before I spell out Peirce’s communal inferentialism and its relation to his critique of 
epistemic individualism in greater depth, it helps to take a closer look at Peirce’s life and 
                                               
5 To be clear, I also think that there is a central place for Peirce’s notion of the community. However, I firmly reject 
Haack’s criticisms of Peirce, which is a matter I take up in Chapter One.  
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philosophical development. While some scholars, even in philosophy, may be aware of Peirce’s 
central ideas – including his pragmatism (or pragmaticism, as he later called it) – many are 
unfamiliar with his other ideas.6 Peirce saw himself as a systematic philosopher, so it helps, at 
the outset, to have a better sense of how his ideas hang together. By having such biographical 
information, we can further grasp the views of a philosopher who tends to be challenging to 
understand. More importantly, such information offers us insights into why Peirce takes such a 
stronger stance against epistemic individualism. 
Charles Sanders Peirce (1839-1914) was the son of the distinguished Harvard professor 
of mathematics and astronomy, Benjamin Peirce, who exerted a profound influence on him. 
Benjamin considered Charles a prodigy, and often introduced him to some of the greatest minds 
in America at the time. By training and avowal, Charles was primarily a scientist and a logician. 
When twelve, he read Richard Whately’s Elements of Logic (1826), and from then on, he said 
that he could never think of a problem otherwise than as a logical problem (Brent, 1998: 48).  
Peirce is widely recognized as the founder of pragmatism, the philosophical movement 
associated with the classical age of American philosophy (1860-1940), which also included 
William James and John Dewey. According to Peirce, pragmatism is a logical method (CP 
8.191), and he regards the kernel of it as follows: “[pragmatism is] a method of ascertaining the 
meanings of hard words and of abstract concepts” (added emphasis; CP 5.464). This formulation 
dispels a crude, common misconception about pragmatism, which is that it concerns what merely 
is practical or useful. Far from forcing the meaning of our concepts to refer only to the here and 
now, Peirce tends to think of the conceivable practical effects of our concepts; that is, if they are 
meaningful, we need to ask what predictions they hold or what expectations we have about them. 
                                               
6 Peirce later refers to his position in “What Pragmatism Is” (1905) by the name pragmaticism to distinguish his 
position from other forms of pragmatism that he finds objectionable.   
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In a definite statement, free of details, Peirce maintains that we “must look to the upshot of our 
concepts in order rightly to apprehend them” (CP 5.4). The aim of discovering the method that 
would clarify our concepts is one of Peirce’s continual interests along with the need to be 
“masters of our own meaning” (W3: 260). When it comes to the task of clarifying the meaning of 
an idea or concept, it bears repeating that Peirce intends for the method to spell out the 
conceivable or possible effects of the idea or concept. In this way, Peirce refers to what he calls 
the rational purport of the concept (CP 5.428). That is, the meaning of an idea or concept does 
not merely relate to an actual situation but can relate even to the indefinite future. One central 
motivation of Peirce’s pragmatism is to guard against the traps of verbalism by unmasking 
profound-sounding but empty metaphysical assumptions. In a famous example, Peirce applies 
his pragmatism to the Catholic doctrine of transubstantiation, which is, roughly, the religious act 
of supposedly changing bread and wine into the body and blood of Christ (W3: 265-266). Peirce 
questions whether there would be any conceivable experiential differences between the table 
wine and the seemingly changed wine. While the example may be somewhat controversial, 
Peirce could have used the example of homeopathy or other less contentious cases.7 By relating 
our ideas or thoughts to their possible bearings on beliefs and actions, Peirce holds that 
pragmatism is the way to distinguish between what is meaningful and meaningless.  
Independently of Ferdinand de Saussure (1857-1913), Peirce founded semeiotics, the 
theory of signs.8 Along with his pragmatism, many regard Peirce’s theory of signs to be one of 
his most significant contributions to philosophy. His theory of signs aims to provide us with a 
                                               
7 The example of homeopathy may be more apt, since Peirce regards its claim to be curative to be bogus. “That 
homeopathists pay greater attention than others to diet and nursing is well known. By saying that they give no 
appreciable medicine, I mean that there is absolutely no other reason to think that they give any except the fact that 
patients who have taken their doses get well” (original emphasis; W1: 452).  
8 More precisely, semeiotics is, according to Peirce, the theory of triadic sign relations.  
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systematic way to understand the nature of representation and communication. Especially at the 
end of his life, Peirce was absorbed in the project of coming up with an adequate theory of signs, 
so that future generations could fill in the details and rely on such a theory.9 
During his lifetime, Peirce was a notorious figure in academic philosophy, as he made 
many enemies and gained a bad reputation. A few months before the outbreak of World War I, 
Peirce died in relative isolation and poverty. In large part, Peirce became persona non grata in 
academia at the time because of his volatile personality, strained social relationships, and 
licentious lifestyle (Brent, 1998). Such a reputation made it extremely difficult for Peirce to 
disseminate his philosophical ideas or find students to carry on his projects. In part, the situation 
explains the absence of broader acclaim for his philosophical writings. Not until the publication 
of his Collected Papers in the 1930s did Peirce’s ideas begin to gain fuller recognition. Many 
scholars acknowledge that, as a collection, these papers suffer from several faults, the most 
severe being that they present Peirce’s writings thematically rather than chronologically. Often 
they tend to fail to exhibit the progression of Peirce’s ideas. More recently, the Chronological 
Edition provides a fuller statement of his thinking and better captures the development of his 
thought.  
The imprint of Peirce’s scientific training was permanent on his thinking. Trained as a 
chemist, he often remarked that he had his mind shaped by his life in the laboratory; and so in the 
spirit of his pragmatism, he would approach a problem as an experimentalist who aims to put our 
ideas to the test (Skagestad, 1981: 55). For Peirce, the scientific attempt to discover the truth 
                                               
9 Peirce’s theory of signs is quite complex, and in this dissertation, I do not take it up (see: Sebeok, 2001; Short, 
2007). As for a simple definition of a sign, Peirce often states it in the following way (or some variation of the 
following): “A sign is something which stands for another thing to a mind” (W3: 82). Peirce claims that, for any 
sign, there is a triadic relation between sign, object, and interpretant (what serves to translate or interpret the 
meaning of the sign). In general, Peirce distinguishes the following three types of signs: icons, indices, and symbols.      
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connects to his views on logic. In a remark that is characteristic of how Peirce views logic, he 
writes, “It is a historical fact that logic originated in an attempt to discover a method of 
investigating truth. Moreover, the doctrines of logic, as they exist, center about the forms of 
inference” (W2: 350). It is noteworthy that Peirce takes the study to encompass more than formal 
or mathematical logic. For, under the purview of logic, Peirce would include matters that we now 
tend to regard as belonging to epistemology or the philosophy of science (Skagestad, 1981: 16). 
Peirce saw himself primarily as a logician, and he sought to revive logic at a time when it 
had fallen into deep disfavour (W1: 162). Thomas Goudge remarks that, in Peirce’s day, “the 
whole science of logic was in a torpid, unprogressive state, against which [Peirce] never ceased 
to do battle” (Goudge, 1950: 111-112). Peirce made it a significant task of his to restore the 
reputation of logic as a serious science and proclaimed, “I am as confident as I am of death that 
Logic will hereafter be infinitely superior to what it is as I leave it; but my labours will have 
done good work toward its improvement” (CP 2.198). Peirce made several contributions to logic, 
as he had a hand in the development of quantification theory (i.e., predicate logic), mathematical 
logic, and an innovative system of existential graphs (see: Roberts, 1973).  
In mapping out what he considers the common ground between logic and science, Peirce 
formulates what he calls the logic of science. Peirce spells out this logic in his 1865 Harvard 
Lectures On the Logic of Science and again in his 1866 Lowell Lectures The Logic of Science; 
Or, Induction and Hypothesis. These lectures precede the Cognition Series (1868-69) by a few 
years and provide the blueprint of the methods and doctrines that Peirce takes up in that essay 
series.10 A decade after the Cognition Series, he revisited these doctrines and methods in The 
Illustrations of the Logic of Science, which contained his most influential papers, “The Fixation 
                                               
10 The Cognition Series is a standard way of referring to Peirce’s three papers in The Journal of Speculative 
Philosophy. In what follows, I adopt this shorthand. 
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of Belief” (1877) and “How to Make Our Ideas Clear” (1878). Briefly put, Peirce articulates the 
logic of science primarily in terms of two types of synthetic inference known as abduction and 
induction.11 Both types of inference have a strong bearing on how we reason about our 
experience and objects in the world. Even if we cannot be sure of its short-term success, Peirce 
regards the logic of science as the primary way to make empirical discoveries. Peirce believes 
that by following the logic of science we would make these discoveries at least in the long run. 
Turning now to his philosophical ideas and the logic of science, it is worth noticing that 
Peirce takes the logic of science to be the means of making empirical discoveries. He sees his 
communal inferentialism as putting us on the path towards the achievements that our 
philosophical notions of knowledge, truth, and reality reflect. Peirce expects that our epistemic 
achievements must be ones that relate to a community of inquirers or inferential beings. It is an 
inferential process, according to Peirce, that leads to these achievements. That inferential process 
includes what Peirce takes to be the three patterns of correct inference – namely, abduction, 
deduction, and induction. According to Peirce, inquiry begins with a surprise, a disruption, an 
anomaly, or a real doubt. For inquiry to begin, something must interrupt our beliefs or habits.  
Peirce maintains that abduction is a form of inference that supplies a hypothesis or 
conjecture that aims to explain the surprise or anomaly. According to Peirce, the first step 
towards knowledge is to propose hypotheses that aim to account for what we find mysterious or 
surprising. In Peirce’s view, abduction is the means of generating, not justifying, a hypothesis 
that aims to explain surprising or puzzling phenomena. After making an abduction, deduction 
can trace out certain consequences of the hypothesis. In this case, deduction does not add any 
                                               
11 Peirce often refers to the pattern of inference known as abduction by different names. He sometimes calls it 
hypothesis, retroduction, or presumption. In this dissertation, unless there is a good reason not to do so, I am going 
to use the label abduction.  
10 
 
information to the hypothesis. Lastly, induction is the means of testing or justifying a hypothesis, 
as induction requires us to take samples – often at random – to move towards the establishment 
of representative generalizations. As we carry out a series of inductions, Peirce argues that we 
move towards the truth or towards a real representation of the things that we sample. According 
to Peirce, in the logic of science, each type of inference underscores a distinct epistemic value: 
abduction aims to explain, deduction seeks coherence and making worthwhile predictions, and 
induction aims at truth.12  
In the course of studying the types of correct inference, Peirce arrives at the following 
remarkable view: the mind is fundamentally inferential. The following statements are typical of 
how Peirce understands the nature of the mind: the modifications of the mind are inferential 
(W2: 243), “every judgment results from inference” (W2: 242), and the mind is “developing 
according to laws of inference” (W2: 240). While Peirce’s account of the mind is of interest 
itself, it tends to serve a further purpose, as Peirce is eager to use it to expose the faults of the 
Cartesian view of the mind. In particular, he challenges the Cartesian view since it assumes that 
the fundamental activity of the mind is non-inferential. That is, the Cartesian view supposes that 
the mind contains intuitions (roughly, non-inferential cognitions or thoughts not determined by 
any other thoughts) and that the mind possesses a faculty by which to identify which cognitions 
are intuitions. This issue concerning the nature of the mind bears a deep connection to my 
project, since Peirce traces the Cartesian view of the mind to the root of Cartesian individualism. 
While I shall lay out the argument in greater depth in Chapter One, the idea is that the individual 
would be the locus of knowledge, according to the Cartesian, given that the mind could discover 
non-inferential or intuitive knowledge. Peirce deploys a probabilistic argument to show that it is 
                                               
12 The context matters here. It is in the logic of science – a term that Peirce uses – that he discusses these particular 
aims for each of these patterns of inference.  
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quite unlikely that the mind possesses a faculty to know which cognitions are intuitions; and 
hence, he maintains that there is a lack of justification for the assumption that the individual is 
the locus of knowledge. 
Having sketched Peirce’s conception of the logic of science and his supposition that the 
mind is fundamentally inferential, we can begin to see why Peirce insists that epistemic 
individualism runs into a wall of limitations. According to Peirce, the individual has only so 
much time, can take only a limited number of samples, and can make only so many inferences. 
Given that the individual is finite and extremely limited in these ways, the project of applying the 
logic of science, with its aim of making extensive empirical discoveries, is not one that the 
individual could reasonably undertake. Reflecting on the history of science and philosophy, 
Peirce sees that our greatest achievements come from the culmination of our collective 
endeavours. Each generation of inquirers is, to borrow an apt metaphor, standing on the 
shoulders of its predecessors. Now since such successes are the result of communal efforts and 
reflect the communal stable agreement that investigators would reach, Peirce holds that our 
epistemic notions, including truth and knowledge, must be communal notions. Put simply, these 
notions must be so since they must relate to the community of inquirers (or inferential beings). 
Accordingly, for Peirce, epistemic individualism represents the severe limitations we face; and 
hence, Peirce tends to treat our concepts of error, ignorance, fictions, and prejudices all as being 
ones that relate to individuality. By contrast, our philosophical notions such as knowledge, truth, 
and reality, according to Peirce, are communal notions. For example, in explicating the idea of 
reality, Peirce states the following: 
The very origin of the conception of reality shows that this conception essentially 
involves the notion of a COMMUNITY, without definite limits, and capable of an 
indefinite increase of knowledge (W2: 239).  
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Peirce sees the conception of reality as standing in opposition to error, ignorance, and fiction, the 
distinctive marks of individuality. In the passage, the notion of a community derives from 
Peirce’s view of the inferential mind, and the increase of knowledge or information comes from 
the products of following the patterns of correct inference. In particular, the results of the logic of 
science – abduction, deduction, and induction – lead to further knowledge or information. 
“Finally, as what anything really is, is what it may finally come to be known to be in the ideal 
state of complete information, so that reality depends on the ultimate decision of the community” 
(W2: 241). 
 Tying together the above threads, by Peirce’s communal inferentialism, I shall mean the 
combination of the following three components or sources:  
(1) Peirce’s conception that the mind is fundamentally inferential; 
(2) Peirce’s view of the patterns of correct inference;  
(3) Peirce’s notion of the community    
 
Peirce relies on these three sources to explicate our central epistemic notions, and he sees them 
as pointing to the inferential road towards intellectual progress and our highest epistemic aims. 
Together, these components offer a powerful interpretive framework in which to see what Peirce 
maintains is wrong with epistemic individualism. Accordingly, when I refer to communal 
inferentialism, I intend by that term the amalgam of the above sources. They have a degree of 
cohesion that allows one to devise a framework out of them. For, consider that Peirce’s 
conception of the inferential mind is what leads him to hold that cognitive progress comes from 
adhering to the patterns of correct inference. If the mind could have intuitions, then it could 
bypass the need to follow such inferential patterns, and could gain knowledge or information by 
direct non-inferential means. The three components in Peirce’s communal inferentialism tie into 
one another; and each reflects a fundamental philosophical commitment that Peirce retains over 
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the course of his writings. Thus, I maintain that there are plausible reasons in support of my 
decision to refer to Peirce’s communal inferentialism, and then also to rely on it as the critical 
tool to assess Peirce’s critique of epistemic individualism. 
Before I conclude this general introduction, it is worth briefly mentioning that a strength 
of the approach I take is that it moves Peirce’s inferential commitments into the light they 
deserve. In the scholarly literature, there is a tendency for such commitments to recede into the 
background, since the focus tends to be on Peirce’s theory of inquiry. That theory concerns 
Peirce’s conceptions of belief and doubt, which are most certainly quite important, but even in 
his theory of inquiry, Peirce’s communal inferentialism plays a significant role. In large part, the 
situation is due to what tends to be an overly restrictive focus on Peirce’s two most influential 
papers, “The Fixation of Belief” and “How to Make Our Ideas Clear.” In both papers, Peirce 
develops his theory of inquiry, claiming that inquiry is the struggle to escape real doubt and to 
regain belief. Typically, scholars place a great deal of attention on what Peirce means by the end 
of inquiry (see: Misak, 1991; Hookway, 2000). However, in an effort to restore interpretive 
balance, I shall maintain that it is helpful also to see Peirce’s aim in terms of the end of 
inference.13 Such an aim puts the focus on the right place, particularly where the concern is to 
explain Peirce’s critique of epistemic individualism. 
 
 
 
 
                                               
13 By the end of inference, I mean the upshot or result of following the patterns of correct inference (i.e., abduction, 
deduction, and induction) as carefully as possible. Peirce maintains that doing so would lead to a state of complete 
information or knowledge, which would relate to the complete development of the community.   
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Overview of the Chapters   
In Chapter One, I reexamine Peirce’s case against Cartesian individualism, and defend the case 
from his critics who claim that he fails to understand Descartes. I support the claim that we 
currently lack an appreciation of the reasons that Peirce argues from when he makes this case, 
and that is due to not seeing the case through the lens of Peirce’s communal inferentialism. 
Surprisingly, there is greater common ground between Peirce and Descartes than we tend to 
notice, even if their approaches to our epistemic goals diverge. Overall, I aim to provide an 
adequate response to Peirce’s critics and have us see that Peirce’s communal inferentialism 
uncovers the reasons he argues from in his case against Cartesian individualism. 
In Chapter Two, I take up Peirce’s case against the nominalist’s view of knowledge, and 
respond to an account of that view from Forster’s Peirce and the Threat of Nominalism (2011). 
The nominalist assumes that the set of concrete individual things exhausts reality, and that reality 
is the extra-mental source or origin of our sensations. Forster rightly claims that Peirce targets 
the nominalist’s view of knowledge, which holds that the individual must reconstruct knowledge 
using private sensations. However, given such a basis, the nominalist’s view appears to lead to 
skepticism about the external world. The slide into such skepticism is, according to Forster, the 
problem with the nominalist’s view of knowledge. In response to Forster, I show that, according 
to Peirce, there seems to be another option open to the nominalist: to hold that the mind can non-
inferentially mirror concrete individual things. This option reflects what Peirce says is the 
nominalist’s conception of the mind. I go on to apply Peirce’s communal inferentialism to 
underscore the argument that Peirce makes to close off this option too. Overall, I hold that a 
communal inferentialist reading of Peirce’s case against the nominalist’s view of knowledge 
reveals that the case is even stronger than it at first appears. 
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In Chapter Three, I develop a communal inferentialist reading of Peirce’s influential 
essay, “The Fixation of Belief,” and will focus on a central problem in that essay, which is how 
to fix belief not merely in the individual but also in the community, however much the 
community may develop. I provide evidence to show that Peirce is once again wrestling with the 
general problem of epistemic individualism and attempting to expose what is wrong with it. 
However, the reading I offer must grapple with a set of longstanding interpretive difficulties over 
Peirce’s theory of inquiry as he lays it out in “The Fixation of Belief.” I argue that a communal 
inferentialist reading resolves these difficulties. To test the adequacy of my reading, I further 
compare it to an interpretation that Thomas Short puts forth in “Peirce on the Aim of Inquiry: 
Another Reading of the ‘Fixation’” (2000).   
 In Chapter Four, I offer an interpretation of Peirce’s view of truth as public. My aim is to 
show that Peirce means for his view of truth to expose the serious faults of epistemic 
individualism. Currently, there is not much scholarship on Peirce’s view of truth as public. 
However, using Peirce’s communal inferentialism, I show why Peirce maintains that truth cannot 
be private and why it must be public. I conclude the chapter with a treatment of Peirce’s 
pragmatism and his effort to clarify the meaning of our concept of truth. 
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1 CHAPTER ONE 
Peirce’s Case against Cartesian Individualism 
 
But thus to make single individuals absolute judges of truth is most pernicious (“Some 
Consequences of Four Incapacities,” 1868). 
 
It is widely held that Peirce’s case against Cartesian individualism is the prime example of his 
critique of epistemic individualism, though the case is controversial, as several scholars argue 
that Peirce misreads Descartes in ways that reduce the force of his case.14 Robert Meyers (1967) 
and Susan Haack (1983), for example, claim that Peirce fails to understand the purpose of 
Descartes’ method of doubt, the main instrument that Descartes claims allows the individual 
properly to search for absolute certainty.15 However, as Douglas Anderson (2006) warns, in 
opposing Peirce to Descartes in such a stark way, we risk failing to see that, “Peirce saw himself 
as standing in an intellectual tradition with Descartes, as sharing the same problems, interests, 
and concerns” (Anderson, 2006: 154). Situating Peirce’s critical reaction to Descartes, then, 
requires one to strike a careful balance: to stress the conflict between these philosophers, but not 
to the point that doing so fails to explore and explain what they have in common. 
The aim of this chapter is to reexamine and defend the case that Peirce makes against 
Cartesian individualism.16 I rely on Peirce’s communal inferentialism as the critical lens to 
uncover the reasons that support his case. I will take three steps in this reinvestigation and 
defense. First, taking Anderson’s insight as my cue, I will begin with an account of two 
                                               
14 Murphey, 1961: 101-102; Bernstein, 1964: 165; Gallie, 1966: 74; Scheffler, 1974: 53; Anderson, 1995: 105; 
Anderson, 2006: 157; Forster, 2011: 238-240. Consider the following passage from Cottingham: “The first thing to 
strike the reader about Descartes’ method of philosophizing is its highly individualistic stance. The meditator, alone 
by the fireside, attempts to rid himself of the prejudices of the past, and reflects on his own nature and existence” 
(Cottingham, 1984: 38). 
15 In Descartes’s Method of Doubt, Broughton maintains that Descartes’ search for absolute certainty or for the 
truths of first philosophy (i.e., metaphysical or primary truths) reflects the central motivation for why Descartes 
devises and employs the method of doubt (see: Broughton, 2002: 7; see: CSM I: 125).   
16 In case it is unclear, Cartesian individualism is a specific form of epistemic individualism. It holds that the 
individual is the locus of knowledge, and it relies on the presumptions and argumentative strategies of Cartesianism 
to support that view.   
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epistemic goals that Peirce and Descartes have in common: (1) to free us from our prejudices and 
(2) to put us in the position of optimal epistemic judges. Second, I will reply to Meyers and 
Haack by arguing that Peirce is closely tracking Descartes’ commitments. I will maintain that, 
for Peirce, Cartesian individualism is at the root of the problem, and that Descartes’ method of 
doubt cannot help the individual to achieve goals (1) and (2). Third, I will show that, far from 
denying that these are worthy epistemic goals, Peirce sees his communal inferentialism as 
opening the way towards them. 
1.1 Two Epistemic Goals in Common 
Douglas Anderson argues (2006) that, because of a restrictive focus on their differences, it often 
eludes notice that Peirce and Descartes have “a background of shared interests” (Anderson, 
2006: 154). Anderson warns that by concentrating so much on points of contrast we are likely to 
overlook the common philosophical ground between Peirce and Descartes. While Anderson does 
not mention the two epistemic goals that I will focus on – namely, the aim to free us from our 
prejudices and the aim to become optimal epistemic judges – the account that I offer is in line 
with his general approach. I now turn to the strongest evidence for the claim that Peirce is 
challenging Descartes’ attempts to accomplish these two goals.  
1.1.1 Prejudices and Judges 
One of Peirce’s central tasks in the Cognition Series is to expose the faults of what he refers to as 
the spirit of Cartesianism.17 He takes most philosophers of the early modern period – and even 
many of his contemporaries – to be in the grip of its influence and assumptions. Many of the 
                                               
17 Peirce does not say why he refers to it as the spirit of Cartesianism. The likely explanation is that he is drawing 
the familiar distinction between the spirit and letter of a doctrine or set of teachings. Below, for example, items three 
and four seem to reflect the direction of Descartes’ thinking, but they do not conform to the letter of his writings. 
Notice that items one and two closely relate to the letter of Descartes’ doctrines. Peirce even refers to them as 
Descartes’ teachings. Fortunately, my reinvestigation and defense of Peirce’s case concerns items one and two 
below, making it a more straightforward case than it would be otherwise.    
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assumptions reinforce the idea that the individual is the locus of knowledge, and the two that 
stand out relate to the epistemic goals concerning prejudices and judges.   
Peirce introduces the spirit of Cartesianism in “Some Consequences of Four 
Incapacities,” the second article of the Cognition Series, as follows: 
1. It teaches that philosophy must begin with universal doubt; whereas scholasticism had 
never questioned fundamentals. 
2. It teaches that the ultimate test of certainty is to be found in the individual consciousness; 
whereas scholasticism had rested on the testimony of the sages and of the Catholic 
Church. 
3. The multiform argumentation of the middle ages is replaced by a single thread of 
inference depending often upon inconspicuous premises. 
4. Scholasticism had its mysteries of faith, but undertook to explain all created things. But 
there are many facts which Cartesianism not only does not explain, but renders absolutely 
inexplicable, unless to say that ‘God makes them so’ is to be regarded as an explanation 
(W2: 211-212). 
  
Items three and four are not germane to the present purposes, so I will set them aside and will 
instead focus on items one and two; I will further ignore the rift that Peirce notes between 
scholasticism and the spirit of Cartesianism.18  
 In his critical assessment of the spirit of Cartesianism, Peirce makes the following pair of 
statements, which are his direct responses to items one and two above: 
(a) We cannot begin with complete doubt. We must begin with the prejudices which we 
actually have when we enter upon the study of philosophy (added emphasis; W2: 212).  
(b) The Cartesian criterion [of truth or certainty] amounts to this: ‘Whatever I am clearly 
convinced of, is true.’ If I were really convinced, I should have done with reasoning, and 
                                               
18 While writing the Cognition Series, Peirce was conducting a series of studies on various topics in scholasticism, 
and the one that he concentrated on was the problem of universals. I intend to set that topic aside in this chapter, 
though I will treat it briefly in Chapter Two. For the moment, it is worth noting that Peirce’s articles in the Cognition 
Series tend to mimic the scholastic style of disputation in the form of posing the contested question and presenting 
reasons for-and-against the question along with relevant objections and replies. Peirce believes that this style has the 
advantage of making sure to beg no questions (in the sense of presuming an answer to a contested question and 
pretending that an opponent would grant it unearned). Hence, he regards the scholastic style as making the key 
premises more conspicuous from the outset. This advantage relates to the third item of the spirit of Cartesianism. 
See: “Questions concerning Certain Faculties Claimed for Man” (1868) for an example of Peirce’s adoption and 
adaptation of such a style of argumentation.      
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should require no test of certainty. But thus to make single individuals absolute judges of 
truth is most pernicious (added emphasis; W2: 212).19 
 
These responses, (a) and (b), reflect Peirce’s challenge to Descartes’ attempt to do the following: 
first, to use complete doubt to liberate the mind from its prejudices, and second, to make the 
individual an absolute or optimal epistemic judge. 
 Critics of Peirce tend to focus on Descartes’ masterpiece Meditations on First Philosophy 
– and I shall outline some central themes of that work below – but some of Descartes’ other 
writings, including his Principles of Philosophy, provide a clearer statement of his aim to free the 
mind of its prejudices. Taking into consideration what Descartes says about his effort to rid the 
mind of prejudices will be useful, since critics dispute Peirce’s interpretation of Descartes. 
1.1.2 Reinvestigation: Descartes on Prejudices 
At the beginning of Principles of Philosophy, Descartes underscores the need to free the mind 
from its prejudices to know the truth. Such an emphasis appears in the first principle of that book 
as follows: 
The seeker after truth must, once in the course of his life, doubt everything, as far as 
possible. Since we began life as infants, and made various judgements concerning the 
things that can be perceived by the senses before we had the full use of our reason, there 
are many preconceived opinions [praejudicia] that keep us from knowledge of the truth. 
It seems that the only way of freeing ourselves from these opinions is to make the effort, 
once in the course of our life, to doubt everything which we find to contain even the 
smallest suspicion of uncertainty (original emphasis; CSM I: 193).  
 
In CSM, the editors often translate the Latin praejudicia into “preconceived opinions,” though 
some English translations of Descartes’ writings use “prejudices.”20 To sort out these matters of 
                                               
19 These two statements capture Peirce’s core responses to items one and two. However, I have extracted the 
statements from the longer responses that Peirce gives to each item. I will take up his responses in greater depth in 
sections two and three of this chapter. For now, though, these statements suffice to provide us with a grasp of why 
Peirce rejects items one and two of the spirit of Cartesianism, especially as they relate to the goals concerning 
prejudices and judges, the focal points of this section.     
20 In the following entry on “Prejudice” from their historical dictionary on Cartesianism, Ariew et al. explain the 
nature of such prejudices: “The primary target of Cartesian doubt and revision is our praejudicia or preconceived 
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terminology and gain a clearer sense of what Descartes means by prejudices, consider the 
following dictionary entry by Patterson: 
Prejudices (Latin praejudicia, French préjugés; usually translated as “preconceived 
opinions” in CSM) are opinions that we accept not because we have clearly perceived 
that they are true but as a result of earlier judgments we have made…a prejudice is an 
opinion that is accepted without sufficient reason, but not everything accepted without 
sufficient reason is a prejudice. The first time I assent to something I do not clearly 
understand, the opinion I form is not a prejudice, but it becomes one if I continue to 
affirm it simply because I did so in the past (Patterson, 2016: 604). 
 
While the English term prejudices may apply to judgements we make before being in a position 
to judge, as we can tell from this entry, Descartes maintains that the prejudices relate to the 
opinions one continues to assent to despite failing to have sufficient reason for them. According 
to Descartes, “right from infancy the mind was swamped with a thousand such preconceived 
opinions,” including opinions such as “the Earth is immobile” or “the sun is no larger than it 
appears,” but also ordinary beliefs such as “fire burns” or “I have eyes” (CSM I: 219).  
In “Some Consequences of Four Incapacities,” Peirce never cites the evidence that 
supports his response to Descartes’ commitment to having to begin philosophical inquiry with 
the task of expelling the mind’s prejudices. However, since I am reinvestigating Peirce’s case – 
and shall proceed to defend it – I must consider some of the evidence that supports it. There are 
two things to note from the outset. First, Peirce regards Descartes’ goal to liberate the mind as 
part of Cartesian individualism, since the individual is supposed to carry out the task of reaching 
this goal. Peirce insists that the task is not one that an individual can fulfil, in large part because 
of the nature of the prejudices and the inability of the individual to produce the real doubts 
                                               
opinions. At the outset of the Meditations, the meditator notes ‘how many false things, in my early years, I took for 
true.’ Certain opinions are acquired by the soul almost as soon as it is joined with the body…those tenacious beliefs 
can be relinquished, even when recognized to be false, only by strenuous effort. It is for that reason, among others, 
that Descartes recommends in the Meditations that the meditator should persist obstinately in doubting his former 
opinions, and impress upon himself the truths he has learned” (Ariew, Des Chene, Jesseph, Schmaltz, and Verbeek, 
2003: 210-211).  
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needed to remove such prejudices. According to Peirce, it takes a communal effort to unfix or 
uproot such prejudices. Second, Descartes is connecting the goal of freeing the mind from its 
prejudices to the further goal of putting the individual in the position to be an optimal epistemic 
judge. The further goal is for the individual to be able to discover a firm and lasting foundation 
for knowledge. In Descartes’ project, the individual is to begin philosophical inquiry with the 
truths of first philosophy (i.e., metaphysical or primary truths); that is, truths that are absolutely 
certain and indubitable. There is a tight conceptual link between these two epistemic goals: the 
individual cannot be an optimal epistemic judge, according to Descartes, until the individual 
expels the prejudices. Let us now consider the evidence from Descartes’ writings that supports 
Peirce’s choice to fix his attention on Descartes’ goal to free the mind from prejudices.  
 In the “First Meditation” on “What can be called into doubt,” Descartes says that he is 
“struck by the large number of falsehoods that I had accepted as true in my childhood,” and he 
forms a plan to guard against assenting to them anymore (CSM II: 12). “For the purpose of 
rejecting all my opinions,” he says, he will withhold judgement from anything that is the least bit 
doubtful. To execute this stringent policy of withholding judgement, he explores a variety of 
doubt-possibilities, including whether he is dreaming or whether an all-powerful evil-demon is 
tricking him (CSM II: 13-15). He subjects his prejudices to one wave of doubt after another, with 
the aim of demolishing them to discover what is beyond all possible doubt. In the Discourse on 
the Method, Descartes provides a statement of what he took himself to have done in the “First 
Meditation.” There, he writes, “I was not copying the sceptics, who doubt only for the sake of 
doubting and pretend to be always undecided; on the contrary, my whole aim was to reach 
certainty – to cast aside the loose earth and sand so as to come upon rock or clay (CSM I: 125).  
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While in the “First Meditation” Descartes is not altogether explicit that the nature of his 
task is to expel all his prejudices, he is clear about that aim in his reflective remarks on the 
Meditations. In a thought-provoking exchange from the “Objections and Replies,” the French 
philosopher and priest Pierre Gassendi (1592-1655) questions Descartes about his task in the 
“First Meditation.” Gassendi writes,  
I approve of your project of freeing your mind from all preconceived opinions 
[praejudicia]. There is just one point I am not clear about, namely why you did not make 
a simple and brief statement to the effect that you were regarding your previous 
knowledge as uncertain so that you could later single out what you found to be true. Why 
instead did you consider everything as false, which seems more like adopting a new 
prejudice than relinquishing an old one? (CSM II: 180). 
 
To be clear about what motivates Gassendi’s question, he takes Descartes’ particular way of 
pursuing this task to be circuitous and liable to have readers fall into the severe error of lending 
credence to the possibility that God could be deceptive. According to Gassendi, a more direct, 
less dangerous route is to face these prejudices by more simply confessing the weakness and 
fallibility of the human mind. For the present purposes, I am not seeking to address the multiple 
aspects of Gassendi’s objections. Rather, I mean to underscore the following: that Descartes, in 
general, agrees with Gassendi about what the task is in the “First Meditation.” However, 
Descartes firmly maintains that it takes an immense effort to free the mind from prejudices. He 
strongly disagrees with Gassendi’s suggestion that such an effort ends up creating a new 
prejudice. In response, Descartes holds that, “a philosopher would not have said that ‘considering 
everything as false is more like adopting a new prejudice than relinquishing an old one’” (CSM 
II: 242). In his reply to Gassendi, Descartes writes, 
You say that you approve of my project for freeing my mind from preconceived opinions; 
and indeed no one can pretend that such a project should not be approved of. But you 
would have preferred me to have carried it out by making a ‘simple and brief statement’ – 
that is, only in a perfunctory fashion. Is it really so easy to free ourselves from all the 
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errors which we have soaked up since our infancy? Can we really be too careful in 
carrying out a project which everyone agrees should be performed? (CSM II: 241-242).   
Descartes considers the aim of removing praejudicia to be a valuable project and a necessary 
preliminary to seeking true judgement. I want now to turn to the evidence of the second goal 
concerning epistemic judges.  
1.1.3 Reinvestigation: Descartes on Epistemic Judges 
Peirce’s argument against why the individual can be an absolute epistemic judge traces to his 
denial that we have any cognitive powers that would let us “rightly to judge,” as Peirce says, 
which of our thoughts could be “ultimate premises” (W2: 193).21 Such premises would have to 
be ones that no further reasoning or inference could overturn or unfix. Without such a power, the 
key Cartesian claim loses its force. That is, the claim that the individual is the locus of 
knowledge rests on the assumption that the mind can know which thoughts are true or absolutely 
certain. Without such a power, there can be no way reasonably to insist on an indubitable 
foundation for our beliefs. In Peirce’s eyes, if the Cartesian claim about the mind turns out to be 
spurious, then the rest of the Cartesian apparatus collapses along with it. However, before I 
describe Peirce’s argument in further detail, we need to know more about what Descartes says 
about epistemic judges. To proceed with this examination, I will now spell out the relationship 
that Descartes sees between the mind and true judgements. The matter is one of the most 
significant in Descartes’ work, for Descartes insists that, “the most absurd and grotesque mistake 
that a philosopher can make is to want to make judgements which do not correspond with his 
perceptions” (CSM II: 273).  
                                               
21 Peirce tends to refer to what he regards as Descartes’ claim that the individual could be an absolute epistemic 
judge. While Peirce does not say so, it is likely that he uses the word “absolute” to indicate that Descartes is seeking 
absolute certainty – at least to the degree possible for humans. After all, in Descartes’ view, God is an absolute judge 
– the most eminent judge and eminent being. Considering as much, I prefer to the terms optimal judge or best judge. 
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 It helps to recall that the full title of Descartes’ masterpiece is Meditations on First 
Philosophy.22 Following tradition, by first philosophy, Descartes is referring to the need to begin 
philosophy with metaphysical truths or considerations (Mautner, 2005: 46).23 According to 
Descartes, in the search for a “firm and lasting” foundation for knowledge, we need to be able to 
recognize such truths and see how our beliefs (if they are true or warranted) trace to the root 
truths (CSM II: 17). Written in the style of a personal philosophical journey, Descartes’ 
Meditations depicts the thinker’s turn towards the mind and away from the past along with the 
unreliable world of sensation. Descartes supposes that a philosophical purge will let the 
individual return to what belongs to the mind alone: its rational nature and innate ideas.24 Unlike 
in the Meditations, Descartes’ Principles of Philosophy contains a straightforward statement of 
his project of first philosophy. There, he writes, 
The first part of philosophy is metaphysics, which contains the principles of knowledge, 
including the explanation of the principal attributes of God, the non-material nature of 
our souls and all the clear and distinct notions which are in us (CSM I: 186).25  
                                               
22 The subtitle is as follows: “in which are demonstrated the existence of God and the distinction between the human 
soul and the body” (CSM II: 12). The need for demonstrations (roughly, proofs) reflects Descartes’ commitment that 
all knowledge should be modelled on mathematical knowledge (CSM, II: 274). According to Descartes, 
mathematics discloses the way in which philosophers ought to order and analyze their thinking in seeking to make 
discoveries. In Rules for the Direction of the Mind, a posthumous publication (probably written in 1628), Descartes 
says that he develops his philosophy on the model of mathematics and on the insight of the original meaning of 
“mathematics” (relating to mathesis, i.e., learning or discipline) and how there is a mathesis universalis that applies 
to every subject (CSM I: 19). That subject that applies to every subject is, according to Descartes, mathematics. This 
explains Descartes’ assumption that all branches of knowledge can be unified – perhaps akin to the metaphor of the 
tree of philosophy – though knowledge must start with the kind that begins with the roots, with first philosophy or 
metaphysics. Descartes applies the mathematician’s eye and sense of order to his search for the truths of 
metaphysics. Somewhat bombastically, Peirce remarks that, “The demonstrations of the metaphysicians are all 
moonshine” (CP 1.71). Peirce is explicit that we must begin philosophy and learning with hypotheses (i.e., abductive 
inference) instead of imaging that we can start with metaphysical truths and their demonstrations.  
23 According to Aristotle, first philosophy is the study of “being qua being,” where that means being per se, as 
opposed to particular beings (e.g., Socrates or Bucephalus) who are in certain conditions or states (see: Rosenkrantz 
and Hoffman on “Being,” 2011: 53). 
24 For a brief account of how Descartes’ masterpiece owes its name to “the via purgativa of the meditational 
tradition” (especially in Catholic theology), see: Hill, 2012: 8. For an account of Descartes’ doctrine of innate ideas 
and our rational nature, see: Cottingham, 1986: 144-149. 
25 Nowadays it is typical to treat Descartes as having made his most significant philosophical contributions to 
epistemology, the study of knowledge. That may be so, but we need to recall that he is looking to know the truths of 
metaphysics. With some plausibility, then, Peirce writes, “Descartes is the father of modern metaphysics, and you 
know it was he who introduced the term ‘philosophic doubt,’ he, first, declaring that a man should begin every 
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Descartes further pictures philosophy as follows: “Philosophy is like a tree. The roots are 
metaphysics, the trunk is physics, and the branches emerging from the trunk are all the other 
sciences…” (CSM I: 186). Notice the plural: the roots of metaphysics. In the more technical 
passage just prior to this one (quoted above), Descartes maintains that there are root truths about 
the mind, God, and the principles of knowledge. In the Meditations, after doubting as much as he 
can, Descartes arrives at his most famous truth or realization: that whenever he thinks about or 
doubts the proposition “I am, I exist,” he must be something. This is a variant of the so-called 
cogito – or cogito ergo sum, “I think, therefore, I am.” He asks us to do the same, and to see that 
God must exist, since the idea of God, an idea of a perfect and most powerful being (and 
arguably a perfect idea, innately put there by God), is one that we could not generate. While I am 
not going to recount or assess the details of Descartes’ entire undertaking, I mean to have us see 
the fundamental assumptions he makes and the way he views the structure of knowledge. The 
last line of the previous passage concerning clear and distinct notions or perceptions reveals the 
way in which Descartes believes he can know these root truths (some, or all, of which must be 
innate, according to Descartes).26 Relying on an ocular metaphor, Descartes holds that the mind 
is capable of seeing “the knowledge of the truth through its first causes” (CSM I: 181). 
                                               
investigation entirely without doubt” (W1: 103). The passage is from a very early – when Peirce was just twenty-
four – oration titled, “The Place of Our Age in the History of Civilization” (1863). Notice that, in the passage, Peirce 
is targeting Descartes’ preliminary to the task of discovering the truths of first philosophy. Peirce sees, as Ariew et 
al. (2003) point out, that the primary function of Cartesian doubt is to eliminate (at least the influence of) our 
praejudicia.     
26 Descartes writes, “I call a perception ‘clear’ when it is present and accessible to the attentive mind – just as we say 
that we see something clearly when it is present to the eye’s gaze and stimulates it with a sufficient degree of 
strength and accessibility. I call a perception ‘distinct’ if, as well as being clear, it is so sharply separated from all 
other perceptions that it contains within itself only what is clear” (CSM I: 207-208). For Peirce’s criticisms of 
Descartes’ doctrine of clear and distinct perceptions, see “How to Make Our Ideas Clear,” especially: W3: 257-261. 
Though rarely noted, Peirce criticizes Descartes’ doctrine and the adoption of it by the Port-Royal logicians in an 
earlier article, “Upon Logical Comprehension and Extension.” See: W2: 271-272.  
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 What I further want to point out is that Descartes, relying on the assumption that the mind 
can see what is true or most certain, aims to put us in the position then to judge what is true. 
Descartes is seeking to have us be in the optimal or best position that we, as thinking things, can 
be in to see the truths so clearly that the mind cannot help but assent to them. Until we apprehend 
the truths of the mind, as ideas of things pertaining to first philosophy, Descartes is unwilling to 
relinquish his policy of withholding judgement. Briefly, the reason for that is that Descartes 
maintains that the source of error is a failure to tie the will to the intellect, where the will tends 
wildly to judge what it does not know to be true (CSM I: 207; CSM II: 37-38). According to 
Descartes, it is irresponsible of the meditator to assent to propositions that could be mistaken. 
That is, the thinker is doing something wrong by failing to suspend judgement in matters where 
the mind cannot tell what is true. However, the case is different when the mind or intellect uses 
all its powers or faculties so that the mind is completely convinced. Accordingly, thinking stops 
where there is such conviction, for even the optimal or best judge must believe in that case. In a 
summary that Descartes makes to help his critics see what his project aims at, Descartes writes,  
As soon as we think that we correctly perceive something, we are spontaneously 
convinced that it is true. Now if this conviction is so firm that it is impossible for us ever 
to have any reason for doubting what we are convinced of, then there are no further 
questions for us to ask: we have everything that we could reasonably want (added 
emphasis; CSM II: 103).  
Such conviction is the truest form of intellectual freedom, according to Descartes; and he 
reassures his readers that there is no worry about the will being unfree because it is forced to 
believe what the intellect perceives to be true, since the intellect or mind is our real nature (see: 
CSM II: 36). 
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1.1.4 Peircean Insights and Critical Evaluation 
Now I will provide a sketch of how Peirce responds, to have a clearer sense of his argumentative 
strategy, which I will return to and unfold in subsequent sections of this chapter. I take Peirce’s 
response to be insightful, as it closely tracks Descartes’ attempt to make the individual an 
optimal epistemic judge. Consider the following reasoning: if the mind or intellect lacks a power 
to see the truth, as Peirce firmly maintains, then there is good reason to reject the additional parts 
of Descartes’ grand project. If the mind lacks such perceptive powers, then we need to be wary 
of the effort to trust judgement of the sort Descartes imagines. That is, in Peirce’s eyes, we have 
to make sure we do not license a philosophy that considers the individual alone as the best 
epistemic judge. Furthermore, let us assume that we lack the special cognitive powers to find an 
unshakeable conviction or ultimate premise. If so, it is dangerous to pretend that we have an 
immovable conviction that could be ultimate, so that no possible further inquiry or reasoning 
could unfix it. Seen in this light, Peirce summarizes Descartes’ purported test for truth or 
certainty as follows: “‘whatever I am clearly convinced of, is true’” (note the parallelism – 
especially regarding “…convinced of” – between Peirce’s criticism and Descartes’ statement) 
(W2: 212).27 According to Peirce, “If I were really convinced, I should have done away with 
reasoning, and should require no test of certainty. But thus to make single individuals absolute 
judges of truth is most pernicious” (added emphasis; W2: 212). We will end up being convinced 
– or stop inquiring or reasoning – because we believe in the certainty that the mind can 
apprehend metaphysical truths a priori (i.e., prior to, or independently of, experience). In the 
                                               
27 In “Charles S. Peirce’s Critique of Cartesianism,” Bernstein maintains that it is somewhat unfair and inaccurate 
for Peirce to say that the Cartesian criterion amounts to the claim that “whatever I am convinced of, is true” 
(Bernstein, 2010: 35). Bernstein does not mention Descartes’ passage from “The Second Set of Replies” concerning 
spontaneous conviction. As I see it, the passage – especially in context – frees Peirce from Bernstein’s charge. I 
furthermore do not think that the apparent parallelism in style and language is a coincidence even if Descartes’ is not 
writing in English.        
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concluding sections of this chapter, I will take up Peirce’s argument against the idea that the 
mind alone can directly apprehend what is so. Among the arcs in the circle of ocular terms that 
Descartes uses to describe epistemic perception, the one that Peirce focuses on is intuition (a 
special term used to refer to a kind of direct cognitive “seeing” or grasping) (see: Gallie, 1966: 
62).  
One last point remains about Peirce’s insight into Descartes’ claim that utter conviction 
stops all further reasoning. Peirce too takes quite seriously the idea that a conviction – whether 
well-founded or not – is the resting place of reasoning and inquiry. We might even say that it is 
the lesson that Peirce takes from Descartes. In Peirce’s “The Fixation of Belief,” this relates to 
Peirce’s central point that, so long as we have a belief, we no longer inquire, reason, or have 
doubts about it. That is, “as soon a firm belief is reached we are entirely satisfied” (added 
emphasis; W3: 248). Even in the Cognition Series, Peirce says the following about the 
conviction and sort of judgements that a belief involves. “We can unquestionably distinguish a 
belief from a conception, in most cases, by means of a peculiar feeling of conviction,” and Peirce 
continues, “it is a mere question of words whether we define belief as that judgment which is 
accompanied by this feeling, or as that judgment from which a man will act” (added emphasis; 
W2: 205). Whether we like it or not, whether we may have more inquiring or reasoning to do in 
the future about some given matter, if we have a belief about it, we are convinced. As I see it, 
that is the lesson or insight Peirce takes away from Descartes’ attempt to make the individual an 
absolute epistemic judge. Lacking any special powers of the mind, the individual is convinced of 
the beliefs that the individual happens to have – and put into practice, that activity becomes most 
pernicious. 
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To reinforce the summary I am providing, consider the following evidence. In “How to 
Make Our Ideas Clear,” Peirce tracks the development of Descartes’ doctrine of clear and 
distinct ideas. There, Peirce considers how Leibniz attempts to improve on Descartes’ doctrine. 
The details do not matter as much as what Peirce says Leibniz did not see: “He thus missed the 
most essential point of the Cartesian philosophy, which is, that to accept propositions which 
seem perfectly evident to us is a thing which, whether it be logical or illogical, we cannot help 
doing” (added emphasis; W3: 259). That is, if an individual is convinced, then reasoning and 
thinking stops there, according to Peirce. He is explicit about this point in “The Fixation of 
Belief” in 1877, though it appears that Peirce grasps “the most essential point of the Cartesian 
philosophy” even in the Cognition Series in 1868. In less than a year after publishing the 
Cognition Series, in an unpublished manuscript, Peirce contends that, “the Cartesian method of 
philosophizing is to begin with a state of philosophic doubt and requires us to lay aside all our 
beliefs [i.e., Cartesian praejudicia] and begin the whole process of inference anew” (W2: 356). 
Peirce continues by pointing out that it is “impossible to have an unaffected doubt that fire 
burns” when we are already convinced by it (W2: 356; CP 5.498; CP 7.325).28 That is, according 
to Peirce, we cannot help but consider it “perfectly evident” that fire burns. As I understand 
Peirce, he views Descartes’ project to be the following: Descartes insists that we must expel the 
praejudicia of the mind to see what is true and start from a solid foundation. But many Cartesian 
praejudicia tend to be immoveable convictions (e.g., fire burns flesh). They remain despite what 
                                               
28 The additional references are to the same case of fire burns. In his later writings from 1905, Peirce argues that 
there are many beliefs that are indubitable, as he says, where he means beyond actual doubt. Peirce views 
indubitable beliefs and acritical inferences (i.e., products of reasoning that tend to be below our level of awareness) 
to form the repository of our common sense. Nonetheless, Peirce holds that there may be an opportunity at some 
time to challenge them. We want to subject some of them to logical scrutiny, especially to filter out prejudices. 
Hence, Peirce refers to his doctrine as his critical common-sensism (CP 5.438). It takes the lessons from “The 
Fixation of Belief” most seriously. It concedes to Thomas Reid and Sir William Hamilton among others of their ilk 
that we do need to begin with common sense. But it remains a critical view, since it does not concede that common 
sense is the obvious measure of human reasoning and knowledge. That would be the end of inference or inquiry.  
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we want, even if it is the truth; and hence, according to Peirce, we must begin with Cartesian 
praejudicia or our prejudices (that is, with the beliefs or convictions that we actually have when 
we begin philosophical inquiry). 
In the next section, I take up Descartes’ method of doubt, and there are two reasons to do 
so. First, critics claim that Peirce misunderstands that method. Second, according to Descartes, 
the method is supposed to allow the individual successfully to achieve the two goals of freeing us 
from our prejudices and putting us in the position of optimal epistemic judges.  
1.1.5 Descartes’ Method of Doubt: Its Three Functions 
In Descartes and the Doubting Mind (2012), James Hill notes that Descartes’ method of doubt is 
supposed to perform at least three functions. Reflecting the order that Descartes introduces them 
in his “Synopsis” of the Meditations, Hill reports the following:  
[Descartes] says that the method is designed to free us from our ‘preconceived opinions’ 
[praejudicia]; he says that the method of doubt is ‘the easiest route by which the mind 
may be led away from the senses’; and he also says that the doubts will ‘make it 
impossible for us to have any further doubts about what we subsequently discover to be 
true’ (Hill, 2012: 43).  
 
Relying on Hill’s summary, the following is a convenient list of the three functions that 
Descartes’ takes his method of doubt to perform: 
(1) Free the mind from its prejudices [praejudicia] 
(2) Withdraw the mind from the senses 
(3) Allow the mind to discover what is beyond all possible doubt.  
 
Given that there are these several functions, without having such a list in view, there is the risk of 
confusing or overlooking some of the functions. While Hill does not say so, I gather that he 
considers the list exhaustive, and that is how I regard the list also, though the response I offer to 
Peirce’s critics will remain adequate, even if it turns out that there are further functions. 
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In Descartes and the Doubting Mind, Hill focuses on function (2), as he considers it an 
indispensable undertaking, “…a sine qua non for the grounding of [Descartes’] new 
philosophical system” (Hill, 2012: 44). According to Hill, at the beginning of the Meditations, 
Descartes is seeking for the meditator to break from “the thrall of an empiricist mindset,” where 
that mindset is immature and pre-critical (Hill, 2012: 44). It reflects how the meditator’s mind is 
rife with praejudicia, in which the meditator continues to judge as true the beliefs that stem from 
the senses and imagination – beliefs that are open to possible doubt. According to Hill, such a 
mindset is passive, and Descartes is seeking to have us see that, “The doubting mind is a judging 
mind” (Hill, 2012: 53). According to Hill, the doubting and judging mind is intellectually active. 
 Now I do not intend to dispute Hill’s thesis that the primary function of Descartes’ 
method of doubt is to withdraw the mind from the senses.29 Rather, the more modest point I wish 
to have us appreciate is an uncontroversial one: Descartes’ method is to perform at least the 
above three functions. In his “Synopsis” of the Meditations, Descartes stresses functions (1) and 
(2): “Although the usefulness of such extensive doubt is not apparent at first sight, its greatest 
benefit lies in freeing us from all our preconceived opinions, and providing the easiest route by 
which the mind may be led away from the senses” (CSM II: 9).30 With this in view, I will now 
examine and take a stance on the controversy. 
1.2 The Controversy: Did Peirce Misread Descartes? 
Both Robert Meyers (1967) and Susan Haack (1983) argue that Peirce misreads Descartes, and 
their ground for the charge is that Peirce fails to grasp the purpose of Descartes’ method of 
                                               
29 Some scholars of Descartes, including Ariew et al. (2003), claim that the primary function of Cartesian doubt is to 
free the mind from its praejudicia. After all, Descartes uses his method of doubt in the “First Meditation” to set him 
up to seek a firm and lasting foundation in the “Second Meditation.” 
30 Instead of continually using the term praejudicia, in what follows, when I comment on Descartes’ position, I will 
often simply use prejudices. 
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doubt. In “Peirce and Cartesian Doubt,” Meyers asserts that, “Peirce misunderstands Descartes’ 
method of doubt and the nature of his inquiry” (Meyers, 1967: 22). Similarly, in “Descartes, 
Peirce, and the Cognitive Community,” Haack argues that, “Descartes’ aim [is] to discover, 
which, if any, of the things he believes is certain” (Haack, 1983: 244). Haack goes on to claim 
that, “Peirce has no really plausible objection to Descartes’ method,” and that, “he misrepresents 
what the method is” (Haack, 1983: 250).  
While Haack and Meyers are right that it is sometimes difficult to sort out the details of 
the Peirce-Descartes dialectic, I maintain that their views fail establish that Peirce misreads 
Descartes. I will maintain that Peirce focuses on Descartes’ attempt to free the mind from its 
prejudices, the first function of that method. For convenience, I shall refer to the first function as 
the Cartesian preliminary (the preliminary to the task of first philosophy). However, Meyers and 
Haack focus on the third function, Descartes’ attempt to push possible doubt to its limit and 
make us absolute epistemic judges. I hold that their views labor under a confusion or 
misapprehension: Meyers and Haack take Peirce to be making an argument against the method’s 
third function, while Peirce argues against the first function, the Cartesian preliminary.    
 The following passage from “Some Consequences of Four Incapacities” is at the heart of 
the controversy: 
We cannot begin with complete doubt. We must begin with all the prejudices which we 
actually have when we enter upon the study of philosophy. These prejudices are not to be 
dispelled by a maxim, for they are things which it does not occur to us can be questioned. 
Hence this initial scepticism will be a mere self-deception, and not real doubt; and no one 
who follows the Cartesian method will ever be satisfied until he has formally recovered 
all those beliefs which in form he has given up. It is, therefore, as useless a preliminary as 
going to the North Pole would be in order to get to Constantinople by coming down 
regularly upon a meridian. A person may, it is true, in the course of his studies, find a 
reason to doubt what he began by believing but in that case he doubts because he has a 
positive reason for it, and not on account of the Cartesian maxim. Let us not pretend to 
doubt in philosophy what we do not doubt in our hearts (original emphasis; W2: 212).   
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Though it is a contested passage, I hold that the following reading is correct: Peirce is targeting 
the first function of Descartes’ method of doubt to remove prejudices. I take Peirce’s reference to 
the preliminary and its uselessness to be to what I am calling the Cartesian preliminary. This 
reading integrates the further parts of the passage, revealing a high degree of cohesion. Peirce 
argues that the preliminary is useless or a mere formalism since he takes Descartes’ method of 
doubt to stall in its attempt to carry out its first function. The prejudices include convictions such 
as that fire burns or that I have eyes. In the next section, I will unfold the crucial parts of my 
reading further, for we need to ask the following: why does Peirce stress the word can in the 
above passage? The reading I support is comprehensive enough to explain that part too. 
Although he does not mention the first function of Descartes’ method of doubt, James 
Broyles, in “Charles S. Peirce and the Concept of Indubitable Belief” (1965), expresses 
puzzlement over what Peirce is arguing in the previous passage. Broyles finds the above passage 
particularly challenging to interpret, given Peirce’s emphasis on the word can, but then Peirce’s 
silence on what he means by that word. On this issue of what Peirce might mean, Broyles writes, 
“It is not clear as to whether Peirce is claiming that it simply does not occur to us to question 
certain beliefs or whether it occurs to us and we then see that they can not be questioned” 
(Broyles, 1965: 80). While there is not enough evidence to sort this out conclusively, given that 
Peirce is tracking Descartes’ attempt to rid the mind of its prejudices, it seems that Peirce is 
denying that we can question them because they remain so convincing (e.g., fire burns). In that 
case, to answer Broyles, we may be aware of such beliefs or convictions, but we find that we are 
unable to question them. Our belief that fire burns perseveres in spite of our wishes or the 
Cartesian need to suspend judgement in it. Now notice that we are, indeed, aware of the belief 
that fire burns. We are conscious of the belief and ready to act on it. If a fire breaks out, we 
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expect that it could destroy people or things we value. This is too obvious to require that I spell it 
out further, but there is a connection that Peirce means for us to see: to continue to have the 
expectation or readiness to act is a clear indication that the conviction persists in us. It means that 
the belief is still there, even if we pretend that we are suspending judgement in it or performing 
the first function of Descartes’ method of doubt. According to Peirce, unless we are able to undo 
the conviction we have that fire burns, we should confess that it is there and not pretend that we 
can doubt it or remove it.  
1.2.1 Meyers’s View 
In “Peirce on Cartesian Doubt,” Meyers relies on two central reasons to support his claim that 
Peirce misreads Descartes. According to Meyers, (a) Peirce and Descartes have distinct 
conceptions of doubt, but Peirce fails to grasp the purpose of Cartesian doubt; and (b) Descartes’ 
preliminary is useful because it aims at indubitable knowledge, not a change of beliefs. Overall, 
Meyers argues that Peirce fundamentally fails to grasp the nature of Descartes’ inquiry. 
Expressed rather brusquely, Meyers concludes that Peirce “misses Descartes’ point” (Meyers, 
1966: 20). In what follows, I will assess the support that Meyers cites for reasons (a) and (b), and 
then I will offer a defense of Peirce, which relies on the above reading of the key passage from 
“Some Consequences of Four Incapacities.” 
1.2.2 Peirce and Descartes on Belief and Doubt 
Consistent with a standard line of interpretation, Meyers holds that Descartes and Peirce have 
distinct conceptions of doubt. The contrast is as follows: Descartes uses what he calls hyperbolic 
or methodological doubt, while Peirce only permits what he calls real or genuine doubt. As is 
well known, in the Meditations, Descartes entertains doubts such as the following: the possibility 
that an all-powerful evil demon might be tricking me about everything that I think I know (CSM 
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II: 15). Descartes employs such doubts methodologically to see where the limit of doubt is, so 
that he can find out what is beyond all possible doubt. However, even though Peirce knows that 
Descartes is aiming to push doubt to its limit, Peirce holds that such doubts are paper doubts or 
pretend doubts (CP 5.514; see: Johanson, 1972). The reason that Peirce makes this claim is that 
he will only count something as a doubt if it has the following effects on us: it must cause “the 
irritation of doubt” (or a feeling of dissatisfaction) and it must tend to unsettle our current beliefs 
or convictions (Meyers, 1966: 14; W3: 247). In Peirce’s estimation, Cartesian doubts have no 
such effects, and so they fail to be real doubts. Now in distinguishing these two effects, Meyers 
points out that they refer to two different conceptions of doubt: the psychological conception and 
the logical conception (Meyers, 1966: 14). Meyers argues that Peirce means to stress the logical 
conception, where doubt tends to destabilize belief and takes the form of erratic activity. To be 
clear, when Peirce discusses the nature of belief, he holds that there is a psychological side to it, 
as a belief is “a calm and satisfactory state” (W3: 247; W2: 205). In addition, there is a practical 
side of belief, since there is a readiness to act, “a habit of action” (W3: 263; W2: 205). The 
practical side relates to what many refer to as Peirce’s dispositional account of belief. In line 
with what Meyers’s calls the logical conception of doubt, he claims that is best to think of doubt 
as “the privation of a habit” (Meyers, 1966: 17). Meyers extracts this label from the following 
passage, which I will quote in full since the context is helpful in tying together the above threads: 
Belief is not a momentary mode of consciousness; it is a habit of mind essentially 
enduring for some time, and mostly (at least) unconscious; and like other habits, it is 
(until it meets with some surprise that begins its dissolution) perfectly self-satisfied. 
Doubt is of an altogether contrary genus. It is not a habit, but the privation of a habit. 
Now a privation of a habit, in order to be anything at all, must be a condition of erratic 
activity that in some way must get superseded by a habit (CP 5.417). 
 
While Meyers casts Peirce’s logical conception of doubt in terms of “the privation of a habit,” he 
suggests that Peirce’s use of privation is obscure. However, in a different context, Peirce 
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compares the relationship between “a habit and its privation” with that of “sight and blindness” 
(CP 2.608). Based on this comparison, I take Peirce to mean that belief is a natural state. Unlike 
belief, doubt is an erratic condition, which we judge we should not be in, as it is something from 
which we are struggling to escape.   
 With Peirce’s logical conception of doubt in mind, Meyers goes on to sketch Peirce’s 
view of knowledge. Meyers rightly sees Peirce’s view of knowledge in terms of communal 
inquiry, and he discusses its relation to the fixation of belief. Since I take up these matters in 
Chapter Three and Chapter Four, I will reserve a fuller treatment of the topic until then. In any 
case, what Meyers means to stress are the following aspects of Peirce’s view of knowledge: “(1) 
belief is a habit of action which may be present even though the individual is not conscious of his 
belief, and (2) man cannot see beyond his beliefs to the facts of reality” (Meyers, 1966: 14). The 
first aspect concerning a habit of action is familiar from the previous discussion about the logical 
conception of doubt. However, Meyers’s assumption that a belief, according to Peirce, could be 
unconscious is controversial. Peirce tends to hold that we must be at least dimly aware of our 
beliefs for them to count as beliefs. Consider that Peirce is willing to admit that a belief can be 
mostly unconscious, but that is not tantamount to admitting that a belief can be altogether 
unconscious. For example, in “Questions concerning Faculties Claimed for Man,” Peirce insists 
that, “the knowledge of belief is essential to its existence” (W2: 205), and in “How to Make Our 
Ideas Clear,” he plainly says, “[belief] is something that we are aware of” (W3: 263). Setting 
aside this issue, the second aspect that Meyers focuses on is surely correct and informative: 
Peirce denies that we can see over our beliefs and tell which of them is true (CP 5.440). Peirce 
maintains that all we have to go on, as a possible indication that they are true, is the fixation that 
would result from their surviving a battery of real doubts. Differently put, if a belief would carry 
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on being a habit of action after being subjected to a series of doubts raised by the community of 
inquirers, then that may suggest that the belief would stand in the long run, though there can be 
no guarantee that it would. At best, according to Peirce, we are seeking “a belief unassailable by 
doubt,” where doubt here refers to what Peirce means by real doubt (CP 5.416). Thus, we are in 
the following condition: “we can never verify beliefs by comparing them to non-mental facts in 
reality” (Meyers, 1966: 15). On that score, I take Meyers’s description of the second aspect to be 
insightful.  
1.2.3 Meyers’s Defense 
While I view Meyers’s exposition to be substantially correct when it comes to Peirce’s view of 
knowledge and Peirce’s logical conception of doubt, I resist Meyers’s effort to press them into 
the service of showing that Peirce fails to grasp both Descartes’ conception of doubt and 
Descartes’ view of the nature of inquiry. To support the charge that Peirce misreads Descartes, 
Meyers relies on the example of taking oneself to be holding a piece of paper. According to 
Descartes, such an everyday belief remains open to possible doubt, considering that the source of 
the belief may rest on a ground that fails to secure it from being conceivably false. For example, 
I may be dreaming that I am holding the paper or an all-powerful evil demon may be tricking me 
into thinking that I am holding it. Meyers maintains that Peirce’s charge that Cartesian doubts are 
pretend is what leads Peirce to fail to see what Descartes is doing. Meyers writes, “According to 
Peirce, Descartes claims the following:  
(1) I doubt that I have a piece of paper in my hands.  
 
What Descartes is claiming, however, is: 
 
(2) It is possible for me to doubt that I have a piece of paper in my hands” (added emphasis; 
Meyers, 1966: 19). 
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Meyers denies that Descartes must actually doubt that there is paper in his hands, since it is only 
the possibility of doubt that concerns Descartes. According to Meyers, Descartes’ project is to 
see what is beyond possible doubt, and so, Meyers maintains that Peirce misses Descartes’ point. 
Now this is where Meyers makes a secondary point to rebut Peirce’s charge that Descartes 
pursues a useless preliminary. Meyers rejects Peirce’s claim that Descartes merely ends up with 
the beliefs with which he began because he did not subject them to real doubt. Rather, Meyers 
claims that Descartes is seeking knowledge, not true beliefs. Meyers further contends that 
Descartes at least takes himself to end up with indubitable awareness, which is, on the surface, 
not a useless pursuit. Meyers maintains the following:  
In short, Descartes’ doubts are about knowledge claims in his sense of ‘know’ and not 
about the truth of belief, whereas Peirce’s criticism rests on the view that Descartes 
claims to be doubting beliefs and not merely knowledge claims. Peirce, in other words, 
misunderstands Descartes (Meyers, 1966: 21). 
 
1.2.4 Assessment of Meyers’s View: Including Descartes’ on Belief 
Based on his account of what Descartes means by possible doubt and what he means by 
knowledge, Meyers concludes that these moves free Descartes from Peirce’s criticisms. Meyers 
does not consider whether there is another way of reading Peirce’s case, and that appears to be 
part of the problem. On the surface, Meyers’s defense of Descartes and the charge against Peirce 
appear plausible, but further scrutiny shows that his examination fails to consider that Peirce is 
targeting Descartes’ attempt to rid us of our prejudices. Even more germane to the adequacy of 
my reply, it requires more than Cartesian or possible doubt to uproot such prejudices; rather, it 
takes real doubt to remove such prejudices or inveterate convictions. While Descartes’ method of 
doubt does have the further aim of gaining indubitable knowledge, Meyers’s account fails to 
consider the initial function of that method, which is where Peirce trains his sights. 
Consequently, I do not challenge Meyers’s account of Descartes’ further aim to discover 
39 
 
indubitable knowledge (the third function of the method of doubt). However, I hold that Meyers 
attacks the wrong target. I deny that Meyers supplies adequate reasons to defend both Descartes’ 
method of doubt and the usefulness of the Cartesian preliminary.31 
 Although Meyers covers much ground in his exposition of the views of both Descartes 
and Peirce, one part that he does not take up is Descartes’ conception of belief; instead, Meyers 
squarely focuses on Descartes’ view of knowledge. Rarely do scholars consider Descartes’ 
remarks about belief from his Meditations. However, they are pertinent to the present purposes, 
since they underscore the difficulty that Descartes encounters in having to deal with prejudices. 
In the “First Meditation,” where Descartes aims to call into doubt everything that he 
possibly can, he notices that his project begins to stall at the point where he attempts to free 
himself from all his prejudices. There, Descartes writes, “My habitual opinions keep coming 
back, and, despite my wishes, they capture my belief, which is as it were bound over to them as a 
result of long occupation and the law of custom” (emphasis added; CSM II: 15). The habitual 
opinions that Descartes mentions bear a resemblance to Peirce’s description of the nature of 
belief as involving a habit of action. However, since Descartes regards them as stubborn 
prejudices that he cannot shake, he depicts himself as a prisoner of them. Descartes further 
remarks that he must take extreme measures if he is to liberate his mind from them; otherwise, he 
says, “…I shall never get out of the habit of confidently assenting to these opinions” (emphasis 
added; CSM II: 15). What is critical to notice is that Descartes concedes that his methodological 
doubts fail to free his mind from these opinions or prejudices (they win his assent in spite of his 
                                               
31 To repeat, Descartes needs to accomplish the first function of his method of doubt, which is to remove our 
praejudicia or completely suspend the judgements that relate to them. Primarily, that is what Peirce is denying that 
we can do. Peirce maintains that we need to begin with the beliefs that we actually have, while Descartes tries to 
clear them away, especially to achieve the philosophical purge, which is the preliminary to his project of first 
philosophy. Meyers is looking at the wrong target: it is not the third function of the method of doubt that we need to 
focus on, but the first. Meyers’s claim that Peirce badly misrepresents Descartes fails to have enough support to 
sustain such a strong charge. 
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seeing that he lacks sufficient reason to accept them). In response to this dire situation, Descartes 
devises the following plan:     
I think it will be a good plan to turn my will in completely the opposite direction and 
deceive myself, by pretending for a time that these former opinions are utterly false and 
imaginary. I shall do this until the weight of preconceived opinion is counter-balanced 
and the distorting influence of habit no longer prevents my judgement from perceiving 
things correctly (added emphasis; CSM II: 15).  
 
Notice that Descartes is not simply claiming that he must shake free of these prejudices to go on 
to set his beliefs on a new foundation; rather, the prejudices tend to interfere with his ability to 
discover the foundation, to perceive things correctly. While Peirce does not cite this passage, it 
appears to support his contention that the Cartesian preliminary to rid us of our prejudices or 
adequately combat their influence is a failure. Seen in this light, it is plausible for Peirce to 
maintain that we must begin with the prejudices that we actually have, since they tend to be so 
convincing. We must begin with our prejudices and then subject them to real doubt. According 
to Peirce, the only plausible way of proceeding is to reject Descartes’ individualistic project; 
instead, we need to turn philosophy into a communal study. In that case, we would enter the 
community of inquirers (or inferential beings) and could raise real doubts in one another to free 
us from our prejudices.  
1.2.5 Haack’s View 
Haack and Meyers reach the same conclusion – that Peirce misreads Descartes – though they 
arrive at it for different reasons. Haack says that, “Peirce’s critique has two themes – that 
Descartes’ method is impossible, and that it is pointless” (Haack, 1983: 238). On the first theme, 
Haack argues that Peirce’s reasons are “thoroughly inconclusive,” and so, she maintains that 
Descartes’ method is at least possible; on the second, Haack claims that his criticisms are “more 
effective” (Haack, 1983: 238). Haack denies Descartes’ claim to indubitable knowledge, so she 
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agrees with Peirce on the second theme that attempting to follow through with Descartes’ 
method of doubt would be pointless. However, it is the first theme that I shall focus on, since 
Haack maintains that “Peirce has really no plausible objection to Descartes’ method [of doubt],” 
and that he “misrepresents what that method is” (Haack, 1983: 250). Consistent with my reply to 
Meyers, I support the claim that Haack’s view too overlooks the first function of Descartes’ 
method of doubt, the attempt to free the mind from its prejudices. However, Haack further 
attends to what Peirce means by “a positive reason to doubt.” And so, the response I provide 
builds on my reply to Meyers by adding some points about what Peirce means by such a reason 
to doubt, for my interpretation of it comes from my defense of Peirce and differs from the 
interpretation that Haack puts forth.  
Haack argues that the following are Peirce’s reasons for disputing Descartes’ method of 
doubt. (A) Peirce believes that Descartes’ method of doubt assumes that we can doubt at will, but 
voluntary doubt is impossible, and so that method must be wrong (Haack, 1983: 244); (B) Peirce 
holds that doubt requires a specific reason, and thus doubt cannot generalize, which means that 
we cannot begin with complete doubt (Haack, 1983: 247). In response, I shall argue that Peirce is 
closely tracking Descartes’ method of doubt’s first function, and that his point is not so much 
that we cannot doubt at will – though he does seem to hold that view – but that Descartes’ 
method fails to uproot our prejudices. Haack’s charge that Peirce misreads Descartes’ method of 
doubt depends on her claim that Descartes indeed ‘actually does begin with the doubts he has.’ 
On that score, as I shall argue, Haack’s account is mistaken; that is, Descartes insists on the 
Cartesian preliminary, the initial step towards the project of first philosophy. 
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1.2.6 Haack’s Evidence: Doubt is not Voluntary 
Turning to the evidence that Haack cites to show that Peirce denies that we can doubt at will, 
Haack begins her account with what she refers to as “the causal origin [of doubt]: doubt is the 
state one is in as a result of an external check to a previously-held belief. This underpins Peirce’s 
claim that doubt is not voluntary” (Haack, 1983: 242). According to Haack, such an origin is not 
within our control, and so, given its involuntary character and its connection to doubt, it follows 
that doubt cannot depend on our will. Haack states that, for Peirce, “doubt consists in the 
interruption of belief by some experience” (Haack, 1983: 243). Haack goes on to distinguish the 
causal account from what she refers to as the logical account of doubt. In classifying these 
aspects of Peirce’s conception of doubt, Haack makes the following statements:   
Doubt is, in part and explicitly, causal: doubt is the state that results from the inhibition 
of belief by some stimulus (Haack, 1983: 243).  
[Doubt is] more covertly, logical; for Peirce seems to take it for granted that the kind of 
experience that will interrupt one’s belief is a falsifying experience, an experience, that is, 
which gives one grounds to believe something incompatible with what one already 
believes (Haack, 1983: 243).32 
In spelling out the less familiar logical element of doubt, Haack points out that a reason to doubt 
what one believes could come from, say, “learning that someone else believes differently” 
(Haack, 1983: 244). Such an example, she claims, provides the believer with grounds to update 
or revise belief. While Haack does not mention it, I consider that the logical element of doubt – 
and in particular, Haack’s own example of that element – helps to clarify what Peirce means by 
having a positive reason to doubt. When it comes to a positive reason to doubt, Haack believes 
that Peirce makes an argument about how doubt is specific and fails to generalize. But as I aim to 
                                               
32 To avoid confusion, notice that what Haack calls the causal element of doubt relates closely to what Meyers refers 
to as the logical conception of doubt. 
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show, the example of “learning that someone else believes differently” and gaining a reason to 
doubt from it supports the communal model of doubt that Peirce seeks to advance. 
In stating her defense of Descartes’ method of doubt, Haack notes that Descartes’ places 
“the greatest possible disvalue” on being in error (Haack, 1983: 245). With the disvalue of error 
in view, Haack goes on to describe Descartes’ method of doubt as follows: “the method is to 
begin with the beliefs one actually holds and submit them to a severe test, retaining only those 
which pass the test” (added emphasis; Haack, 1983: 245). As we can tell, on my reading and 
defense of Peirce, Haack’s account makes a severe mistake here, as the method of doubt’s first 
function is to remove such beliefs or prejudices. I will return to this point below in my 
assessment of Haack’s view. 
 Haack argues that Peirce’s insistence that we cannot doubt at will does not undermine 
Descartes’ method of doubt. According to Haack, Peirce fails to understand Descartes’ sense of 
what it is for something to be ‘dubitable.’ On this matter, Haack says that it is easy to suppose 
that Descartes’ method does assume that doubt is voluntary: “One might suppose that it does, 
since the test of whether it is possible to doubt something would be to try to doubt it” (original 
emphasis; Haack, 1983: 245). But Haack contends that supposing that it does still falls prey to a 
misinterpretation, which she says we can see by attending to the matter of drawing the right 
distinction between two interpretations of ‘dubitable.’  
1.2.7 Haack’s Two Interpretations of Dubitable: The Fundamental Distinction 
At the core of Haack’s defense, there is the following distinction:  
To say that a proposition is dubitable might mean either of two things:  
(a) The descriptive interpretation: that it is psychologically possible that someone should 
actually doubt it. 
(b) The normative interpretation: that it is possible that there should be a reason for 
doubting it (Haack, 1983: 245). 
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Haack maintains that Descartes’ method relies on the normative interpretation. As Haack sees it, 
the normative interpretation captures the disvalue that Descartes places on error. On that 
interpretation, if something is in the least bit doubtful – or it is conceivable that it is false – then 
one should suspend judgement in it. If one objects that the suspension of judgement requires 
voluntary doubt, Haack responds as follows: “[since] it is the causal origin of Peircian doubt 
which entails its involuntary character, one cannot simply extrapolate Peirce’s thesis that doubt is 
involuntary to conclude that suspension of belief is also involuntary” (Haack, 1983: 246). 
Haack’s point is that we should read Descartes on his own terms, where that means according to 
the normative interpretation of dubitable.  
In contrast to the normative interpretation, Haack contends that Peirce takes the 
descriptive interpretation and applies it to Descartes’ method of doubt. According to Haack, 
Peirce insists that Descartes’ method is impossible since it is psychologically impossible to have 
real doubts about many everyday things (e.g., that I have hands, that I have eyes, that fire burns, 
etc.). In Haack’s view, Peirce’s stress on the causal origin of doubt forces him to accept the 
descriptive interpretation of the ‘dubitable,’ and hence, Haack says that Peirce misreads 
Descartes. Haack concludes that, once we draw the above distinction, we can see that Descartes 
holds the normative interpretation, which apparently protects his method from Peirce’s criticisms 
(Haack, 1983: 244-245). 
1.2.8 Assessment of Haack’s View 
I turn now to an appraisal of Haack’s line of defense. Let us begin with Haack’s statement of 
what she asserts is quite puzzling about the Peirce-Descartes dispute. Haack finds the following 
puzzling:  
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So Descartes’ test, dubitability, does not require deliberate doubt. And Descartes, as he 
says, intends to begin with the beliefs he actually has, which is, according to Peirce, the 
only place one can begin; the puzzle is why Peirce should regard this as an objection to 
Descartes. (Haack, 1983: 246).  
Haack says she provides the grounds to exonerate Descartes’ method of doubt and to show that 
the method is at least possible. But the problem is that what she takes Descartes to say is the 
opposite of what he actually said: Descartes’ method’s first function is to free the individual 
from all original beliefs or prejudices. However, Haack’s view takes a significant oversight (that 
relates to the underscored line above). Haack’s view fails to establish the conclusion that she 
draws: that Peirce’s objections to Descartes’ method of doubt are implausible and irrelevant. 
Quite the opposite is true: Peirce challenges whether Descartes can begin philosophy with a 
prejudice-free mind, which is over whether the method of doubt succeeds in performing its first 
function. 
Against Haack’s defense of Descartes’ method of doubt as possible, the first theme she 
takes up, I deny that the focus on voluntary doubt is the correct target. While Peirce does reject 
that we can doubt at will, his chief target is not that point. Rather, he holds that we have 
convictions that tend to resist anything but powerful real doubts. The reason Peirce argues that 
we must begin with our prejudices is that he admits that some of them are convictions or firm 
beliefs. As such, they tend to influence our thinking, behaviour, and actions. Let me use a plain 
example – and the one Peirce keeps returning to – the belief that fire burns. Although it contains 
a bit of vagueness – for, we might ask about just what fire burns – Peirce routinely cites the 
example that fire burns flesh. According to Peirce, the belief reflects our animal instincts and 
sentiments. But, as we have seen, what is most significant to see is that, even if we take ourselves 
to be in doubt, if the expectations and readiness to act in certain ways does not change, then there 
is a strong indication that the conviction remains. For example, if someone tells me that my 
46 
 
house is on fire and I believe them, I am surely going to rush home to try to protect the things I 
value. According to Peirce, the conviction that fire burns is too strong and faces no real doubts, 
so that we continue to have the same expectations, readiness to act, and the same “feeling of 
conviction” (W2: 205). It appears, then, that Descartes’ effort to have us doubt such a conviction 
is bound to be a sham or fraud, which is how Peirce views it. 
 Now Descartes assumes that the individual can succeed in the task of prejudice-
elimination, but Peirce knows that the individual tends to be unable to question convictions. 
While the example of a belief such as fire burns is one we likely have no real doubts about, the 
prejudice that the “the sun is as large as it appears” – a prejudice Descartes mentions – is one that 
we can subject to real doubt. To unsettle the conviction, Peirce relies on a communal process 
(W2: 212; W2: 239). The process aims to correct ignorance, error, and prejudices. In the more 
ordinary sense of the term prejudice, Peirce mentions cases such as biases about “the relation of 
the sexes” along with prejudices in cultural and religious practices (W3: 256). Such practices are 
sure to generate conviction in some, even if they may not be as strong as the conviction that fire 
burns. As Peirce sees it, the way towards the elimination of prejudice and error is through a 
communal process, in which investigators raise real doubts in one another and seek to satisfy 
them (W2: 212). The real doubts can unsettle the conviction on which the prejudice rests, which 
is why Peirce trusts the process. Eventually, if it is a prejudice we are subjecting to real doubt, 
then we could correct it over time.  
Turning now to Haack’s second line of defense, she focuses on what Peirce means by “a 
positive reason to doubt,” and Haack places the emphasis on the specificity of doubt. While 
Haack admits that Peirce is not explicit on what he means by such a reason, the interpretation she 
offers, I maintain, fails to be complete or to track Peirce’s communal commitments in this 
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context. Given the lack of explicit clarity, it is best to return to the passage where Peirce talks 
about such a reason and to look for the clues there. Peirce writes, “A person may, it is true, in the 
course of his studies, find reason to doubt what he began by believing; but in that case he doubts 
because he has a positive reason for it, and not on account of the Cartesian maxim” (added 
emphasis; W2: 212). As I see it, a positive reason to doubt relates to Peirce’s effort to turn 
philosophy into a communal study. In that case, the reasons to doubt come up in that community 
and are not for the individual alone. In support of that angle of interpretation, we should note 
that, a few lines after Peirce mentions a positive reason to doubt, he refers explicitly to “the 
community of philosophers” (original emphasis; W2: 212). In that way, his process of doubt-
resolution is one that folds into his greater project to restructure philosophy; that is, his attempt 
to transform philosophy into a communal discipline. 
Overall, as I have argued, Haack’s view contains the same major flaw that we find in 
Meyers’s account: both overlook how Peirce targets Descartes’ aim to disaccustom the mind 
from its prejudices. Peirce denies that the method of doubt can do that, though it is supposed to 
be the first function of that method, which aims to perform the Cartesian preliminary. I conclude 
that the above defense I have provided frees Peirce from the charge that he misreads Descartes. 
As I have shown, the contrary is true. To overcome some of the prejudices – let alone all of them 
– would require real doubt, not Cartesian doubt. Based on such reasons, Peirce’s objections to 
Descartes’ individualistic method of doubt are not irrelevant or pointless; rather, there are quite 
plausible reasons in favour of his objections. 
1.3 Peirce’s Communal Inferentialism 
In this concluding section of the chapter, I will examine two further parts of Peirce’s case against 
Cartesian individualism before turning to Peirce’s communal inferentialism. The first concerns 
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the Cartesian view of the mind, while the second concerns an intuitive self-consciousness (an 
issue that relates to Descartes’ so-called cogito). I will show that Peirce means for his communal 
inferentialism to open the way towards becoming optimal epistemic judges.  
1.3.1 Challenging the Cartesian view of the Intuitive Mind 
The first task Peirce takes up in “Questions concerning Certain Faculties Claimed for Man,” the 
first article of the Cognition Series, is to challenge a broadly Cartesian view of the mind that he 
claims most early modern thinkers suppose. The reason to qualify the view as “broadly 
Cartesian” is that Peirce holds that most philosophers of the time, including Descartes’ rivals, 
accept this general picture of the mind. The most significant feature of the view is that, if it were 
true, the individual would have a special faculty by which to judge rightly those cognitions that 
would count as instances of infallible and non-inferential knowledge. That is, crucially, if the 
individual had such a faculty rightly to judge such thoughts, then the individual could be an 
optimal epistemic judge. In other words, the individual could be the locus of knowledge and 
epistemic individualism would be true. Given this relation to the theme of this chapter, the bulk 
of this section will focus on this issue concerning the mind and Peirce’s argument against it.  
 In “Questions concerning Certain Faculties Claimed for Man,” Peirce opens the article as 
follows: 
QUESTION 1. Whether by the simple contemplation of cognition, independently of any 
previous knowledge and without reasoning from signs, we are enabled rightly to judge 
whether that cognition has been determined by a previous cognition or whether it refers 
immediately to its object (W2: 193).   
 
Peirce poses the question in quite a compressed way, but the core of it is whether the mind could 
have direct epistemic access to know which of our cognitions count as instances of immediate 
knowledge. Peirce uses the term intuition to refer to a cognition that would not depend on any 
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other cognition and would relate to its object immediately (Murphey, 1961: 106-107).33 The term 
intuition relates to a purported sense of direct seeing (in the cognitive sense) (Scheffler, 1974: 
45). Accordingly, Peirce offers the following definition: “the term intuition will be taken as 
signifying a cognition not determined by a previous cognition” (W2: 193). The status of an 
intuition is akin to a “premise not itself a conclusion” (W2: 193; Goudge, 1950: 14; Skagestad, 
1981: 23).  
One point that requires attention is that an intuition is, according to Peirce, supposed to 
be a non-inferential cognition (Prendergast, 1977: 281). That is, a non-inferential cognition could 
not rest on any reasoning or be determined by any previous cognitions. In that case, an intuition 
is supposed to provide immediate access to what is true, bypassing any reasoning process. While 
that is how to characterize what an intuition is, according to Peirce, he is asking the more 
fundamental question: do we have a mind capable of having an intuition? In another form of 
Descartes’ idiom, Peirce can rephrase the question to ask whether the mind contains a cognitive 
power to have intuitions (or clear and distinct perceptions).  
1.3.2 The Argument from Disagreement: Against an Intuitive Power 
Against the claim that we have an intuitive cognitive power, Peirce makes the following 
argument, which I now reconstruct and refer to as his argument from disagreement. 
1. If the mind has an intuitive power to tell which cognitions count as intuitions, then we 
should not disagree about which cognitions are intuitions  
2. We often disagree about which cognitions are intuitions  
3. Therefore, it is quite probable that the mind lacks such an intuitive power (W2: 194-
195).  
 
                                               
33 It is noteworthy that Peirce traces the origin of the term intuition in philosophy, claiming that the first to use it – 
more specifically, the word intuitus – was by St. Anselm in his Monologium. Turning to its use in the scholastic 
period, Peirce refers to Duns Scotus’ doctrine of intuitive cognition, where “no intuitive cognition was allowed to be 
determined by a previous cognition” (W2: 193).  
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Peirce does not take this argument to establish its conclusion with deductive certainty. Rather, he 
sees the argument as providing quite strong probabilistic evidence that we lack such an intuitive 
power. We need to keep in mind, though, that Peirce uses the argument to target those early 
modern thinkers such as Descartes who assume that looking to one’s own mind or internal 
authority was the way to settle questions. As Peirce put it, “the power of intuitively 
distinguishing intuitions from other cognitions has not prevented men from disputing very 
warmly as to which cognitions are intuitive” (W2: 194). Peirce further draws a historical 
connection: “In the middle ages, reason and authority were regarded as two coordinate sources of 
knowledge, just as reason and the authority of intuition are now” (W2: 194). These sources are, 
in embryonic form, “the method of authority” and “the method of a priority” that Peirce 
discusses in “The Fixation of Belief” (methods I describe in further detail in Chapter Three). 
 Peirce denies that we are able to begin philosophy with prejudice-free minds and that we 
must begin with intuitions. If the mind were able to recognize such intuitions, we should expect 
more agreement about what counts as an intuition. But the case of the clash between the sources 
of internal and external authority challenge the assumption of there being an intuitive power. 
Furthermore, since careful and serious thinkers disagree about what counts as absolutely certain 
or intuitive, there is plenty of evidence against the assumption that we have such a power. 
Overall, if Peirce’s argument stands – and I take there to be plausible reasons in support of it – 
then the internal authority that could make the individual the locus of knowledge is unwarranted. 
The Cartesian rationale to put the individual in that position rests on the idea that the individual’s 
mind contains intuitive faculties. However, before concluding his case against Cartesian 
individualism too hastily, Peirce anticipates the Cartesian reply that our concept of the self must 
be intuitive.  
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1.3.3 No Intuitive Self-Consciousness 
Based on the above denial that we have an intuitive cognitive power, Peirce questions whether 
“an intuitive faculty of self-consciousness is the most probable cause which can be supposed” 
(W2: 201). Peirce does not mention Descartes’ cogito in this context, though many scholars see 
Peirce as challenging the status of the cogito here (Haack, 1983: 251; Skagestad, 1981: 20). That 
is, by disputing that there is intuitive self-consciousness, Peirce’s response is to the claim that 
self-consciousness is something that we cannot be mistaken about and must be intuitive. Peirce 
maintains that, “self-consciousness may easily be the result of inference” (W2: 204). But what is 
the argument he relies on to establish such a claim? To support his view that even self-
consciousness could come from inference, Peirce provides a miniature theory of the development 
of self-consciousness. As he sees it, the self emerges through a recognition of error, by a 
mistaken inference, and not the recognition of the self by an intuitive cognitive power. 
 The key to Peirce’s account is that the origin of self-consciousness comes from making 
an error, from a discrepancy or surprise in our experience. In having such an experience, the 
fallible or personal self emerges. Borrowing from Kant, Peirce considers the development of the 
self in young children who only begin using the word “I” at a later stage of their development. 
He mentions the case of a hot stove or a lit candle. The child’s parents may warn that the stove or 
candle are capable of burning the child, but the child may ignore its parents and want the world 
to be just the way that matches up with its desires and wants. When the child burns itself, the 
child then recognizes that there must be a source of the ignorance or error, so that there is here 
the dawning of self-consciousness. According to Peirce, the upshot of this account is that there is 
no need to assume that there is an intuitive self-consciousness. Since the account explains the 
facts without that assumption, it provides a plausible or adequate way to see how the 
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development of the self could be the result of inference (that there must be a private self that is 
the source of error or ignorance). Accordingly, there is no reason to assume that we have an 
intuitive cognitive power in this case.34 
1.3.4 The Communal and Inferential Process 
Peirce clears the way for his communal inferentialism by denying that there is an intuitive power 
by which to gain non-inferential knowledge and an intuitive self-consciousness. Absent these 
powers, the question becomes one of how to make intellectual progress. Connecting the above 
points, Peirce is maintaining that we must begin with the convictions that we actually hold, but 
we also need to start philosophy with an account of the inferential and communal process. In 
short, Peirce insists that we begin with our convictions and with the patterns of correct inference, 
which he says we have no real doubts about once we appreciate what the patterns are (W2: 242). 
Let us now investigate the relevant patterns of inference and consider the role that Peirce sees the 
community as having. 
 In “Some Consequences of Four Incapacities,” Peirce claims that, “all knowledge of the 
internal world is derived from hypothetical reasoning” (W2: 213). In making this claim, Peirce is 
challenging the Cartesian views about introspection, intuitive cognition, and the private, “internal 
world” of the individual thinker (W2: 205). According to Peirce, these are not the conditions we 
in are when we enter inquiry, and he regards them as the products of the false view of epistemic 
individualism. Turning to his positive proposal, Peirce insists on the following: 
The class of modifications of consciousness with which we must commence our inquiry 
must be one whose existence is indubitable, and whose laws are best known…We must 
begin, then, with a process of cognition, and with that process whose laws are best 
understood and most closely follow external facts. This is no other than the process of 
correct inference, which proceeds from its premise, A, to its conclusion, B, only if, as a 
                                               
34 For an account of Peirce’s view of the self, see Vincent Colapietro’s (1989) Peirce’s Approach to the Self. 
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matter of fact, such a proposition as B is always or usually true when such a proposition 
as A is true (W2: 214).  
 
In this pivotal passage, by indubitable, Peirce is not referring to the Cartesian sense of the term 
(i.e., something that is beyond all possible doubt, including hyperbolic doubts). Rather, he means 
the condition where we are free from real doubt.35 With respect to his inferentialism, Peirce 
maintains that, “every judgement results from inference” (W2: 242) and that, “Every exercise of 
the mind consists in inference” (W2: 242). Such claims are part of Peirce’s massive effort to 
“reduce all mental action to the formula of correct reasoning” (W2: 214). Setting aside that part 
of his project, the reductionist side of it, it is his view that, since the mind is fundamentally 
inferential, to make progress, we need to follow an inferential process.36 As he sees it, our best 
judgements would be the ones that would result from carrying out the process. Accordingly, that 
is Peirce’s way of putting us in the position of optimal epistemic judges. 
 As for the patterns of correct inference, Peirce classifies them in two ways.37 On the one 
hand, there is necessary inference (in the form of deduction), and on the other, there is 
probabilistic inference (in the form of induction and abduction). During the 1860s, in outlining 
what he refers to as the logic of science, Peirce casts these patterns in the form of Aristotelian 
syllogisms.38 Peirce spells out these patterns of inference as follows:   
                                               
35 According to Peirce, a real doubt is one that tends to produce a sense of nervousness or irritation and one that 
tends to unfix the habit of action or conduct that a belief involves. As Peirce sees it, a methodological or hyperbolic 
doubt is unlike a real doubt in those respects. Ordinarily, Peirce refers to such a doubt as a counterfeit paper doubt or 
a Cartesian doubt. 
36 For accounts of Peirce’s larger project to reduce all mental activity to the patterns of correct inference, see: 
Murphey, 1961; and Hookway, 1985: 30-32.   
37 The following reconstruction of Peirce’s view of the logic of science reflects the presentation of it in the entry by 
Burch in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy on “Peirce” along with the presentation of it by Bellucci and 
Pietarinen in the Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy on “Peirce’s Logic.” 
38 The reason that Peirce casts these patterns in the form of Aristotelian syllogisms when he spells out the logic of 
science deserves some comment. First, we need to remember that Peirce is writing not long after Kant had 
concluded that Aristotle had completed logic and that the logician’s work would be to refine Aristotelian logic 
(Murphey, 1961: 55-94). Second, Peirce did not make pioneering contributions to quantificational logic until around 
1885, though he did appreciate the logic of relatives in the early 1870s and there did not limit his attention to 
syllogistic logic. It was Kant’s claim that all correct inferences could reduce to Barbara that Peirce meant to correct. 
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Figure I 
Deduction: 
 
S is M 
M is P 
S is P 
 
Figure I moves from a major premise (S is M) to its minor premise (M is P) to its conclusion (S 
is P). A deductive inference, according to Peirce, involves necessary reasoning, so that, when the 
premises are so related to conclusion, as they are in Figure 1, the conclusion follows from the 
premises (CP 1.65). According to Peirce, “Deduction is the only necessary reasoning” (CP 
5.145). That is, its reasoning is conclusive, not probabilistic.  
Peirce spells out two patterns of probabilistic inference that are inversions of Figure I 
(see: W2: 30-31; W2: 215; W3: 326). These patterns are the following: 
Figure II  
Abduction:  
 
S is M  
P is M  
S is P 
 
And,  
Figure III  
Induction:  
 
M is S  
M is P  
S is P  
 
                                               
Barbara is a syllogism that entirely consists of universal affirmative categorical propositions, so that it takes the 
form of AAA. For example, All Greeks are Mortal; All Athenians are Greeks; therefore, All Athenians are Mortal. 
When he articulates the logic of science, Peirce is also responding to Kant’s claim about this attempt at reduction, 
but Peirce is still under the assumption that he must think of the proposition in terms of the subject and predicate 
(and has not fully realized the import of the logic of relatives). A fuller book-length treatment of this matter appears 
in Murphey’s The Development of Peirce’s Philosophy. Murphey provides us with a chronological account of how 
Peirce’s philosophical system(s) develops in light of his logical advancements. I intend for this footnote to help the 
reader to know some of the relevant historical context and have a sense of the philosophical ideas that led Peirce 
initially to classify the logic of science using Aristotelian syllogisms. A comprehensive treatment of these matters is 
beyond the scope of this section and this project.         
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Figure II and Figure III do not provide conclusive support for the conclusion, so they are not 
logically (deductively) valid in the contemporary sense of the term.  
An example can help to grasp the above figures. Relying on his Rule, Case, and Result 
way of organizing inferential patterns, Peirce characterizes the above patterns as follows: 
(i) Deduction:  
Rule   all the beans from this bag are red 
Case   these beans are from this bag 
Result   these beans are red 
 
(ii) Induction: 
Case  these beans are from this bag 
Result  these beans are red   
Rule  (probably) all the beans from this bag are red  
 
(iii) Abduction (or Hypothesis): 
Rule  all the beans from this bag are red 
Result  these beans are red 
Case  (probably) these beans are from this bag 
 
Burks provides a helpful statement of the two probabilistic types of inference: “induction is an 
inference from a sample to a whole, while abduction is an inference from a body of data to an 
explaining hypothesis” (Burks, 1946: 301). In short, abduction aims to explain by putting forth a 
hypothesis or conjecture, while induction takes the form of a sampling inference that seeks to 
represent a real ratio (e.g., things having a particular quality such as these beans are red).   
 In Peirce’s later writings, he outlines the logic of science in terms of stages of inquiry 
(EP2: 441; Anderson, 1995: 49; Forster, 2011: 133). The first stage is abduction, the second is 
deduction, and the third is induction (CP 8.209). Abduction relies on a conjecture that aims to 
account for something surprising or an anomaly. Based on the conjecture or hypothesis, we then 
deduce predictions or consequences. After having the predictions in place, we can then test them 
with the sampling process of induction (CP 7.672). As Peirce put it, “Abduction commits us to 
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nothing. It merely causes a hypothesis to be set down upon our docket of cases to be tried” (CP 
5.602). It is worth pointing out that contemporary philosophers tend to use the term abduction to 
mean “inference to the best explanation” (see: Misak, 2013: 48). For Peirce, though, an 
abduction begins with a conjecture or hypothesis. As we gain more information, our abductions 
can become better and more explanatory (W2: 209). Abduction begins with hypotheses, 
especially as opposed to intuitions, as defined above. 
I indicated above that the stages of inquiry in the logic of science are to move us closer to 
being optimal epistemic judges. To illustrate these stages, consider the following example of 
malaria (from mala aria, which literally means bad air).39 Before I use this example, I must say 
that I am not assuming here that we are starting from scratch, so to speak, with no beliefs already 
formed or no inferences already made; rather, the purpose of this example is to show the 
movement from one stage to next, and how the process is supposed to work.40 Imagine we are 
living in a time and in a society where we do not know much about disease or what the cause of 
malaria is. But further imagine that we are the proto-epidemiologists of our society who need to 
figure out what the cause is. After considering some cases, we conjecture that the air around 
stagnant water is the source. From there, we then deduce that the stagnant water, in general, is 
the cause. Warnings go out for people to stay away from such waters so that they do not contract 
the “bad-air” disease (where that air is around bodies of stagnant water). However, we mean for 
our deductions to serve as predictions for further inductive tests. To perform the induction, we 
                                               
39 While I am imagining this example and taking some liberties in filling in the details (especially to illustrate the 
stages of the logic of science used in the process of scientific discovery), the example likely reflects, to some extent, 
how we discovered the real cause of malaria. Malaria is, of course, a mosquito-borne disease rather than caused by 
the foul air around stagnant bodies of water. 
40 Peirce admits that, when we begin to reason explicitly, it is quite likely that we have already arrived at various 
beliefs, including ones as primitive as fire burns or as general and indefinite as there is something outside the mind 
that impinges on us. In this example of malaria, I am not assuming that we begin in a state where we have no beliefs 
and then begin to gain them through the stages of inquiry. 
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intend to take a wide range of samples to figure out whether the ponds, tarns, or bogs in the area 
are the source of the epidemic.41 Eventually, we notice that there is a connection between 
stagnant water with mosquitos in it and outbreaks of malaria. Given our previous thinking, we 
now encounter a further surprise about the mosquitos, not the bad air, being the cause. In this 
way, we engage in the inferential process in the form of these stages of inquiry again, but this 
time with the hypothesis that the mosquitos are the source of the outbreak. 
Such an illustration captures the process that Peirce relies on to make intellectual 
progress, but what to notice now is that the process cannot be one for the individual alone. In 
aiming to make as many empirical discoveries as we could, there are too many hypotheses to 
make, predictions to deduce, and samples to take. If there is a chance of success, Peirce argues, 
the inferential process needs to be communal. On this matter concerning the communal and 
inferential process, Peirce writes, “at any moment we are in possession of certain information, 
that is, of cognitions which have been logically derived by induction and hypothesis” from other 
cognitions (W2: 238). By continuing with the inferential process, Peirce maintains that, in the 
long run, “The cognitions which thus reach us by this infinite series of inductions and 
hypotheses…are of two kinds, the true and the untrue…” (W2: 239). On that ground, he further 
states that, “at a time sufficiently future, the community will always continue to reaffirm…” 
judgements that would be true (W2: 239). But the judgements would be “dependent on the future 
thought of the community” (W2: 241). Accordingly, Peirce’s communal inferentialism is the 
way he maintains that we could become optimal epistemic judges (W2: 241).  
                                               
41 Again, if I were to assume that we are starting from scratch here, without beliefs and without having made 
previous inferences, then it would appear that I have smuggled in a series of inductions and other inferences when it 
comes to testing these particular things. But I make no such assumption in this example, and I have explicitly 
canceled out that assumption in previous footnotes. I would like to thank Dave DeVidi for prompting me to think 
about this example further. However, if there remain faults or infelicities with this example, I take full responsibility 
for them. 
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1.4 Conclusion 
In this chapter, I reinvestigated and defended Peirce’s case against Cartesian individualism, 
which is what scholars consider the prime example of epistemic individualism. In the first 
section, I reexamined Descartes’ aims concerning prejudices and epistemic judges, using the 
textual evidence from his work and the accounts from scholars of Descartes. The need to do that 
was to make sure to carry out a fair and accurate reexamination. In the second section, relying on 
the material and conclusions from that reinvestigation, I defended Peirce from his critics who 
assert that he misrepresented Descartes and failed to understand the purpose of the method of 
doubt. By showing that Peirce is contesting the first function of the method of doubt, I rebutted 
their charge. In the third section, I considered how Peirce opens the way toward our epistemic 
goals by relying on his communal inferentialism. According to Peirce, such a model exposes the 
flaws of Cartesian individualism and restores a viable path towards our central epistemic aims. 
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2 CHAPTER TWO 
Peirce’s Case against the Nominalist’s View of Knowledge 
 
The gist of all the nominalist’s arguments will be found to relate to a res extra animam 
(original emphasis; “Fraser’s the Works of George Berkeley,” 1871).42 
 
In the previous chapter, I reexamined and defended Peirce’s case against Cartesian 
individualism. There, using Peirce’s communal inferentialism, I replied to the severe charge that 
Peirce misread Descartes. I argued that Peirce’s communal inferentialism provides the 
explanatory framework in which to appreciate the set of plausible reasons that supports Peirce’s 
case. One entry point into the present chapter is to return to the issue of whether the individual 
can be the locus of knowledge, and to concentrate on whether the individual’s mind can gain 
non-inferential knowledge. The question about the nature of the mind and whether the mind can 
gain such knowledge crops up again, but this time in a different context. As I pointed out in the 
previous chapter, Peirce rejects Descartes’ assumption that the individual must look inward, 
having to rely on the mind alone as the primary source of knowledge. According to Descartes, 
the individual must seek a foundation for knowledge in the form of a rational intuition (i.e., a 
cognition that is non-inferential and known with absolute certainty).43 As I showed, Peirce denies 
                                               
42 W2: 471. A res extra animam translates as a thing external to the mind. In this context, it is a thing-in-itself, an 
incognizable reality, as Peirce refers to it. 
43 That Descartes’ appeal to rational intuition is what Peirce is contesting appears in numerous accounts in the 
literature (see: Buchler, 1955: ix; Scheffler, 1974: 44-45; Skagestad, 1981: 23; Haack, 1983: 251; Anderson, 2006: 
155). Recall that in Chapter One I took up the issue concerning whether there are rational intuitions and whether the 
mind is equipped to know whether there are any. For Descartes, rational intuitions are what he is seeking as the 
truths of first philosophy, as what form the foundation for knowledge. Peirce quite firmly denies that the mind has a 
special faculty by which to identify an intuition. If we had such a faculty, there should be much less disagreement 
about fundamental issues. However, there is much disagreement over them, which then casts strong doubt on 
whether there is such a faculty. I laid out the argument in some detail at the end of Chapter One. There, I made it 
clear that the assumption that the mind has such a faculty might lure some thinkers to endorse Cartesian 
individualism. However, relying on Peirce’s work, I showed that there are strong reasons to doubt that there is such 
a faculty, and hence there are strong reasons to challenge Cartesian individualism along these lines. In the context of 
Chapter One, the upshot is that the individual could not be in the position of an optimal epistemic judge.   
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that the mind can recognize such an intuition, and so, against Descartes, he maintains that the 
individual cannot be an optimal epistemic judge or the locus of knowledge. 
In this chapter, I will investigate Peirce’s case against the nominalist’s view of knowledge, 
and will give special attention to Peirce’s reasons for rejecting the nominalist’s assumption that 
the individual’s mind can mirror (i.e., non-inferentially picture) things in the world.44 While 
Peirce’s case against the nominalist’s view of knowledge is complex, I shall propose a way of 
capturing the core argument that Peirce makes against it. Essentially, as I see it, Peirce is forcing 
the nominalist to face what I shall refer to as the dilemma of epistemic individualism. When it 
comes to the possibility of gaining knowledge of things in the world, the dilemma consists in the 
following alternatives: either the nominalist assumes that the individual’s mind can mirror 
concrete individual things, or the nominalist must concede skepticism. The first horn is a false 
view of the mind, while the second is a position fatal to any attempt to gain knowledge. In three 
sections, I will spell out Peirce’s case against the nominalist’s view of knowledge along with the 
                                               
44 There are limitations to the scope and theme of this chapter, considering that Peirce traces the threat of 
nominalism to all aspects of philosophy and even to aspects of everyday life (see: Forster, 2011). In response, then, I 
can only briefly touch on what nominalism is, according to Peirce. Primarily, he regards it as a position in the 
scholastic debate over the reality of universals or generals. In the Century Dictionary, Peirce provides the following 
entry: “Nominalism: The doctrine that nothing is general but names; more specifically, the doctrine that common 
nouns, as man, horse, represent in their generality nothing in the real things, but are mere conveniences for speaking 
of many things at once, or at most necessities of human thought; individualism” (EP1: xxiv). To be clear, in this 
dictionary entry, individualism refers to the nominalist’s commitment that only concrete individual things are real. A 
universal or general is supposed to be an entity or being that could be predicated of and instantiated by more than 
one particular thing. For example, this bowling ball and this marble seem to have a common property of roundness. 
In this case, roundness is supposed to be a universal, since both things are said to partake in it. We can ask, then, 
whether roundness is real. There are two things to say about this. First, for Peirce, the predicate roundness is going 
to operate as a sign, perhaps even as a symbol, so that it is of the nature of a word or sign. It is not something that 
exists independently of round things (the misconception is due to a failure to know what the scholastic debate was 
about, and then to use the sort of strawman positions that opponents make out of scholastic realism). Second, Peirce 
thinks that the answer depends on being clear about what we mean by real and having a sense of what the mind 
must be like. As I shall explain in the chapter, by real, Peirce at least means what is independent of what anyone in 
particular thinks. In Peirce’s later writings, he defends the view that there are real laws or real types (CP 1.16). What 
makes such entities general is that no number of concrete individual things or instances could account for what they 
are. Consider a natural law such as gravity. For it to be such a law, it cannot depend on any finite number of 
instances of things obeying it. Rather, if it did have that sort of dependence, it would not be a law or be general. (For 
accounts of Peirce’s reaction to the medieval debate over universals, see: Boler, 1963; Mayorga: 2007).  
61 
 
dilemma just mentioned. First, following Forster (2011), I will present an account of the 
nominalist’s view of knowledge. Second, I will take up the problem concerning skepticism about 
things in the external world. Third, I will examine what Peirce regards as the nominalist’s 
conception of the mind and why Peirce insists that this conception is false. 
2.1 The Nominalist’s View of Knowledge: Building on Forster’s Reading  
In Peirce and the Threat of Nominalism (2011), Paul Forster tracks Peirce’s case against 
nominalism over a broad range of issues that relate to ethics, mathematics, psychology, and 
religion, among other areas of study. One particular area that Forster focuses on is the 
nominalist’s view of knowledge and Peirce’s rejection of that view. Forster begins his account of 
the nominalist’s view of knowledge with what he refers to as “the essence of nominalism,” 
which involves a central ontological claim (a claim about what there is). According to Forster, 
the essence of nominalism is as follows: “Nominalists hold that reality comprises individuals” 
(Forster, 2011: 4). It is this ontological claim that shapes the nominalist’s view of knowledge. As 
Forster points out, nominalists maintain that all entities reduce to one type: to concrete individual 
things. That is, to put it simply, nominalists recognize only particular things as real, so that there 
is only this cat, that rock, this tree, that computer, and so on – along with the particular qualities 
or properties of each thing. Accordingly, nominalists deny that there are universals or generals, 
where a universal or general is supposed to be an entity or being that more than one thing can 
partake in or instantiate. For such general entities, there is no way to refer to them as this thing or 
that thing because they are not particular or individual things. The essence of nominalism, then, 
excludes generals or universals from an account of what there is.  
Even at this early stage of the account, we can see why Forster takes the essence of 
nominalism to constrain the nominalist’s view of knowledge in a rather straightforward way. To 
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appreciate the connection, it is worth noting the following. Since knowledge in part depends on 
representing what is real, and there are only concrete individual things, according to the 
nominalist, all knowledge must be of concrete individual things. For the nominalist, anything 
else that we claim to know besides such things would amount to an empty claim. These points 
about the nominalist’s ontological commitment further help to clarify the meaning of the term 
nominalism. Consider, for example, a claim that fails to pick out an individual concrete thing. 
Say, I claim that roundness is the common property of this bowling ball and this marble. In 
response, the nominalist will argue that the object of the claim – the roundness of these things – 
is not something in addition to these two things, but is a mere name, nomina (see: Mayorga, 
2007: 1). The nominalist may grant that this ball is round and that this marble is round, but the 
nominalist will likely maintain that each thing has a particular roundness, so that roundness is 
not common to each (see: Rosenkrantz and Hoffman, 2011: 205-206). On such a basis, the 
nominalist will go on to dismiss or explain away claims about the reality of generals or 
universals. Even if everyday language seems to suggest that some things are general or universal, 
the objects of such claims are mere names, according to nominalists, and not real things. To 
reiterate, the central ontological thesis of nominalism is that there are only concrete individual 
things along with the particular properties related to them. Accordingly, nominalists insist that 
positing the existence of anything else besides such things and their properties is superfluous. 
The nominalist seeks to be as frugal as possible in ontology and to admit only what there is. 
After spelling out the nominalist’s ontological commitments in a similar way to how I 
have above, Forster describes the nominalist’s view of knowledge as follows: 
Nominalists typically claim that the individual experiences that provide the foundation of 
knowledge are private. As a result, they view epistemology as charged with the task of 
explaining how representations of reality can be known to be true when knowers can 
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never get outside those representations to compare them with things as they are apart 
from thought (Forster, 2011: 5).     
Forster’s emphasis on the nominalist’s view of knowledge being one that relates to private 
sensations or individual experiences puts the focus in the right place. It underscores how the 
nominalist’s view of knowledge assumes epistemic individualism. At this stage, a point of 
contrast is worth underscoring to avoid confusion. Unlike the proponent of Cartesian 
individualism, the nominalist tends to accept sensory experience as the source of knowledge. The 
proponent of Cartesian individualism must reject sensory experience from playing a fundamental 
epistemic role, since sensation is open to possible doubt and falls short of absolute certainty. 
According to the nominalist’s view of knowledge, the individual must find a way to achieve 
knowledge by using private sensations or by relying on what is supposed to be the mind’s faculty 
of intuition. As I shall aim to show, the point about private sensations raises the problem of 
external world skepticism for the nominalist, while the latter possibility about the mind, on the 
surface, may seem to make the nominalist’s view of knowledge viable. I will argue that the 
nominalist’s view of mind, however, cannot rescue the nominalist’s view of knowledge; rather, 
the failure to rescue that view of knowledge generates the dilemma of epistemic individualism for 
the nominalist. 
While these points about private sensations and the foundation of knowledge capture the 
nominalist’s view of knowledge in broad outline, the case becomes clearer when we appreciate 
the thinkers that are Peirce’s main targets. Peirce’s case against the nominalists includes 
scholastic thinkers such as William of Ockham but also thinkers closer to his own time. In the 
Cognition Series and his review of “Fraser’s Works of George Berkeley” (1871), Peirce argues 
that the British empiricists were the inheritors of scholastic nominalism, and he tends to target 
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these philosophers.45 On this point, Murphey remarks that “the British empiricists...if they were 
not overtly nominalists, yet subscribed to doctrines tending in that direction” (Murphey, 1961: 
107-108). To be clear, the British empiricists that Peirce tends to criticize include Hobbes, 
Locke, Berkeley, and Hume. It is well-known that these thinkers maintain that sensation is the 
primary source of knowledge. In the Cognition Series and his review of “Fraser’s The Works of 
George Berkeley,” Peirce holds that the British empiricists tend to consider our ideas to be 
copies of concrete things in the world. To take a simple example, if I have the idea of a dog, it 
would have to be of a dog with a certain colour, size, shape, and so on. Peirce notes that many of 
the British empiricists take the difference between the content of a sensory experience and the 
idea of it to come down to a difference of vivacity, force, or liveliness. An idea, that is, is 
supposed to be a fainter or more decayed copy of the original experience or sensory impression 
(W2: 232). The idea I have of the dog, that is, is less vivid than the impression I had of the dog 
while I was looking at that animal. These points concerning the British empiricists and their 
views about sensory impressions and ideas are quite familiar. However, Peirce makes the more 
original and provocative claim that the British empiricists subscribe to these views about 
sensations and ideas because they – perhaps unwittingly – make nominalistic assumptions. 
In his review of “Fraser’s The Works of George Berkeley,” Peirce provides evidence to 
show that the British empiricists assume the essence of nominalism, viz., that only concrete 
individual things exist. While I refrain from taking up the historical case that Peirce makes, 
which relies on tracing the influence of William of Ockham and other scholastic nominalists on 
the British Empiricists, there is a plausible case for Peirce’s claim when we consider the 
following problem. For the British empiricists, a troublesome problem is how we can gain 
                                               
45 The reference is to a book review that Peirce wrote of the edition of Berkeley’s works edited by the Scottish 
theologian and philosophers Alexander Campbell Fraser (1819-1914).  
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knowledge of concrete individual things in the world on the basis of our sensory experience. In 
support of his claim, Peirce underscores how the British empiricists maintain that knowledge of 
anything real must be of a concrete individual thing, so that true impressions of such a thing must 
be as definite as the concrete thing itself. Using the simple example above, if I have a true 
impression of this dog, it must capture the characteristics that the dog actually has and must 
represent them as they actually are.  
Returning to the point about private individual experiences, Forster explains several 
points that relate to the nominalist’s attempt to find a foundation for knowledge. Forster writes 
that, “Peirce rejects the view, traditionally held by nominalists, that knowledge claims are 
grounded by what is present immediately in experience…the nominalist thinks the mind is given 
particular experiences – ideas, impressions, or sense data – and these experiences are the source 
of knowledge” (Forster, 2011: 113). How this relates to epistemic individualism is that the 
experiences must be private, since the sense data are private and the senses of individual 
experiencers are separate. Essentially, no two individuals could have the same experiences. 
Forster explains that, “Since no two inquirers are immediately connected to the same sensory 
particulars, nominalists maintain that the data on which knowledge are formulated are private 
and vary from inquirer to inquirer” (Forster, 2011: 158). This is not a solution to the problem of 
knowledge, but rather expresses the problem that the nominalist faces. In general, the privacy of 
these sensations frames the problem of knowledge for the nominalist. 
While I agree with the general way in which Forster describes the nominalist’s view of 
knowledge, I hold that Peirce makes the point about the privacy of sensory experience in an even 
more forceful manner. To support this claim, I will now show that Peirce holds that our 
sensations are radically private. The reason to underscore the sense of radical privacy is that it 
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exposes the deep connection between the nominalist’s view of knowledge and the epistemic 
individualism that underlies it in a lucid way. 
2.1.1 Sensations: Why they are Radically Private 
In the review of “Fraser’s The Works of George Berkley,” Peirce maintains that, “The matter of 
sensation is altogether accidental” (W2: 470). There, Peirce challenges nearly the entire tradition 
of nominalism, though, as I mentioned, he places a special focus on the British empiricists. 
Peirce defines sensation in a particular way: “We shall do well to reserve the word sensation as 
the name for the element introduced into consciousness,” and he further says that sensations are 
“entirely private and peculiar” (added emphasis; W3: 49). Peirce appears to use the words 
observation and sensation to mean the same thing (W3: 57). Observations, says Peirce, introduce 
“the new elements of belief” (W2: 60).46 According to Peirce, sensations or observations are 
private, unique, and non-repeatable. On this matter, Peirce writes, 
…Observations are for every man wholly private and peculiar. And not only can no man 
make another man’s observations, or reproduce them; but he cannot even make at one 
time those observations which he made at another time. They belong to the particular 
situation of the observer, and the particular instant of time (W3: 42-43). 
To provide a simple illustration, Peirce considers the ink-stand on the table, as seen by himself 
and a friend. Each of them observe the ink-stand from different angles, at different times, and 
with different sensory organs, yet they agree that the same object is there. “The fact in which we 
agree that there is an ink-stand there, is what we conclude from the different appearances which 
we each severally observe. We may change places and still we shall fail to get each other’s 
observations; for the difference of time then comes in” (W3: 42). In addition to this simple 
                                               
46 I presume that Peirce would say the same thing about sensations: that they introduce new elements of belief. In 
fairness to Peirce, the statements I have quoted appear in some of the unpublished manuscripts that lead up to “The 
Fixation of Belief.” As he often does, Peirce uses his unpublished writings to explore various ideas. However, when 
it comes to the nature of sensations, the account I am providing is – or is close to – his considered position on the 
matter.  
67 
 
example, Peirce cites a number of cases from the history of astronomy where scientists, having 
made separate observations and with different instruments, yet arrived at the same conclusion – 
say, about the rotation of Earth (W3: 42; W3: 273). In expressing the non-repeatability of 
observations or sensations, Peirce claims that they are sui generis, where this term stands for 
something that is its own or distinct kind (W2: 226; W3: 48). Since such sensations or 
observations are sui generis, according to Peirce, he maintains that there would be no way for the 
nominalist to gain knowledge on their basis. That is, the accidental and radically private 
character of sensations disqualifies them from serving as a foundation for knowledge.  
Although sensations are sui generis and radically private, according to Peirce, we should 
not lose sight of his claim that sensations can contain “precisely the same information” (W2: 
470). Through communal inquiry, Peirce maintains, inquirers can filter out what is accidental 
about sensation and gain information. Peirce illustrates this process of communal inquiry as 
follows: 
Suppose two men, one deaf, the other blind. One hears a man declare he means to kill 
another, hears the report of the pistol, and hears the victim cry; the other sees the murder 
done. Their sensations are affected in the highest degree with their peculiarities. The first 
information that their sensations will give them, their first inferences will be more nearly 
alike, but still different…their final conclusions remotest from sense, will be identical and 
free from the one-sidedness of their idiosyncrasies (W2: 468-469). 
 
In the context in which Peirce offers this illustration, he is regarding communal inquiry as a 
process, and the upshot of it is what he refers to as the final opinion or the conclusion that the 
community would reach after carrying out this process as far as it could go. Sensations or 
observations, according to Peirce, are the cause or origin of our thoughts, but they go through an 
inferential and corrective process, which refines and informs them. According to Peirce, the 
initial thoughts that spring from our sensations are individualistic and private, but they go 
68 
 
through such a process and end up being communal. That is, as Peirce puts it, they are tending 
toward the final opinion (the fixation of belief, as he would later call it).   
So far, I have sketched what Peirce regards as the nominalist’s view of knowledge, 
relying partly on Forster’s account to fill in some of the essential details. I pointed out the 
problem that the nominalist faces in having to appeal to radically private sensations as the means 
to knowledge. According to Peirce, since sensations are sui generis, they cannot provide a 
foundation for knowledge. The nominalist cannot look to communal inquiry for a way around 
this predicament because the nominalist subscribes to epistemic individualism. In the next 
section, I will turn to Peirce’s treatment of the nominalist’s conception of reality, since that 
conception makes it clearer why the nominalist must face the problem of skepticism. After I take 
up this matter, I will examine the nominalist’s conception of the mind and show why it leads to 
the dilemma of epistemic individualism. 
2.1.2 The Nominalist’s Conception of Reality 
Almost invariably, whenever Peirce turns to the topic of reality he contrasts his view with that of 
the nominalist’s conception (see: W2: 165; W2: 239; W2: 467; W3: 271; EP2: 343). In its 
simplest formulation, though there are details to add, the nominalist’s conception holds that 
reality refers to the extra-mental source or origin of sensations. Since we are already familiar 
with the nominalist’s view of knowledge, it makes sense that this conception holds that reality is 
the cause of our sensations, and that reality, according to the nominalist, can be altogether 
outside of our minds.47 This conception assumes the relation between the subject of the 
sensations, on the one hand, and an external reality, on the other. Such a division forces the 
                                               
47 As Peirce sees it, the nominalist’s conception of reality primarily relates to concrete individual things. There is the 
further question of what sort of reality the mind has, according to the nominalist. The question is one that the 
nominalist must eventually face, though it is not a question that I will take up in this exposition of how Peirce views 
the nominalist’s conception of reality. I would like to thank Gerry Callaghan for asking me to consider this matter. 
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nominalist to encounter the problem of there being a gap between the subject and real things – 
arguably, an unbridgeable gap.  
To support the exposition so far, consider Peirce’s description of the nominalist’s 
conception of reality in the following passage: 
Where is the real, the thing independent of how we think it, to be found? There must be 
such a thing, for we find our opinions constrained; there is something, therefore, which 
influences our thoughts, and is not created by them. We have, it is true, nothing 
immediately present to us but thoughts. These thoughts, however, have been caused by 
sensations, and those sensations are constrained by something out of the mind. This thing 
out of the mind, which directly influences sensation, and through sensation thought, 
because it is out of the mind, is independent of how we think it, and is, in short, the real 
(W2: 468).   
In a more picturesque image, Peirce discusses two different standpoints on the question of reality 
in terms of a river. He claims that the nominalist’s conception is akin to the spring or the origin, 
while his view of reality is like the basin, where experience, reasoning, and thinking are heading. 
Using this image, Peirce lays out the nominalist’s conception as follows:  
…The spring, and origin of thought. It is said that all thoughts are ultimately derived 
from sensations; that all conclusions of reasoning are correct only so far as they are true 
to the sensations; that the real cause of sensation therefore, is reality which thought 
presents. Now such a reality, which causes all thought, would seem to be wholly external 
to the mind—at least to the thinking part of the mind, as distinguished from the feeling 
part; for it might be conceived to be, in some way, dependent upon sensations…[this 
was] the motive principle of nominalism…the nominalistic view emphasizes [reality’s] 
externality (W3: 29).   
 
Peirce admits that the nominalist’s conception is attractive, given that there is a strong 
assumption in our everyday thinking that reality is external to the mind. Now in considering its 
allure, I must point out that Peirce is not denying that his view of reality – and I shall sketch the 
view out further to supply the right contrast – makes no commitment to there being an external 
reality. Indeed, Peirce admits that there is an external reality, but he aligns his view with the 
upshot or conclusion of the investigations we make into it. As for the naturalness of the 
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nominalist’s conception, Peirce accounts for it by considering the meaning of the term reality. 
On this matter, Peirce writes, “‘Real’ is a word invented in the thirteenth century to signify 
having Properties, i.e., characters sufficing to identify their subject, and possessing these whether 
they be anywise attributed to it by any single man or group of men, or not” (EP2: 434; see: de 
Waal, 1998). A necessary condition for something being real, according to Peirce and this 
definition, is that it is independent of what you, I, or anyone in particular thinks about it. Clearly, 
extra-mental things that are the causes of our sensations meet this condition. However, even prior 
to this matter of definition, Peirce sees that the concept of reality marks a sharp contrast between 
reality and a fiction or figment of the mind, so that whatever is a fiction – something dependent 
on the imagination of a particular mind – cannot be real. The question for Peirce is whether we 
need to assume a view that relates only to external reality and whether that assumption is 
meaningful. 
To spell out the previous point, the further details matter. For, Peirce goes on to claim 
that the nominalist’s conception of reality is meaningless (W2: 239). To see this, we need to 
consider the following. One assumption the nominalist makes is that reality relates to an 
incognizable thing-in-itself, a concrete individual thing just as it is (W2: 208; W2: 469). Using 
Latin, Peirce sometimes refers to a res extra animam – a thing that transcends the mind. Thus, he 
writes, “the gist of all the nominalist’s arguments will be found to relate to a res extra animam” 
(W2: 471). While the details are even more complex when it comes to Peirce’s charge that the 
nominalist’s conception of reality is incoherent, the simplest way to state it is that to be a concept 
something must be cognizable. By incognizable, Peirce notices that the prefix “in-” is, in this 
context, simply the negation of something possibly relating to a mind (W2: 208). But such a 
negation does not leave open the possibility of being a concept at all. At the risk of sounding 
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flippant, Peirce may bluntly ask what the nominalist could have in mind by a res extra animam 
or thing that exists just as it is. The point is not about something that happens to be out of our 
minds now – or even that happens to be out of all minds. Rather, the nominalist appears to be 
making an empty assumption since whatever it might stand for could not possibly relate to a 
mind. Without going into the particulars, in the following passage, notice the form of 
argumentation that Peirce takes the nominalist to be using: “The word ‘man’ is true of 
something, that which ‘man’ means is real. The nominalist must admit that man is truly 
applicable to something; but he believes that there is beneath this a thing in itself, an 
incognizable reality. His is the metaphysical figment” (W2: 239). In a more straightforward 
statement that makes the same point, Peirce maintains that, “The nominalist, by iso lating his 
reality so entirely from mental influence as he has done, has made it something which the mind 
cannot conceive” (W2: 481). Its inconceivability, according to Peirce, makes it so that the 
nominalist’s view of reality is meaningless. Accordingly, Peirce insists that reality must be 
cognizable. 
However, this last assumption about reality having to be cognizable leads to the 
following puzzle: how can reality be cognizable, on the one hand, but be independent of what 
any particular mind thinks about it, on the other? It seems that a view of reality may be able to 
meet one condition but not the other. This is where Peirce takes his view of reality to prove its 
merits, for he claims that the conclusion or verdict of the community would be independent of 
any particular mind but, crucially, would remain cognizable. The final opinion or conclusion that 
the community would reach, that is, would not transcend the mind; rather, it would be the 
ultimate product of a corrective process. Why that should be concerns the point above about the 
distinction between fiction and reality. According to Peirce, “reality is independent of the 
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individual accidental element of thought,” while “A fiction is something whose character 
depends on what some mind imagines it to be” (W3: 55-56). Thus, Peirce returns to the original 
question concerning the meaning of reality: “what do we mean by the real? It is a conception 
which we must first have had when we discovered that there was an unreal, an illusion; that is, 
when we first corrected ourselves” (W2: 239). Peirce envisages the community of inquirers, one 
generation after another, carrying out the corrective process and filtering out fictions and errors 
in our thought. Anchoring his view of reality in this communal and corrective process, Peirce 
further articulates the meaning of reality: “The real is that which, sooner or later, information and 
reasoning would finally result in, and which is therefore independent of the vagaries of me and 
you. Thus, the very origin of the conception of reality shows that this conception essentially 
involves the notion of a COMMUNITY” (original emphasis; W2: 239). Along with this 
corrective process, we should notice that Peirce mentions the results of all information and 
reasoning, which relates to the final products of the patterns of correct inference (especially 
abduction and induction, which are the two types of reasoning he mentions a few lines before 
making this statement about the very origin of the conception of reality). According to Peirce, 
then, reality must be cognizable, communal, and the upshot of a corrective and inferential 
process. Consequently, a communal inferentialist reading clarifies Peirce’s conception of reality.  
To conclude this section, it is quite unlikely that nominalists trace out the consequences 
of their conception of reality in anything like the detail that Peirce does. There is the further 
question about whether nominalists would accept Peirce’s description of even his general outline 
of their conception of reality. However, I must set that question aside, for it would require 
delving into the history of philosophy in a way that is beyond the scope of this chapter. At this 
stage, the point I mean to underscore is that the nominalist’s view assumes that reality relates to 
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the origin or spring of sensation. But since that origin appears to be extra-mental, the threat of 
skepticism about the external world looms large. One possible assumption that may save the 
nominalist’s view of knowledge is the conception that the mind can mirror the world, but before 
I turn to that conception, I need to explain the threat of skepticism first.  
2.2 Skepticism 
In his account of the nominalist’s view of knowledge and Peirce’s case against it, Forster returns 
to the point about how this view shows that there is a gap between the individual’s sensations, on 
the one hand, and what those sensations are supposed to be of, on the other. According to 
Forster, the nominalist’s view of knowledge, with its attempt to reconstruct knowledge using 
private sensations, results in skepticism in a rather straightforward way: 
Peirce insists that the nominalist account of knowledge leads to scepticism. He argues 
that if, as the nominalist maintains, private experiences are the sole objects of immediate 
knowledge, then the claim that science yields truth about an extra-mental reality is 
baseless. The result, Peirce maintains, is to call the epistemic credentials of science into 
question and undermine the adoption of truth as even a regulative ideal (Forster, 2011: 9).   
As Peirce sees it, the corrective and inferential process is one that reflects the efforts of science 
to discover external reality. However, by limiting their view of reality to a thing-in-itself, the 
nominalist, according to Peirce, assumes a conception of reality that departs from or ignores the 
corrective and inferential process. Setting aside the matter of truth being a regulative ideal, it is 
the nominalist’s assumptions about an incognizable reality that creates the gulf between the 
subject and external reality.48 Forster builds on the above passage by further describing the 
assumptions that nominalists make about truth and knowledge: 
As [Peirce] sees it, nominalists frame the problem of truth in terms of a theory of 
knowledge informed by the metaphysical view that only individuals exist. They typically 
                                               
48 The basic point about a regulative ideal is that is supposed to regulate or provide a standard for how we should 
engage in our epistemic practices. In the case of inquiry, as Misak puts it, we are “obliged to suppose” such an ideal, 
which holds that if we were to carry on inquiry, we would reach truth (Misak, 1991: 140). See: Thayer, 1981: 40-43; 
Hookway, 2002: 60; Misak, 2013: 50-52.  
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view knowledge as grounded in sensation and introspection and hold that any information 
gained through experience of this kind is to be analysed into individual sensory contents 
that are immediately apprehended by the mind (Forster, 2011: 157). 
While I agree with Forster’s assessment and his claim about the nominalist having to confront 
the threat of skepticism, there is an even more compelling part of Peirce’s argument that would 
strengthen Forster’s account. It is that Peirce closes off a further possible escape route for 
nominalists, which is their conception of the mind as being able to achieve non-inferential 
knowledge. By taking up this matter, we will see that Peirce’s case against the nominalist’s view 
of knowledge is quite thorough and forceful. Although, in the previous statement by Forster, he 
mentions that the nominalist looks to introspection, Peirce’s criticism of the nominalist’s 
conception of the mind more closely targets an assumption about a faculty of intuition. I will 
now examine Peirce’s argument against the nominalist’s conception of the mind, and then 
conclude the chapter with a brief section on the dilemma of epistemic individualism. 
2.3 The Nominalist’s Conception of the Mind 
To provide an account of what Peirce says is the nominalist’s conception of the mind, I will take 
up the relevant material from the Cognition Series, his review of “Fraser’s The Works of George 
Berkeley,” and his book review of James Mill’s Analysis of the Human Mind. Nowhere does 
Peirce give a unified account of the nominalist’s conception of the mind, so I will have to 
reconstruct such an account. Notwithstanding the absence of such an account in his writings, it is 
clear that Peirce takes his criticisms of the nominalist’s conception of the mind to offer an 
illuminating angle on why we should reject the nominalist’s view of knowledge.  
Near the end of his review of “Fraser’s the Works of Berkeley,” Peirce makes the 
following remark: “In 1829 appeared James Mill’s Analysis of the Human Mind, a really great 
nominalistic book” (W2: 485). A few years before this remark, Peirce wrote a review of this 
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great nominalistic book, and he claims that Mill’s thinking is a prime example of “The English 
Doctrine of Ideas” (W2: 302). In line with the British empiricists, Mill maintains that the mind 
contains sensations and ideas in the form of copies or images. As I pointed out above, Peirce is 
eager to expose the nominalistic assumptions that he detects in what the British empiricists hold 
the mind to be like. Above all, Peirce targets the assumption that the mind, to gain knowledge or 
to relate to reality, must have ideas that are as definite and exact as extra-mental concrete 
individual objects. Peirce claims that Mill’s theory of the mind displays this assumption and its 
consequences in ways that are even clearer than what we find in the works of the traditional 
British empiricists. On this matter, Peirce writes, 
The beauty of the theory appears when we consider that it is as much as to say simply 
that ideas in consciousness are concrete images of things in existence. For a thing to 
exist, and for it to have all its characters; or for two things to exist, and for them to have 
all their relations of existence to each other, are not two facts, but one (original emphasis; 
W2: 304).  
 
The point that Peirce is pressing is that Mill’s theory of mind supposes that the mind could copy 
things just as they are in the world, so that the mind can function as though it were a mirror. To 
show that the mind contains ideas that are copies, Mill relies on an analysis of the mind. As 
Peirce sees it, Mill’s analysis is an attempt to employ the principle of “Ockham’s razor.” Since 
there are questions about how to formulate this principle – and even whether we should attribute 
it to Ockham, – I will simply cite what Peirce says about it. Peirce writes, “In metaphysics, the 
maxim called Ockham’s razor [is] to the effect that more elements must not be introduced into a 
hypothesis until it is absolutely proved that fewer are not sufficient” (CP 6.535). In the review of 
Mill’s book, Peirce says,  
And what is analysis? The application of Ockham’s razor – that is to say, the principle of 
reducing the expression of the nature of things and of the mind to its simplest terms by 
lopping off everything which looks like a metaphysical superfluity (W2: 303).  
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Despite the elegance of Mill’s theory of mind, Peirce cites a collection of facts and scientific 
evidence to challenge it, all of which aims to undermine the root assumption that the mind can 
mirror nature. 
In presenting these facts, Peirce remarks about the naïve nominalist who is not able to see 
them: 
…The average nominalist whom you meet in the streets, he reminds me of the blind spot 
on the retina, so wonderfully does he unconsciously smooth over his field of vision and 
omit facts that stare him in the face, while seeing all round them without perceiving any 
gap in his view of the world (CP 4.1). 
 
In comparing the average nominalist to the blind spot of the retina, Peirce is alluding to the 
evidence he cites in the Cognition Series, where he focuses on our inability to tell which 
cognitions are intuitions (i.e., immediate, non-inferential cognitions that represent things just as 
they are in the world). There, he requests the reader to perform the following experiment: 
Does the reader know of the blind spot on the retina? Take a number of this journal, turn 
over the cover so as to expose the white paper, lay it sideways upon the table before 
which you must sit, and put two cents upon it, one near the left-hand edge, and the other 
to the right. Put your left hand over your left eye, and with the right eye look steadily at 
the left-hand cent. Then, with your right hand, move the right-hand cent (which is now 
plainly seen) towards the left hand. When it comes to a place near the middle of the page 
it will disappear – you cannot see it without turning your eye. Bring it nearer to the other 
cent, or carry it further away, and it will reappear; but at that particular spot it cannot be 
seen. Thus it appears that there is a blind spot nearly in the middle of the retina (W2: 
197). 
In this experiment, Peirce aims to make it clear that the mind must play a role in visual 
experience. There is a tendency, especially in British empiricism, to regard the mind as passively 
recording things in the world, as though the mind were like blank paper or a blank slate. Leaving 
aside the question of whether that is a fair view of British empiricism, Peirce is seeking to have 
us become aware of how the mind cannot exactly copy external things. Thus, he writes,  
It follows that the space we immediately see (when one eye is closed) is not, as we had 
imagined, a continuous oval, but is a ring, the filling up of which must be the work of the 
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intellect. What more striking example could be desired of the impossibility of 
distinguishing intellectual results from intuitional data, by mere contemplation (W2: 
197).  
In general, Peirce insists that we have no direct or immediate experience of the world as it is. Let 
us now consider what Peirce says about mental copies or images, and why he further argues that 
we do not have them.   
 In the Cognition Series, Peirce denies that we have what he calls an exact image of 
anything in the world. On this matter, he says, “Every possible character, or the negative thereof, 
must be true of such an image” (W2: 233). To borrow Peirce’s example, we are to consider 
whether we have an exact image of the road that we ordinarily take to our workplace. We are 
familiar with it and we could recognize it, but being able to represent the road in all its detail is 
something that we cannot do. Peirce writes, “It is apparent that no man has a true image of the 
road to his office, or of any other real thing. Indeed he has no image of it at all unless he can not 
only recognize it, but imagines it (truly or falsely) in all its infinite details” (added emphasis; 
W2: 233). Peirce further states the following: “I will now go so far as to say that we have no 
images even in actual perception” (W2: 235). In some cases, given our anatomy and physiology, 
we can be sure that we have no images, the formation of which would require bypassing the 
influence of the mind. For example, consider the nerve-points in the eye (W2: 198). If the mind 
had no influence on our visual experience, then we should expect, given our physiology and 
anatomy, that things would appear pixilated. Using cases of this variety, Peirce deploys a further 
argument that he takes to be decisive evidence to undermine the nominalist’s conception of the 
mind. Peirce writes,  
But the conclusive argument against our having any images, or absolutely determinate 
representations in perception, is that in that case we have the materials in each such 
representation for an infinite amount of conscious cognition, which we yet never become 
aware of (W2: 236).    
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Peirce’s argument could apply, say, to the previous example of the representation we have of the 
road to our workplace. In this argument, Peirce is attacking the assumption that we have exact 
images by maintaining that there could be no meaning to the assumption about an infinite 
amount of conscious cognition, which never reaches the level of our awareness. The 
argumentation is similar to that of Peirce’s attack on the supposition that we can deem some 
things incognizable, since, in the above argument, no one can become aware of the infinite 
details. Peirce maintains that the argument exposes that the assumption about images is non-
sense. Overall, it is clear that Peirce takes his case to show that the nominalist’s conception of 
the mind is spurious.  
2.3.1 The Dilemma of Epistemic Individualism 
In light of the preceding sections, I suggest that Peirce’s case against the nominalist’s view of 
knowledge forces the nominalist to confront a dilemma. In formulating it, I mean to underscore 
the connection to epistemic individualism, since the nominalist’s conception of the mind appeals 
to the individual’s mind as the source of non-inferential knowledge. Given the combination of 
assumptions about the individual and non-inferential knowledge, I maintain that a communal 
inferentialist reading uncovers Peirce’s strongest reasons against the nominalist. As for the 
dilemma, it takes the following form:     
The nominalist must believe that the individual’s mind is capable of gaining non-
inferential knowledge of concrete individual things, or the nominalist must concede 
skepticism. 
The reason to frame the dilemma in this way is: (1) Peirce rules out sensations as the basis of 
knowledge since sensations are radically private or sui generis; (2) Peirce closes off the 
nominalist’s possible escape route from skepticism, which is to maintain that the mind could 
non-inferentially mirror reality. As I see it, the nominalist is likely to agree with Peirce that the 
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point about the privacy of sensations raises the threat of skepticism in an obvious way. But the 
nominalist is likely to assume the conception of the mind as being able to gain non-inferential 
knowledge. To be clear, Peirce insists that this conception is erroneous, so that the nominalist 
can no longer reasonably hold this view; and hence, the nominalist must face the choice of 
assuming a false conception of the mind, or having to admit skepticism. The reason for having to 
make that admission is that closing off the one option concerning the nominalist’s view of the 
mind returns the nominalist to having to face the gulf between sensations and reality. As Forster 
puts it, such a gap leads the nominalist’s view of knowledge to skepticism. In both the cases of 
the nominalist’s views of knowledge and the mind, Peirce is aiming to show that they are 
spurious, but also that we should accept his positive proposals on the nature of the mind and 
knowledge. To put it briefly, given the above evidence I have considered, Peirce maintains that 
the mind is fundamentally inferential; and Peirce further maintains that the road to knowledge is 
inferential and communal, as we saw in the account of Peirce’s view of reality. Overall, then, I 
maintain that Peirce’s communal inferentialism illuminates his argumentative strategy in his case 
against the nominalist’s view of knowledge.  
2.4 Conclusion  
In this chapter, using communal inferentialism, I assessed Peirce’s case against the nominalist’s 
view of knowledge. In the first section, partly relying on Forster’s treatment, I provided an 
account of the nominalist’s view of knowledge and underscored Peirce’s claim about sensations 
being radically private. In the second section, I took up the nominalist’s view of reality and the 
threat of skepticism about the external world. In the third section, I considered how the 
nominalist might escape the threat of skepticism by assuming a conception of the mind as being 
able to mirror the world. Far from being an escape route, I showed that Peirce’s case forces the 
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nominalist into the dilemma of epistemic individualism, which reanimates the problem of 
skepticism for the nominalist in quite a formidable way.     
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3 CHAPTER THREE 
“The Fixation of Belief”: 
A Communal Inferentialist Reading 
 
The problem becomes how to fix belief, not in the individual merely, but in the 
community (“The Fixation of Belief,” 1877).49 
 
The purpose of this chapter is to show that a communal inferentialist reading of Peirce’s 
influential essay “The Fixation of Belief” (henceforth: “Fixation”) provides us with the tools to 
resolve the most controversial aspects of that essay. In view of several attempts to disentangle 
some longstanding interpretive difficulties in the “Fixation,” the reading I offer supports the 
claim that Peirce is again tackling the problem of epistemic individualism. Starting from his 
Cognition Series to the “Fixation,” a period of about a decade, Peirce increasingly sees the 
consequences of our being in the following predicament: we are unable to ‘look beyond our 
beliefs to non-mental facts’ (to borrow Robert Meyer’s apt description). In the “Fixation,” Peirce 
develops a theory of inquiry where he aims to describe and clarify the method of scientific 
investigation, which he claims is the only method that can resolve a problem at the heart of the 
“Fixation.” That problem is the following: how can we fix belief not just in the individual but 
also in the community, however much that community might grow? I will argue that a communal 
inferentialist reading of the “Fixation” allows us to see how Peirce manages to resolve this 
problem.  
However, the reading I offer must compete with an interpretation of the “Fixation” that 
appears in Thomas Short’s “Peirce on the Aim of Inquiry: Another Reading of the ‘Fixation’” 
(2000). In that article, Short claims that the “Fixation” requires a new interpretation to explain 
                                               
49 W3: 250. 
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even the most central ideas of the “Fixation.” Short endorses an angle of interpretation that he 
admits is likely to seem odd at first. According to Short, no one has been able to reconstruct the 
argument from the “Fixation” for the simple reason that Peirce is there not seeking to make an 
argument at all. Rather, instead of providing an argument, Peirce intends for us to see (in what 
Short calls an experiential sense of seeing) the force of what Peirce does in the “Fixation.” 
According to Short, this angle of interpretation resolves two longstanding difficulties: (1) why 
Peirce selects for criticism the non-scientific methods of fixing belief and (2) why Peirce says 
that the aim of inquiry is to fix belief, but then he espouses the method of scientific investigation, 
which seems to postpone such fixation indefinitely. While this reading is innovative, I will 
defend the position that Short’s interpretation is ultimately unconvincing and that Peirce, indeed, 
intends to make an argument in the “Fixation.” I will aim to show that a communal inferentialist 
reading explains the problem at the heart of the “Fixation” and resolves both difficulties, (1) and 
(2). 
3.1 The “Fixation”: The Aim of Inquiry 
“The Fixation of Belief” is the first of six papers that comprise the Illustrations of the Logic of 
Science essay series (1877-78), which Peirce wrote about a decade after the Cognition Series 
(1868-69). A significant difference between the two essay series is Peirce’s stress on his theory 
of inquiry in the Illustrations Series. In particular, Peirce defines inquiry as a struggle to escape 
doubt and to regain belief, a struggle that originates in surprise and real doubt (W2: 247). Given 
the ingredients of belief and doubt, many commentators aptly refer to Peirce’s belief-doubt 
theory of inquiry (see: Johanson, 1972; Haack, 1983: 242; Misak, 1991: 49).50 “How to Make 
                                               
50 More specifically, as Misak puts it, “Peirce characterizes the path of inquiry as follows: belief–surprise–doubt–
inquiry–belief. It is worth reminding ourselves that surprise is what originates doubts and is the spark of inquiry. For 
more details, see Chapter One. There, I discuss the role of surprise when I critically assess the views of Meyers and 
Haack. 
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Our Ideas Clear” is the companion piece to the “Fixation,” and it provides an early statement of 
Peirce’s pragmatism, where he relies on his theory of inquiry to spell out the meaning of our 
concepts. In “How to Make Our Ideas Clear,” Peirce expresses what is known as the pragmatic 
maxim. In Chapter Four, I shall take up Peirce’s pragmatic maxim, so I will refrain from 
considering its details until then. However, the reason I mention it now is that, to gain a handle 
on what Peirce is seeking to do in the “Fixation,” it helps to consider his response to an initial 
objection to his central claim about the aim of inquiry. Let us turn to the objection, and then 
outline Peirce’s reply. 
 In the “Fixation,” Peirce claims that the aim of inquiry is the fixation of belief, but it 
seems odd to describe the aim in this way since it is plausible to say that the aim is truth. That is, 
even if we are considering beliefs, it is a true belief we pursue, not a fixed belief (or not merely 
such a belief). Accordingly, the objection holds that the fixation of belief is not enough to satisfy 
us, since we further aim at truth. In the “Fixation,” why does not Peirce instead claim that truth is 
the object of inquiry? Peirce anticipates the objection, and he writes the “Fixation” and “How to 
Make Our Ideas Clear” with the intent of answering it. After all, he considers the method of 
scientific investigation to be the method that would carry us to the truth at least in the indefinite 
long run (see: W3: 254; W3: 272). Peirce insists that our concepts or notions must have some 
conceivable practical effects to be meaningful, and the one such effect that he attaches to the 
concept of truth is the fixation of belief. Seen in this light, then, we know why Peirce does not 
begin by stating that the aim of inquiry is truth. Consequently, to press the point, Peirce may 
respond to the objector by asking what the difference could be between the fixation of belief and 
truth. On the surface, it seems that there must be a difference, since a fixed belief may have that 
status for some reason besides its being true. That is, Peirce’s approach appears open to the 
84 
 
charge that such fixation could result from accidents or conditions apart from truth. For example, 
Misak begins her account of Peirce’s “Fixation” by posing the initial objection that “a ‘belief’-
freezing pill” may be able to fix belief, though surely we would not consider an eternally 
“frozen” belief to count as what we mean by the aim of inquiry (Misak, 1991: 46). Perhaps less 
strange than the example of a belief-freezing pill, we might ask why the fixation could not result 
from, say, a regime of extreme brainwashing, beginning from youth. As it turns out, Peirce is 
ready to answer objections of this sort too. He maintains that the only beliefs that would remain 
fixed are those that inquirers following the method of scientific investigation would arrive at if 
they were to carry out that method as far as it could go. One hypothesis of this method is that 
there is an external reality, which is not of our own making, but that constrains our thinking and 
gives rise to sensations. But Peirce does not take the method to stop at our sensations, which are 
radically private. The method involves carrying on with the communal and inferential process 
that is so much a part of the method of scientific investigation. The conclusion of such a process, 
according to Peirce, would have to survive all possible reiterations of the process and would be 
the fixation of belief. In brief, Peirce maintains that the method of scientific investigation is the 
most rigorous method, and the status of such fixation owes to the method of scientific 
investigation that sustains it. Warding off this objection and others of this sort requires a fuller 
exposition of Peirce’s theory of inquiry and the inferential commitments he makes in the 
“Fixation,” which is what I turn to now. 
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3.2 The Object of Reasoning 
Peirce opens the “Fixation” with a set of illustrations of the art of reasoning.51 From the outset, 
he is seeking to track its course of development starting from the Romans to the scientists and 
logicians of his own day who tackle the question of how to formulate a logic of science. 
According to Peirce, the history of logic provides lessons for the student of the art of reasoning, 
especially revealing tendencies to avoid. To offer one example, Peirce says that the scholastics 
appeal to the method of authority as their ultimate standard of reasoning (W3: 242).52 However, 
as he expects it to be clear to his readers, such a standard cannot satisfy our inquiries, as history 
shows that scholastic authorities were often wrong or unreliable.  
 Based on failures of this sort, the following questions require our focus, according to 
Peirce: what assumptions about reasoning should we make if we are to master the art of 
reasoning? How are we to rely on reasoning in the search for truth (or fixed belief)? In response, 
Peirce provides a statement of what he says is the standard of good reasoning and further says 
that we need to develop logical habits. On the first point about reasoning, Peirce writes:  
The object of reasoning is to find out, from the consideration of what we already know, 
something else which we do not know. Consequently, reasoning is good if it be such as to 
give a true conclusion from true premises, and not otherwise. Thus, the question of its 
validity is purely one of fact and not of thinking. A being the premises and B the 
conclusion, the question is, whether these facts are really so related that if A is B is. If so, 
the inference is valid; if not, not. It is not in the least the question whether, when the 
premises are accepted by the mind, we feel an impulse to accept the conclusion also (W3: 
244).  
Part of the reason to focus on the above statement is that, in the secondary literature, there is a 
tendency to turn to Peirce’s theory of inquiry without first laying out the inferential commitments 
                                               
51 “Few persons care to study logic, because everybody conceives himself to be proficient enough in the art of 
reasoning already. But I observe that this satisfaction is limited to one's own ratiocination, and does not extend to 
that of other men” (W3: 242).  
52 Typically, the scholastic authorities include the Bible, the Church, and Aristotle (see: W2: 195 n.2; W2: 313).  
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with which he begins the “Fixation.” Given this sort of gap, I hold that it is worth exploring the 
fundamental inferential moves that Peirce makes in the “Fixation” and considering how he 
makes them. It further assists our understanding of Peirce’s communal inferentialism. For, 
Peirce’s concern is to show us how logically we could reach the truth (at least how we could do 
that in the long run. The qualification, “in the long run,” is because we need to use probabilistic 
patterns of correct inference – including inductive sampling – to make empirical discoveries). 
Built into the method of scientific investigation, according to Peirce, are the patterns of correct 
inference (i.e., abduction, deduction, and induction).  
There are two things to note about the last line of the previous passage, in which Peirce 
denies that logic depends on an impulse to accept a conclusion. First, Peirce rejects 
psychologism, the view that logical concepts, including that of validity, reduce to psychological 
concepts or states of the human mind.53 In an “Unpsychological View of Logic” (1865) and his 
1866 Lowell Lectures, Peirce disputes the psychologistic ideas of those he refers to as the 
“anthropological logicians” (W1: 305; W1: 361). As that label suggests, Peirce contends that 
their logical standard is one that appeals to degrees of human conviction or credence. Given the 
object of reasoning as laid out above, it is clear that their standard can diverge from the truth. 
Accordingly, the anthropological logicians adopt a standard that deviates from the object of 
reasoning, which Peirce claims exposes a severe – if not, fatal – flaw of their view. Hence, the 
problem such logicians face is akin to the problem that the scholastics must confront in their 
assumption that certain forms of authority impose the standard of correct reasoning. Second, and 
                                               
53 In “Peirce’s Supposed Psychologism” (1999), Kasser argues that Peirce’s statements in the “Fixation” are strong 
evidence that Peirce maintained his opposition to psychologism throughout his philosophical writings, though some 
commentators raise doubts about whether Peirce was as uniform in his rejection of this position as he often claimed 
to be. Kasser dispels the idea of Peirce’s supposed psychologism, and though the case is beyond the scope and 
theme of this chapter, I agree with Kasser’s assessment.   
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relatedly, Peirce points out that, as “logical animals,” we tend to be more optimistic in our 
thoughts and beliefs than good reasoning would warrant (W3: 244). According to Peirce, our 
tendency to be excessively confident in our own reasoning powers often makes it difficult to 
aspire to the object of reasoning. We tend to slide into wishful thinking, to “see” patterns in 
things that do not naturally display them, to confirm our existing beliefs (in spite of 
countervailing evidence), and so forth. Seen in this light, how does Peirce respond to this 
difficulty? For, now a large concern comes up: how are we to master the art of reasoning – and 
he takes that to be our goal – if human nature tends to stand against such an aim or remains 
uncooperative? On the surface, Peirce imposes a logical standard that we may not be able to 
satisfy, given our ordinary habits and way of going about things. 
3.2.1 Logical Habits and Guiding Principles 
Peirce’s answer to the above difficulty concerns the further inferential commitments he makes in 
the “Fixation.” His solution combines two strands of his thinking. First, Peirce argues that, to 
meet the object of reasoning, we need to follow what he calls guiding principles of inference 
(sometimes he refers to them as leading principles) (W3: 245). Second, in response to our 
tendency to drift from the patterns of correct inference, we need to develop logical habits. These 
strands tie together, as the logical habits that concern Peirce, on this matter, are those that would 
have us habitually adhere to good guiding principles. However, to appreciate the connection, we 
first need to know what a guiding principle is. 
In the “Fixation,” Peirce connects these strands and defines a guiding principle of 
inference as follows: 
That which determines us, from given premises, to draw one inference rather than 
another, is some habit of mind, whether it be constitutional or acquired. The habit is good 
or otherwise, according as it produces true conclusions from true premises or not; and an 
inference is regarded as valid or not, without reference to the truth or falsity of its 
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conclusion specially, but according as the habit which determines it is such as to produce 
true conclusions in general or not. The particular habit of mind which governs this or that 
inference may be formulated in a proposition whose truth depends on the validity of the 
inferences which the habit determines; and such a formula is called a guiding principle of 
inference (original emphasis; W3: 245).  
According to Buchler, the simplest way to express what Peirce means is that “a leading principle 
is a rule of inference” (Buchler, 1940: 192). While Peirce, in the “Fixation,” does not provide a 
clearer definition of a guiding principle of inference than the one above, we can use an example 
to grasp his basic point. Consider the classic litmus test. If I dip a piece of litmus paper into a 
solution, and the paper turns pink, then I draw the conclusion that the solution is acidic. Now the 
habit of mind that governs my reasoning is a guiding principle of inference. Guided in this 
manner, I form the generalization that other pieces of litmus paper would turn pink if I were to 
put then in the solution. Over time, according to Peirce, we will develop logical habits about 
what would happen in cases like those that we find in the classic litmus test. 
Now Peirce notices that in practical subjects or realms, where there are “thoroughly-
beaten paths,” there would be little need to catalogue the particular guiding principles of 
inference that belong to them (W3: 245). He observes that rarely do we drift from the guiding 
principles that apply to practical subjects. However, in unfamiliar subjects, we are likely to get 
lost and disoriented “like a ship in the open sea, with no one on board who understands the rules 
of navigation” (W3: 246). Since logic tends to abstract from practical subjects, there is the need 
to understand and use the guiding principles proper to it. 
Peirce’s chief concern in the “Fixation” and Illustrations Series is with the guiding 
principles of inference that apply to the habits and classes of logical inference (see: CP 2.446). 
Peirce aims to make sure that we form good habits of logical inference. A few years after the 
“Fixation,” in 1880, Peirce writes, “The habit is logically good provided it would never (or in the 
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case of a probable inference, seldom) lead from a true premiss to a false conclusion; otherwise it 
is logically bad” (CP 3.163).54 Again, in 1880, Peirce maintains the following:  
A habit of inference may be formulated in a proposition which shall state that every 
proposition c, related in a given general way to any true proposition p, is true. Such a 
proposition is called the leading principle of the class of inferences whose validity it 
implies. When the inference is first drawn, the leading principle is not present to the 
mind, but the habit it formulates is active in such a way that, upon contemplating the 
believed premiss, by a sort of perception the conclusion is judged to be true (original 
emphasis; CP 3.164).  
Now Peirce’s chief concern is with the guiding or leading principles that apply to types, patterns, 
or classes of logical inference. He aims to classify logical inferences in terms of a familiar 
division. There is explicative or necessary inference (namely, deduction), on the one hand, and 
ampliative or probabilistic inference (namely, induction and abduction), on the other.55  
3.2.2 Returning to Peirce on the Patterns of Correct Inference 
In Chapter One, while spelling out Peirce’s communal inferentialism, I took up Peirce’s account 
of the three patterns of correct inference. I now return to and expand on the significant points I 
made about that account because, in the context of the “Fixation,” Peirce takes the method of 
                                               
54 Concerning Peirce’s penchant for peculiar spellings, he sometimes prefers “premiss,” as we can tell from the 
above statement. Sometimes there are advantages to such spellings, as they can eliminate possible ambiguities, or a 
lack of clarity. In philosophy, Peirce maintains that are good reasons to use terms that have unique spellings (akin to 
how biologists use Latin terms). He advances such a view under what he refers to as the ethics of terminology. 
Peirce’s peculiar use of pragmaticism is a case in point (EP2: 334).  
55 Peirce’s writings are not easy to expound. In this vein, his account of the leading or guiding principles of 
inference depends on several logical assumptions or terms, which tend to reflect Peirce’s way of viewing and putting 
things. A long, but useful passage from 1880 that clarifies the terms belief, inference, and leading principle is the 
following. “A cerebral habit of the highest kind, which will determine what we do in fancy as well as what we do in 
action, is called a belief. The representation to ourselves that we have a specified habit of this kind is called a 
judgment. A belief-habit in its development begins by being vague, special, and meagre; it becomes more precise, 
general, and full, without limit. The process of this development, so far as it takes place in the imagination, is called 
thought. A judgment is formed; and under the influence of a belief-habit this gives rise to a new judgment, 
indicating an addition to belief. Such a process is called an inference; the antecedent judgment is called the premiss; 
the consequent judgment, the conclusion; the habit of thought, which determined the passage from the one to the 
other (when formulated as a proposition), the leading principle” (original emphasis; CP. 3.160). 
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scientific investigation to rely on the patterns of correct inference. Furthermore, an account of 
these types of inference is crucial to the communal inferentialist reading of the “Fixation” I offer. 
As I noted in Chapter One, Peirce’s object in seeking to articulate the logic of science is to 
provide us with a clear grasp of the types of reasoning that do – or would – enable us to make 
empirical discoveries. While deduction does play a role in his account of the logic of science, 
Peirce tends to focus on abduction and induction. Let us take up these types of inference in the 
order and manner that Peirce presents them.  
 Given that the world is likely to surprise us in many ways – since we (very likely) lack 
intuitive faculties, and hence need to learn about things through experience and reasoning – 
Peirce begins with abduction.56 In abduction, we propose a hypothesis that aims to explain an 
anomaly or surprise. In “On Sundry logical Conceptions” (1903), Peirce offers the following 
direct statement of what abduction is and is supposed to do: “The whole operation of reasoning 
begins with Abduction, which is now to be described. Its occasion is surprise. That is, some 
belief, active or passive, formulated or unformulated, has just been broken up. It may be in real 
experience or it may equally be in pure mathematics…” (original emphasis; EP2: 287). Notice 
two things about this statement. First, to be surprised, we must already have some original beliefs 
(some of them may be prejudices).57 The very idea of a surprise assumes that there must be a 
violation of our expectations. Second, Peirce takes abduction to be primary, which means that 
the general inferential process must begin with it. Sometimes Peirce cast his view in terms of 
“the inferential processes in the three stages of inquiry,” where the stages have the following 
                                               
56 Peirce’s argument against the existence of intuitive faculties is the theme of “Questions concerning Faculties 
Claimed for Man” (1868). I examined his argument in Chapter One. The point above is that, lacking such faculties, 
there are no means of direct or immediate knowledge. Rather, to learn about the world, we at least need to rely on 
reasoning. Thus, Peirce relies on the patterns of correct inference to show how we could make intellectual progress.    
57 See Chapter One on the topic of prejudices. There, I discussed Peirce’s case against Cartesian individualism and 
its attempt to remove prejudices all at once. I further discussed Peirce’s proposal for how to engage in a communal 
and corrective process that aims to remove prejudices. 
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order: the abductive, deductive, and inductive stages (CP 2.760). As a type of inference, an 
abduction has the status of a conjecture or guess: “abduction, although it is very little hampered 
by logical rules, nevertheless is logical inference, asserting its conclusion only problematically or 
conjecturally” (CP 5.188).58 An abduction is suggestive, Peirce says, in that it proposes a 
hypothesis to account for a surprise, but does not aim to verify or justify the hypothesis (CP 
7.218).  
 In his writings from the early 1900s, Peirce makes sure that we see that abduction is a 
pattern of inference and that we can know what the rational grounds are for it. Put briefly, Peirce 
holds that abduction takes the following form: 
The surprising fact, C, is observed;    
But if A were true, C would be a matter of course,    
Hence, there is reason to suspect that A is true (CP 5.189).  
 
Notice that the conclusion only maintains that there is reason to suspect that A is true, not that A 
is true, not that there is reason that A is true. An abduction continues to have the status of a 
conjecture. As for its rational grounds, Peirce makes an argument that I will present but will not 
evaluate, since it would take us too far afield. The core of the argument holds that, since, over 
time, we are likely to become better at making correct guesses – and since much time has passed 
– we are likely to be quite good at making abductions. Given this development, Peirce says an 
abduction is like the flash of insight – say, in the context of discovery – though he concedes that 
such a capacity is fallible (see: CP 5.181; CP 5.604). It is nothing like a purported intuitive 
                                               
58 By problematically, Peirce is alluding to Kant’s theory of judgement. A judgement that is problematic takes the 
following the form: “possibly, Gs are Fs” (as opposed to assertoric judgements that are of the form “actually, Gs are 
Fs.” An abduction takes the status of a hypothesis or conjecture. Accordingly, one regards the hypothesis of an 
abduction as possibly being true, but does not assert that it is actually true. However, Peirce provides the following 
comment that helps to be more exact about what he takes the word to mean. “The presumptive conclusion is 
accepted only problematically, that is to say, as meriting an inductive examination” (added emphasis; CP 2.786).  
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faculty, which is supposed to yield non-inferential and infallible knowledge. Rather, the 
ingenuity we tend to have for coming up with good – or worthwhile – abductions likely stems 
from millennia of animal adaptations and learning. Based on this, Peirce takes the upshot of the 
consideration about the grounds of abduction to mean the following. If we were to continue 
making a series of abductions or carrying out the process, we would come up with sufficiently 
explanatory abductions – eventually. 
 Deduction is easier to characterize, and so I shall be briefer in treating it. Peirce takes 
deduction to be necessary reasoning that does not add new information (W1: 362; W2: 215). 
That is, deduction is explicative, not ampliative (EP2: 443). When performed correctly, 
deduction tends to be compulsive, as it forces us to concede the conclusion it reaches. In the 
context of the logic of science, Peirce presses deduction into the service of what helps us to make 
prediction that cohere with the hypothesis. That is, the predictions are ones that closely relate to 
the previously made abductions. Peirce sees deduction as having the further instrumental 
function of helping us to make predictions that are worth both focusing on and further testing: 
“deduction…adds nothing to the premises, but only out of various facts represented in the 
premises selects one and brings attention down to it” – it is a “logical formula for paying 
attention” (W3: 337-338). That is, in the logic of science, deduction aids us in our effort to arrive 
at predictions that cohere with the original abductions. Lastly, we need to test the hypotheses and 
predictions using the final pattern of correct inference: induction. 
 In “Deduction, Induction, and Hypothesis” (1878), the final paper of the Illustrations 
Series, Peirce defines induction as follows: “Induction is where we generalize from a number of 
cases of which something is true, and infer that the same thing is true of a whole class. Or, where 
we find a certain thing to be true of a certain proportion of cases and infer that it is true of the 
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same proportion of the whole class” (W3: 326). Induction is a sampling process, according to 
Peirce, where we take samples in the attempt to reach a generalization that represents the real 
ratio about the things (or properties of the things) we are investigating. For example, if we are 
cargo inspectors searching ships carrying imported coffee beans, we may be able to take a few 
large samples from each ship and arrive at a generalization about the origin of the beans (CP 
1.67). Of course, we may make mistakes due to practical constraints. However, it is even more 
significant that induction is a probabilistic type of inference, which cannot provide a guarantee in 
a given case or set of cases. Peirce’s major claim about induction is that, if we were to carry on 
induction, there would be a time when we represent the real ratio. Put simply, Peirce holds that, 
“induction seeks facts” (CP 7.218). In general, the hypothesis we arrive at in an abduction will 
fail to stand up to testing: “We cannot ordinarily hope that our hypothesis will pass through the 
fire of induction, absolutely unmodified” (CP 7.216). Accordingly, we will have to begin the 
general inferential process – abduction-deduction-induction – over and again. However, when it 
comes to the grounds for induction, Peirce argues that its success lies in how it would have to 
yield truth (or closely approximate the truth) in the long run. And on that point, the central 
ground he cites concerns the relationship between the community and the inductive process.  
I will now take a closer look at the tie between sociality and logicality. It supports a 
communal inferentialist reading of the “Fixation” and other papers in the Illustrations Series. The 
connection also makes it clearer why we should expect induction to postpone the fixation of 
belief. It thus provides the material to meet the longstanding interpretive difficulty that scholars 
note about why Peirce adopts the method of scientific investigation, but why that method often 
leads to the indefinite postponement of fixed belief. 
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3.2.3 Peirce’s Socially Rooted Logic: An Unlimited Community 
Based on Peirce’s account of induction, there is the need continually to take samples to move 
towards a representative generalization or a real ratio. In “The Doctrine of Chances” (1878), the 
third paper in the Illustration series, Peirce argues that, “Logic is rooted in the social principle” 
(W3: 284). To carry out probabilistic patterns of correct inference, we are to identify our 
interests, as logical beings, with the interests of “an unlimited community,” that is, “the 
community that may last beyond all assignable date” (W3: 285). According to Peirce, we already 
have what he refers to as logical sentiments, but the highest such sentiments are those that would 
identify with the community, however much that community might grow. As Peirce states, “our 
interests shall not be limited. They must not stop at our own fate, but must embrace the whole 
community. This community, again, must not be limited, but must extend to all races and beings 
with whom we can come into immediate or mediate intellectual relation” (W3: 284). In spelling 
out the idea of an unlimited community, Peirce makes a connection to our epistemic aims. He 
holds, “And that ideal perfection of knowledge by which we have seen that reality is constituted 
must thus belong to a community in which this identification is complete” (W2: 271). Peirce 
denies that there is any guarantee that we could achieve such knowledge, but he does commit 
himself to the claim that progress is through this communal and inferential process – that is, in 
short, his communal inferentialism. However, along with there being no guarantee of success, 
Peirce concedes that there could be indefinite postponement of the ultimate settlement of belief 
(W2: 469). 
By way of anticipation to an interpretive difficulty regarding the “Fixation,” Peirce must 
concede that the process could lead to indefinite postponement because of the nature of 
induction. Notice that there is no definite number of such samples that we need to take for a 
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given subject matter. Furthermore, we may have to go through indefinite iterations of the 
inferential stages of inquiry to be in a position to succeed in induction. According to the nature of 
probabilistic inference, Peirce openly admits that the next such inference or set of samples we 
make could overturn what we regard as our most explanatory hypotheses. There is no reason 
against the possibility that we would need to take further inferences or samples to reach a true 
conclusion or one that is fixed. 
3.3 Fixing Belief in the Community 
The previous discussion of the unlimited community segues into Peirce’s remarks about the 
community in the “Fixation.” If we connect the above material concerning inference to the 
material in this section, I maintain that we have a communal inferentialist reading of the 
“Fixation” that can illuminate many of the key assumptions of that essay and that can resolve the 
interpretive difficulties surrounding it. I briefly turn now to Peirce’s account of inquiry, and then 
take up the central problem concerning fixing belief in the community. 
3.3.1 Inquiry: The Struggle to Escape Doubt 
In relation to the discussion about the object of reasoning, Peirce maintains that, “A moment’s 
thought will show that a variety of facts are already assumed when the logical question [about 
what the object of reasoning is] is first asked. It is implied, for instance, that there are such states 
of mind as doubt and belief” (W3: 246) and that there is a passage or transition between them. 
The reason that Peirce draws attention to doubt, belief, and the passage between them is that they 
are the components of his theory of inquiry, where he defines inquiry to be the struggle to escape 
doubt and return to belief: “I shall term this struggle inquiry” (original emphasis; W3: 247). 
According to Peirce, we can appreciate what a belief is by noticing that it provides us with a 
feeling of conviction, but also that a belief is dispositional (W3: 363). In a state of doubt, Peirce 
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holds that we feel irritation and dissatisfaction. A state of doubt lacks the habits of action or 
readiness to act that is distinctive of belief. When in doubt, we are in an erratic state. However, 
without real doubt, Peirce argues that there can be no inquiry, since there is no such struggle 
from doubt towards belief. In “The Doctrine of Chances,” it makes sense that Peirce says the 
following: “the only cause of our planting ourselves on reason is that other methods of escaping 
doubt fail on account of the social impulse,” and he asks “why should we wonder to find social 
sentiment presupposed in reasoning” (W3: 285). In that part of the paper, to be clear, Peirce is 
recalling his motivation in the “Fixation” for adopting the method of scientific investigation. As 
it turns out, the method of scientific investigation relies on the patterns of correct inference, so 
that it could attain what Peirce considers the object of reasoning.  
3.3.2 A Central Problem: Fixing Belief in the Community 
Peirce motivates a chief problem of the “Fixation” by first what he refers to as the method of 
tenacity. Tenacity is mostly about clinging to existing beliefs and shunning whatever might cause 
doubt. The tenacious individual is, as Peirce says, similar to the proverbial ostrich that buries its 
head in the sand when in danger (W3: 249). The danger of doubt is what tenacity is seeking to 
escape. Tenacity is, as I will show in Chapter Four, an extreme form of epistemic individualism, 
since it tenacity aims to preserve the beliefs that the individual happens to have and to treat the 
beliefs as though they are fixed. However, it does not seem that the individual, especially in 
having dealings with others, could continue to maintain tenacity over a long period. In 
introducing a central problem of the “Fixation,” Peirce writes,  
But this method of fixing belief, which may be called the method of tenacity, will be 
unable to hold its ground in practice. The social impulse is against it. The man who 
adopts it will find that other men think differently from him, and it will be apt to occur to 
him, in some saner moment, that their opinions are quite as good as his own, and this will 
shake his confidence in his belief. This conception, that another man’s thought or 
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sentiment may be equivalent to one’s own, is a distinctly new step, and a highly 
important one. It arises from an impulse too strong in man to be suppressed, without 
danger of destroying the human species. Unless we make ourselves hermits, we shall 
necessarily influence each other’s opinions; so that the problem becomes how to fix 
belief, not in the individual merely, but in the community (added emphasis; W3: 250).  
When Peirce asks whether “the resolution of my own doubt is more my object in an investigation 
than the production of unanimity among others,” he insists that we must observe the following: 
“no sensible man will be void of doubt as long as persons as competent to judge as himself differ 
from him. Hence to resolve his own doubts is to ascertain to what position sufficient research 
would carry all men” (added emphasis; W2: 355). Tying these ideas together, the highly 
important step that Peirce mentions is one that is decisively away from epistemic individualism. 
As the social impulse grows so too do we move away from what we claim as our own as 
individuals. That is, we move towards a more communal enterprise. Since the social impulse 
grows, according to Peirce, he is thinking of the central problem in terms of a notion of a 
community that could accommodate any such growth. It is worth considering the following apt 
observation from Buchler: “To Peirce the scientific method represents the antithesis of 
individualism. What distinguishes it from all other methods of inquiry is its cooperative and 
public character” (Buchler, 1940: x). Insofar as the community plays this role, it reinforces 
Peirce’s firm stance against epistemic individualism (see: Anderson, 1995: 103).  
Peirce next considers the method of authority, seeking to see whether it could solve the 
above problem of fixing belief in the community. The method of authority seeks to fix belief 
within the state, and so, to that extent, it is communal. It manages the problem in a better way 
than the method of tenacity. But while communal, the state is not a sufficiently unlimited or 
inferential community that is suited for the purposes of inquiry. The state may do everything 
from force and torture to try to fix belief, but Peirce maintains that it cannot succeed (W3: 250-
251). Even in the most benighted states or tribes, there are individuals who notice that 
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individuals from other states think differently from them; that is, they recognize this difference 
and begin to doubt the method of authority itself. Accordingly, the method of authority 
resembles the method of tenacity, but at the political or social level. 
 While both tenacity and authority fail, out of the non-scientific methods, Peirce lastly 
considers a priority. Distinct from the two other methods, the method of a priority asks us to 
allow the mind its freedom to move to whatever ideas it would have as unchecked by experience. 
This is the method of natural inclination, according to Peirce. The method is a priori because it 
tries to allow free rein of the mind by having the mind be independent of experience or of the 
world as it impinges on the mind. In the history of philosophy, Peirce sees the method as creating 
a pendulum of thought that goes from spiritualistic to materialistic doctrines – and back again. 
However, it is clear from his presentation that Peirce associates the method of a priority with 
Descartes and Cartesianism. As we know from Chapter One, Descartes attempts to free the mind 
from its prejudices and the senses, so that the mind can naturally or spontaneously arrive at a 
conviction about what it takes to be true or absolutely certain.  
Peirce sees a priority as failing to solve the problem of fixing belief in the community. 
Rather, in metaphysical matters, Peirce observes that there is often scarcely any agreement 
among such thinkers. They arrive at views that conflict along fundamental lines (e.g., 
spiritualism versus materialism), and then have no way in which to adjudicate the argument but 
to turn again to allowing the mind to freely judge what is true. The amount of intellectual 
disagreement as a result of such of method leads Peirce to conclude that a priority cannot solve 
the above problem concerning communal fixation. Peirce holds that, “metaphysicians have never 
come to any fixed agreement” (W3: 253), and hence, he takes their lack of agreement to indicate 
the inadequacy of the method of a priority.  
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Finally, Peirce describes the method of scientific investigation. It begins with the 
hypothesis that there is an external reality and that we can discover it by communal inquiry and 
through the patterns of correct inference. In the following crucial passage, Peirce explains what 
he means by the method of scientific investigation:  
[The external permanency] must be something which affects, or might affect, every man. 
And, though these affections are necessarily various as are individual conditions, yet the 
method must be such that the ultimate conclusion of every man shall be the same. Such is 
the method of science. Its fundamental hypothesis, restated in more familiar language, is 
this: There are real things, whose characters are entirely independent of our opinions 
about them; those realities affect our senses according to regular laws, and, though our 
sensations are as different as our relations to the objects, yet, by taking advantage of the 
laws of perception, we can ascertain by reasoning how things really are, and any man, if 
he have sufficient experience and reason enough about it, will be led to the one true 
conclusion. The new conception here involved is that of reality” (W3: 254).  
 
The point to notice is that Peirce is not simply making the hypothesis that there is an external 
reality (for, that may leave things at the nominalist’s view of reality, the transcendent cause of 
sensation, the incognizable origin). Rather, Peirce begins with the commitment that there is such 
a reality – and we have, he holds, no real doubts about that commitment – and proceeds to look 
to the way to gain sufficient experience and reason. The conception of reality that he is 
espousing is the one I took up in Chapter Two, where it looks to a corrective and inferential 
process, so that the real is the conception we must have had “when we first corrected ourselves” 
(W2: 239).  
 By referring to the fundamental hypothesis of reality, I agree with Douglas Anderson that 
Peirce means to distinguish a hypothesis from an assertion (Anderson, 1995: 109). Anderson 
sees Peirce’s choice of words here as growing out of his concern for the logical question and his 
logic of science. As with any development in the logic of science, there is, for Peirce, an appeal 
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to abduction and induction. While it may not surprise us anymore to find our minds constrained 
by something external, the following pattern of inference still holds:  
Something outside our minds impinges on our thoughts and causes sensations  
If there were an external permanency (or a reality), this would be a matter of course 
Therefore, there is an external permanency (or a reality). 
 
But to correct the sensations that come from the external reality and to overcome what error, 
prejudice, and fiction is in us, Peirce insists again on reality being a communal notion. On that 
view, the community is capable of indefinite growth (W2: 239). Peirce takes the communal 
nature of the scientific enterprise to support his claim: “all the followers of science are fully 
persuaded that the processes of investigation, if pushed far enough, will give one certain solution 
to every question to which they can be applied” (W3: 273). Proponents of scientific investigation 
are aiming at the universal and ultimate agreement that Peirce often describes in terms of the 
fixation of belief. Such a commitment, according to Peirce, makes it so that the method of 
scientific investigation solves the problem at the heart of the “Fixation” over finding the method 
that could settle belief in the community. However, to support my communal inferentialist 
reading, I aim to assess its merits in relation to another reading of this influential paper. I will 
maintain that my reading offers a way of managing and explaining the longstanding difficulties 
that surround the “Fixation.” 
3.4 Short’s Reading: Peirce’s Thoroughgoing Antifoundationalism 
In “Peirce on the Aim of Inquiry: Another Reading of the ‘Fixation” (2000), Thomas Short 
claims that the longstanding puzzlement over the meaning of Peirce’s influential essay stems 
from the erroneous assumption that Peirce is putting forth arguments in the “Fixation.” Radical 
though it may be, Short holds that Peirce’s approach in the “Fixation” is non-argumentative; 
rather, Peirce uses an experimental approach, according to Short, where we are to see or feel the 
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force of his points. Short claims that Peirce is a proponent of “thoroughgoing 
antifoundationalism” (Short, 2000: 1). Given its crucial role in his reading, I shall begin by 
considering what Short means by this term. I will then evaluate Short’s reading, and will close 
the chapter by arguing that the communal inferentialist reading I offer is a more adequate 
interpretation.  
Short maintains that Peirce is a thoroughgoing antifoundationalist, but to know what this 
means, we need to begin, where Short does, which is with Peirce’s rejection of foundationalism. 
In contemporary epistemology, foundationalism refers to “The doctrine that knowledge is 
ultimately based on beliefs that require no further justification” (Mautner, 2005: 228). 
Foundationalists tend to endorse the position at least because it provides a response to the threat 
of an infinite regress. In terms of epistemic justification, if one belief requires further 
justification from another belief, and the second belief requires further justification for it, then 
there seems to be no end to the need for further justification. According to foundationalists, the 
need for justification must stop somewhere, and they claim that it halts at basic beliefs, which are 
supposed to be non-inferential (i.e., they require no further justification). In relation to this threat, 
basic beliefs are to serve as regress-stoppers.  
In explaining Peirce’s rejection of foundationalism, Short mentions this view as it 
appears in contemporary epistemology, although Short holds that a thoroughgoing 
antifoundationalism extends further than to a consideration about knowledge or epistemic 
justification. Short maintains that it applies to the aims and methods of inquiry (Short, 2000: 1). 
In this broader application, no aims or methods of inquiry are immune to revision or 
modification; rather, they are all thoroughly open to challenge. According to Short, there could 
be a demand for further and further revision – a situation analogous to that of the threat of 
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epistemic regress – but such is, says Short, what the thoroughgoing antifoundationalist must 
tolerate. 
In making the case for the plausibility of thoroughgoing antifoundationalism, Short 
compares it to modern versions of naturalized epistemology (Short, 2000: 2). Such versions of 
this form of epistemology seem to serve as useful models since they too abandon the demand or 
search for foundations for science and knowledge. Short is aware that, by dispensing with the 
traditional need for foundations, one is liable to have one’s position misunderstood. Accordingly, 
Short points out that thoroughgoing antifoundationalism is not a form of skepticism or 
relativism, which are two positions that Peirce would reject. Rather, the anti-foundationalist, 
according to Short, targets foundationalism and its tendency to slide into dogmatism. According 
to Short, the foundationalist must insist that some aims and methods are beyond revision; and 
hence, the foundationalist is no longer able to appeal to further reasons, questions, or inquiries 
(Short, 2000: 1). As Short maintains, Peirce’s view must leave open the possibility for further 
inquiry, and it is thoroughgoing antifoundationalism that could do so. 
3.4.1 Short on the Experiential Interpretation 
After outlining the commitments of thoroughgoing antifoundationalism – and pointing out what 
it rejects – Short goes on to offer an experiential interpretation of the “Fixation.” The following 
statement by Short encapsulates the primary motivation for his reading: “…[The “Fixation”] is 
important most of all for the form in which it is written; for that form exhibits the manner in 
which revisions of method are prompted by the experience of following a method” (Short, 2000: 
3). That is, according to Short, it is an experience of following the methods themselves, not an 
attempt to provide arguments for them, let alone an attempt to supply foundations, which reflects 
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Peirce’s approach in the “Fixation.” In the following example, Short expresses how the 
experiential (non-argumentative) approach applies: 
[If] I say, ‘Go look at that flower: it is blue,’ it is your experience of looking at the 
flower, and not what I say (or not that alone), that leads you to agree with me. That’s not 
an argument, but it works just as well, or better, to convince you. Peirce’s way of 
showing the inadequacy of the first three methods of fixing belief was like that. Or 
something like it; for there is a difference between observing an effect on someone else 
and experiencing that effect oneself (Short, 2000: 4).  
In further supporting his experiential reading, Short claims that it best explains Peirce’s 
introduction of the social impulse when he brings up the method of tenacity. 
Where did the social impulse come from? It pops up unannounced, like a rabbit out of a 
hat. Nothing is said to establish its existence or to indicate that we are to assume it. But 
that’s the point: it is not to be assumed prior to rejecting the method of tenacity. We come 
upon this impulse in finding that tenacity fails to fix our beliefs. We do not recognize the 
social impulse (qua cognitive principle) in ourselves without experiencing the way 
others’ contrary opinions make us doubt our own (added emphasis; Short, 2000: 5).  
Short goes on to apply his experiential reading to each of the non-scientific methods, and each 
time he does so he aims to show that Peirce is calling for us, as readers, to experience what it 
would be like to follow each of the methods. Short maintains that the above passage is powerful 
evidence that his reading reflects Peirce’s thoroughgoing antifoundationalism and what Peirce 
was intending to have us see. 
3.4.2 Two Interpretive Difficulties: Methods and Postponement 
Without taking up the many pieces of evidence that Short adduces for his reading, I mean to turn 
now to the two longstanding interpretive difficulties that he claims his reading resolves. The first 
difficulty concerns why Peirce chooses to focus on the non-scientific methods that he does. The 
second is over how the method of scientific investigation appears to postpone the fixation of 
belief indefinitely. 
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  Relying on the work of other commentators, including Murphey (1961) and Scheffler 
(1974), Short maintains that Peirce’s selection of the non-scientific methods, on the surface, 
appears arbitrary (Short, 2000: 11). For example, Short mentions Murphey’s judgment that the 
methods are ill-sorted and ahistorical, so that Murphey goes on to say that they are “straw 
methods” (Murphey, 1961: 165). That is, according to Murphey, Peirce picks the methods as 
ones that he can conveniently knock down to exhibit the strengths of the method of scientific 
investigation. While Short refrains from accusing Peirce of being disingenuous, he agrees with 
Murphey’s general assessment that Peirce’s selection requires scrutiny and explanation. As we 
can anticipate, Short holds that the non-scientific methods are ones where we are to experience 
the doubt that Peirce casts on each of them. According to Short, Peirce orders the methods in 
such a way as to make us see the need for an experiential reading and to have us accept the 
commitments and consequences of thoroughgoing antifoundationalism. 
The second interpretive difficulty appears to be more serious than the first. For, it looks 
as though Peirce espouses the method of scientific investigation for the reason that it leads to the 
fixation of belief, but that method appears to postpone the fixation indefinitely (Short, 2000: 8). 
Worse yet, Short points out that the method of scientific investigation tends to unsettle many of 
our existing beliefs. With each further experience, study, or finding, there seems to be a 
continual updating of beliefs, at least over years and decades. If we generalize this point, looking 
beyond our lifetime, the difficulty is even more formidable, since each generation looks back on 
the errors and benighted ways of the previous generation. Our beliefs tend to be upset, one after 
another. On such a massive scale, experimental science continually seems to unfix our beliefs. 
Given as much, why does Peirce espouse this method, if the aim of inquiry is the ultimate 
fixation of belief? Short proposes an elegant answer. Peirce is a thoroughgoing 
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antifoundationalist, and he must remain open and tolerant to revision of belief, even on a massive 
scale. Accordingly, the method of scientific investigation postpones the ultimate fixation and it 
does so indefinitely. Short concludes that so much is consistent with his reading, if not offers the 
strongest evidence for it. 
3.4.3 Short’s Reading versus a Communal Inferentialist Reading 
Turning now to an evaluation of Short’s reading, Short is correct that Peirce rejects 
foundationalism, especially the epistemological variant of that position. For example, in The 
Road of Inquiry, Skagestad provides an account of Peirce’s “rejection of the ‘foundation’ 
metaphor,” as he cites Peirce’s critique of Cartesianism and Peirce’s similarity to other anti-
foundationalist philosophers such as W.V.O. Quine and Otto Neurath (Skagestad, 1981: 17-19). 
Skagestad points out that, according to Peirce, there is no way “to step outside the confines of 
our actual knowledge to some sort of Archimedean point from which to evaluate and justify our 
entire body of knowledge” (Skagestad, 1981: 19). Peirce further rejects the foundationalist 
demand to begin inquiry with basic beliefs, since he maintains that our minds are unable to tell 
which cognitions could count as non-inferential knowledge. He makes an argument to that effect 
in his Cognition Series, which I took up in Chapter One. Without repeating it, I will simply point 
out that Short is correct about Peirce’s denial of foundationalism. On that score, Short’s reading 
is impeccable.  
However, is Peirce a thoroughgoing antifoundationalist in the way Short says he is? That 
position involves more than the denial of epistemological foundationalism. It holds that any aim 
or method of inquiry remains open to revision. In response, I cannot see a good reason to hold 
that Peirce is a thoroughgoing antifoundationalist, especially with what he maintains about 
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inquiry (e.g., that there is an aim of inquiry, that its object is the fixation of belief, that it requires 
a community to reach our epistemic goals).  
As for Short’s experiential reading, the evidence he cites for it is uneven and sometimes 
odd. Consider the case of looking at a flower, and now compare it to the case of experiencing 
doubt in the face of peer disagreement. The two cases are quite different, as the one is a 
perceptual experience, while the other may give rise to real doubt, but it is not a perceptual 
experience in any plain sense. However, Short glosses over the differences, as though the cases 
could equally support his reading. I contend that Short must explain in clearer detail how the two 
cases are alike. Furthermore, when Peirce describes peer disagreement of this sort – for example, 
when he cites the social impulse – Short must have a way to explain the distinctive new step that 
Peirce refers to; that is, the step to see another’s thoughts, beliefs, and doubts as equivalent to 
one’s own. An experiential reading does not seem to capture what Peirce is seeking to have us 
consider when it comes to that new step, though it is the central point that Peirce means for us to 
grasp. What is clear is that the insight we gain in grasping it is unlike looking at, say, a rose or 
tulip; and hence, this difference presents a challenge for Short’s reading. 
The case of peer disagreement brings me to Short’s proposal about how to resolve the 
first difficulty regarding Peirce’s choice of methods. Without meaning to be overly forceful, I 
would argue that Short’s reading fails to engage with the central problem of the “Fixation” 
concerning how the fixation of belief must be responsive to a growing community. As I see it, 
Peirce selects and orders the non-scientific methods as he does to show why each of them is 
incapable of being communal enough. That is, they provide no means of possibly resolving peer 
disagreement. They leave us in the condition where epistemic individualism can take over, so 
that an individual – or group of individuals – can claim to have knowledge despite disagreeing 
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with their peers. Whatever our assessment of the situation may be, Peirce finds it objectionable, 
and he intends for the method of scientific investigation to offer the path towards agreement and 
the fixation of belief. Short’s experiential reading fails to address this problem along with 
Peirce’s solution to it. However, as I argued, a communal inferentialist reading sharpens the 
focus on this chief problem in the “Fixation.” 
Although Short claims that his reading resolves the second difficulty concerning the 
indefinite postponement of the fixation of belief, the evidence points in another direction. Rather, 
it relates to Peirce’s inferential commitment to induction, which may postpone the fixation of 
belief indefinitely. The reason is that induction is a sampling process, which cannot stipulate or 
determine any limit on the number of samples we would need to take to reach a generalization 
that would represent the facts. The key point is the following: since the method of scientific 
investigation relies on the patterns of correct inference, including induction, the method is likely 
to lead to the postponement of the fixation of belief in many cases. Seen in this light, such 
postponement is not an anomaly, but an expectation we should have about the method of 
scientific investigation. Curiously, Short appears to recognize this point about induction, even 
though he does not draw the connection to indefinite postponement in the way I have.59 For 
example, Short writes,  
Peirce argued that induction cannot be relied upon to give us the right answer in the short 
run and, hence, that inductive reasoning has no validity for anyone who cannot conceive 
of himself as a member of an indefinitely extended community (Short, 2000: 8).  
 
Notice the last line in Short’s statement concerning the indefinitely extended community. Peirce 
insists that the success of the inductive process requires a communal effort. To put it briefly, the 
                                               
59 Short relates this point about induction to his thoroughgoing antifoundationalist reading. However, as I have been 
urging, when we see the “Fixation” in light of the communal inferentialist reading, the idea of indefinite 
postponement makes sense. It is what we would expect, given Peirce’s commitments about induction, community, 
and inference. 
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idea is that, since induction requires an ongoing sampling process, the community of inferential 
beings, as it continues to grow, must continue to take samples. For any given issue, at some 
point, we are likely to have taken enough inductions to represent the facts, though there is no 
guarantee. Lastly, there is one further piece of evidence I wish to draw attention to, which relates 
to the problem of epistemic individualism. Along with the postponement that induction tends to 
cause, there is another source of such postponement. Peirce highlights this source in the 
following statement: “The arbitrary will or other individual peculiarities of a sufficiently large 
number of minds may postpone the general agreement in that [final] opinion indefinitely” (added 
emphasis; W2: 469). Again, a communal inferentialist reading of the “Fixation” exposes the 
problem of epistemic individualism. Overall, in reply to the second difficulty, I submit that a 
communal inferentialist reading is more plausible than Short’s experiential reading.  
3.5 Conclusion 
The “Fixation” tends to be a puzzling article, despite it likely being Peirce’s most influential 
paper. Though it is sometimes voiced, the charge that Peirce is simply confused in the “Fixation” 
requires a reminder. Peirce’s “Fixation” is not a stand-alone piece, but the first of six papers in 
the Illustrations of the Logic of Science series. He does not articulate the logic of science until 
after the first two papers of the series. In response to the longstanding difficulties concerning the 
“Fixation” and Short’s alternative reading (an interpretation he provides to explain the 
difficulties), I maintain that a communal inferentialist reading of the “Fixation” clears them up. It 
furthermore shows that Short’s reading is rather puzzling. Overall, a communal inferentialist 
reading tracks a central problem in the “Fixation,” the problem of epistemic individualism. When 
seen in connection to his theory of inquiry, this reading provides the right focus, as it unpacks 
many of the key assumptions that Peirce builds into the method of scientific investigation. 
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4 CHAPTER FOUR 
Peirce’s View of Truth as Public 
 
Unless truth be recognized as public –, as that of which any person would come to be 
convinced if he carried his inquiry, his sincere search for immovable belief, far enough,– 
then there will be nothing to prevent each one of us from adopting an utterly futile belief 
of his own which all the rest will disbelieve. Each one will set himself up as a little 
prophet; that is, a little “crank,” a half-witted victim of his own narrowness (original 
emphasis; The Peirce/Welby Correspondence, 1908).60  
 
In the previous chapter, I argued that Peirce’s communal inferentialism provides us with an 
illuminating framework in which to see what is at issue in “The Fixation of Belief,” particularly 
when it comes to the problem of fixing belief not just in the individual but also in the 
community. In this concluding chapter, I aim to clarify Peirce’s view of truth as public, a view 
that Peirce briefly develops in the “Fixation” and “How to Make Our Ideas Clear” but continues 
to refine in his later writings. When Peirce develops this view of truth, he does so in response to 
the problem that the method of tenacity raises, as that method tends to generate an extreme form 
of epistemic individualism. Recall that in the “Fixation” Peirce holds that the social impulse is 
what pushes the tenacious individual into communal inquiry. As the epigraph suggests, Peirce 
maintains that if we fail to recognize that truth is public we are liable to become the victims of 
our tenacity or private beliefs. The epigraph from 1908, then, may seem merely to echo what 
Peirce had already said in the “Fixation” about thirty years prior. However, there is more to this 
story, for it is noteworthy that Peirce, post-“Fixation,” deploys a different line of reasoning in 
reaction to the problem of tenacity. In his later writings, Peirce tends to appeal to the nature of 
experience, not the social impulse, as the initial factor that pushes the tenacious individual 
towards the realization that truth cannot be private. In spelling out his account of experience and 
                                               
60 SS: 73. 
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its connection to truth, Peirce insists that, “The essence of truth lies in its resistance to being 
ignored” (CP 2.139). While experience is one compulsive force, there is another such force, 
according to Peirce, that helps us see why he holds that truth must be public. For, Peirce 
maintains that, “Truth consists in the definitive compulsion of the investigating intelligence” (CP 
2.333). The goal of clarifying Peirce’s view of truth as public, then, requires one to take into 
account both compulsive forces – in the form of experience and the investigating intelligence – 
and to show why epistemic individualism is bound to fail.  
 In three parts, I will take up the task of elucidating Peirce’s view of truth as public. First, 
I will raise what I shall refer to as the problem of tenacity, which principally concerns the 
extreme form of epistemic individualism that the method of tenacity tends to produce. Second, I 
will explain what Peirce means by experience, and will provide that explanation in the context of 
his theory of inquiry. Third, I will focus on what Peirce calls the investigating intelligence, and 
will relate it to his pragmatic maxim or procedure for spelling out the meaning of the idea of 
truth. 
4.1 The Problem of Tenacity: Truth as Private 
What I am calling the problem of tenacity refers to how Peirce, especially in the “Fixation,” 
intends to show what is wrong with both the method of tenacity and the tenacious individual. 
According to Peirce, whenever challenged, the tenacious individual will repeat the following sort 
of mantra about truth: “He will say, ‘I hold steadfastly to the truth, and the truth is always 
wholesome” (W3: 249). While the tenacious individual may incessantly repeat such a line to 
himself, truth is not something that could be just for the individual. After all, tenacious 
individuals are likely to have conflicting opinions with other such individuals. That is, two 
tenacious individuals may keep telling themselves that their beliefs are true and that they have 
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integrity for clinging to them, but when their beliefs conflict, eventually they must gain some 
sense that the truth is beyond any individual’s conviction. Although there appear to be rather 
obvious difficulties with the method of tenacity, curiously, Peirce admires several aspects of this 
method, including “its strength, simplicity, and directness” (W3: 256). However, Peirce tempers 
his praise for tenacity and the individual who adheres to it by pointing out that, “It is impossible 
not to envy the man who can dismiss reason, although we know how it must turn out at last” 
(W3: 256). On this point about ignoring reason, Peirce aims to show how tenacity must 
inevitably fail so that tenacity cannot be the method that would ultimately fix belief. 
Nevertheless, it is not easy to show the tenacious individual why the method must fail 
since such an individual thinks that maintaining any personal belief or conviction is the mark of 
integrity. Given this, the extent to which such an individual seeks to sustain beliefs tends to be 
exaggerated and even comical, so that Peirce compares the tenacious individual to the proverbial 
ostrich (W3: 249). When the tenacious individual confronts the threat of doubt, that individual 
will recoil, burying his head in the sand. Outside the insulated method of tenacity, the process of 
social or communal inquiry always makes the individual face the danger of real doubt, so that the 
tenacious individual must go to great lengths in the attempt to make himself the locus of 
knowledge and to regard his private beliefs as true. According to Peirce, the method of tenacity, 
then, leads to this form of raw and extreme epistemic individualism. However, the key question, 
as I have suggested, is how to expose the faults of tenacity and the individualism it tends to 
generate. 
 Now as I mentioned in the introduction to this chapter, although Peirce deals with the 
method of tenacity in many of his writings, he primarily targets this method in the “Fixation.” 
For the moment, I will take up how he deals with tenacity in the “Fixation” and some of his 
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writings pre-“Fixation,” since he deploys a different line of reasoning against this method post-
“Fixation.” In the “Fixation,” Peirce means to expose the problem of tenacity’s epistemic 
individualism in two key ways. First, Peirce attempts to show why we need to fix belief not just 
in the individual but also in the community, however much that community may grow. This 
problem is the chief one from the “Fixation,” which was a focal point of Chapter Three, so I will 
limit my remarks about it in this chapter. Second, Peirce seeks to show inquirers why inquiry 
needs to be communal and why they need to espouse the method of scientific investigation, 
which Peirce argues is the only method that could ultimately fix belief. At the critical place in the 
“Fixation” where Peirce introduces the method of scientific investigation, he makes sure to point 
out this method’s commitment to what he refers to as an “external permanence” (W3: 253). At 
that juncture in the “Fixation,” where he introduces and outlines the method of scientific 
investigation, Peirce criticizes the method of tenacity for failing to recognize the conception of 
truth as public. Put briefly, he says that, “…the conception of truth as something public is not yet 
developed” in the method of tenacity (W3: 253). As I see it, these two ways express Peirce’s 
attempt to solve the problem of tenacity in the “Fixation,” and I will centre the subsequent 
discussion in this section on them. Both ways underscore the pair of forces that Peirce maintains 
would eventually compel us to see that truth cannot be private. The first feature concerns the 
conclusions we draw from our investigating intelligence, while the second concerns the force of 
experience (though, to reiterate, post-“Fixation,” Peirce reverses their order of appearance). 
 In the “Fixation,” Peirce introduces the method of tenacity at the very point where he 
intends to show that the aim or object of inquiry is the settlement of opinion. To be clear about 
what Peirce means by the settlement of opinion, he means by it the same thing as the fixation of 
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belief (see: W2: 18).61 The term belief, however, may be more apt, considering that Peirce holds 
that belief involves a habit of action, while the term opinion may not suggest that connection as 
clearly as it should.62 As Peirce sees it, in light of what he takes to be the aim of inquiry, the 
method of tenacity presents a formidable initial challenge:  
If the settlement of opinion is the sole object of inquiry, and if belief is of the nature of 
habit, why should we not attain the desired end, by taking any answer to a question which 
we may fancy, and constantly reiterating it to ourselves, dwelling on all which may 
conduce to that belief, and learning to turn with contempt and hatred from anything that 
might disturb it? (W3: 250). 
Peirce treats this question as a genuine one, not a rhetorical question, as we can tell by how he 
engages it. In an early draft of the “Fixation,” where Peirce refers to the method of tenacity as the 
method of obstinacy, he states that the simplest attempt to fix belief is by “obstinate adhering to 
whatever happens to be one’s existing opinions” (W3: 18). Returning to a point mentioned 
above, Peirce observes that the tenacious individual fails to listen to reason in the way that “a 
rational person will” (W2: 355-356). The tenacious individual tends to display willed ignorance 
akin to that of the fanatic or religious zealot. Peirce considers whether the tenacious individual 
who adheres to tenacity and engages in such willed ignorance could do so in the long run, 
especially in the face of all the challenges that such an individual would have to encounter. In the 
same vein, Peirce insists that the method of tenacity cannot hold its ground in practice (W3: 
250).  
For all Peirce’s focus on the method of tenacity, we can ask the following simple critical 
question to figure out Peirce’s motivation in this case. Why should it matter to Peirce – or us, for 
                                               
61 Prior to the “Fixation,” in his writings from the early 1870s, Peirce discusses the final opinion. The final opinion 
and the fixation of belief refer to the same thing; namely, it is the conclusion that the community of inquirers would 
reach if they were to push inquiry as far as it could go.  
62 It is further noteworthy that Peirce takes habits to be governing or mediating our conduct in lawful ways. I take 
him to be suggesting as much when he casts belief in terms of a habit or rule of action. A belief is, Peirce says, of 
the nature of a habit.  
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that matter – if some individuals, even a large population, were to remain simply stubborn and 
ultra-individualistic? According to Peirce, such people would fail to make intellectual progress, 
but perhaps there is simply no way to move such individuals from their beliefs; and so, they may 
remain as they are despite our best efforts to include them in communal inquiry. The question is 
about why Peirce should care so much about tackling the problem of tenacity since it might be 
that some people just are tenacious and individualistic. Now in response, it is worth noting that 
Peirce published the “Fixation” in the Journal of Popular Science, intending the article and his 
other articles that appear there for a wide readership. Given the major theme of community in the 
“Fixation,” Peirce means to address an audience of everyday educated people and have them 
appreciate the significance of that theme and its consequences. Given as much, I do not regard 
the method of tenacity as merely a foil for Peirce to reveal the merits of the method of science. 
Rather, Peirce places considerable value on showing why the method of tenacity is doomed to 
fail, and a large part of the motivation is Peirce’s belief that “This simple and direct method is 
really pursued by many men” (W3: 249). Considering that Peirce believes tenacity to be so 
widely accepted, he sees the method as preventing his contemporaries from appreciating that 
such a form of extreme epistemic individualism is bound to fail. According to Peirce, vast 
numbers of people would be wasting their efforts if they were to follow the method of tenacity 
and would remain in the condition of extreme epistemic individualism. As with many other 
philosophers, Peirce makes it a goal of his to help us avoid false beliefs that add to the 
intellectual waste that he so often finds regrettable. To adapt a line from “How to Make Our 
Ideas Clear,” when it comes to the method of tenacity, Peirce might remark that, ‘it is terrible to 
see the victims of their individuality, with all their intellectual vigour, pine away in the midst of 
intellectual plenty’ (W3: 261).  
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Now in some of Peirce’s writings pre-“Fixation,” there is material to consider that helps 
us see why he takes his appeal to the social impulse, in the “Fixation,” as an adequate reply to 
the problem of tenacity. For example, in a manuscript from 1872, Peirce holds that the method of 
tenacity (or obstinacy) might be effective for “the term of a man’s life,” but over a longer haul, 
the method could not sustain itself in practice because we are “influenced by one another, even if 
not by reason” (W3: 18). Given the above concern about intellectual waste, the limited 
effectiveness of tenacity may provide Peirce with some solace; and the statement indicates how 
Peirce looks to the social impulse to show that tenacity could not ultimately hold its ground in 
practice. That is, as the social impulse increases, there would be fewer and fewer followers of 
tenacity, to the point where there would be no more followers of that method; rather, there would 
be more followers of the communal method of inquiry, namely, the method of science. As Peirce 
observes in “How to Make Our Ideas Clear,” “the method of tenacity never prevailed 
exclusively; reason is too natural to men for that” (W3: 272). This remark about the naturalness 
of our reason exhibits the connection that Peirce sees our investigating intelligence as having on 
his original solution to the problem of tenacity.  
If we connect some of these points, it appears that Peirce claims to have solved the 
problem of tenacity in the “Fixation” by pointing out that, “The method of tenacity will be 
unable to hold its ground in practice. The social impulse is against it” (W3: 250). From there 
Peirce goes on to note something quite significant to the development of our investigating 
intelligence. He says that the tenacious individual takes “a distinctly new step, and a highly 
important one”; and the step is to see that another person’s “thought or sentiment may be 
equivalent to one’s own” (W3: 250). As I read Peirce, this is the crucial step in the “Fixation” 
away from epistemic individualism and the step towards communal inquiry. Even in some early 
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writings, Peirce alludes to this crucial step, but he emphasizes its connection to doubt and the 
role of doubt in inquiry. In the “Practical Logic” (1869-70), a manuscript that provides an early 
blueprint of the “Fixation,” Peirce asks whether “the resolution of my doubt is more my object in 
an investigation than the production of unanimity of others” (W2: 355). Peirce answers that, “no 
sensible man will be void of doubt as long as persons as competent to judge as himself differ 
from him” (original emphasis; W2: 355). Notice that Peirce is here endorsing a communal model 
of doubt, which I described in detail in Chapter One. As we can tell by Peirce’s emphasis, what 
is most significant about this development is that individuals start to see the doubts of other 
inquirers as equivalent to their doubts. While in the “Practical Logic” Peirce does not call this a 
distinctly new step in inquiry, the parallel is strong enough to regard what he says in the 
“Practical Logic” as preparing the ground for what he says in the “Fixation.”  
Peirce’s solution to the problem of tenacity is that he turns first to the social impulse and 
then sees that impulse as leading to the distinctly new step in inquiry, which speaks to the early 
development of our investigating intelligence. But now we may ask what role experience plays 
in “Fixation,” and in particular, we need to know how it relates to the problem of tenacity. It is 
worth noting a broad criticism Peirce makes that relates to all of the non-scientific methods of 
fixing belief. He says that those methods fail to make “…any distinction of a right and a wrong” 
way of settling belief (W3: 254). Concerning tenacity, Peirce claims that, “If I adopt the method 
of tenacity and shut myself out from all influences, whatever I think necessary to doing this is 
necessary according to that method” (emphasis added; W3: 254). According to Peirce, the same 
lesson applies, mutatis mutandis, to the methods of authority and a priority, the other non-
scientific methods. As Peirce sees it, the problem boils down to how these methods fail to remain 
sensitive to the facts and fail to have any commitment to there being an external permanency, 
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which would provide the distinction between right and wrong or a general standard of 
correctness for our beliefs.   
The most straightforward thing to say about the external permanency is that Peirce takes 
it to refer to external reality (W3: 253). By external reality, Peirce means that it is something that 
is not of our making and that impinges on us, constraining our minds and thoughts (W3: 29; W3: 
34). Recall that reality, according to Peirce, must be independent of what you, I, or any other 
individual thinks about it.63 The significance of the hypothesis that there is an external 
permanency or external reality provides a standard of correctness by which to evaluate our 
beliefs; and so, a method of fixing belief, according to Peirce, would need to be responsive to 
such a permanency. Consequently, the non-scientific methods tend to show the fingerprints of an 
all-too-human effort to fix belief; and so, eventually, we would doubt the non-scientific methods 
for that reason. The following passage links many of these points together and further shows 
what is lacking about the method of tenacity:  
To satisfy our doubts, therefore, it is necessary that a method should be found by which 
our beliefs may be caused by nothing human, but by some external permanency – by 
something upon which our thinking has no effect. Some mystics imagine that they have 
such a method in a private inspiration from on high. But that is only a form of the method 
of tenacity, in which the conception of truth as something public is not yet developed 
(added emphasis; W3: 253). 
 
                                               
63 Peirce’s conception of reality is quite complex since he maintains that reality must be independent of what any 
individual thinks about it – that is, reality is unaffected by what we think about it – yet reality is the object of the 
conclusion that the ideal community of inquirers would reach in the long run. As I sought to show in parts of 
Chapter One and Chapter Two, Peirce’s view of reality relates to the conclusion that would be the end of inference 
and the processes required for doubt-resolution, prejudice-elimination, and the overcoming of error and ignorance. 
The key to what appears to be such a complex view of reality is to see that it is supposed to be the opposite of 
fiction, error, ignorance, and anything that depends on the individual or some set of individuals. In brief, our idea of 
reality, according to Peirce, is a communal notion. We are heading towards it as we go through these processes of 
correction, but we can tell what it would be, since we can explicate our notion of reality by having an understanding 
of such processes, which we go through in ordinary life.   
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This passage appears in the final section of the “Fixation,” a few pages after the introduction of 
the social impulse. The passage contains the first and only instance of Peirce explicitly 
discussing the conception of truth as public in the “Fixation.” 
 But why, we may ask, could not the social impulse alone push tenacious individuals 
toward recognizing that truth must be public? An aspect of the first part of the problem now 
appears in a new light, since Peirce had conceded that, “Unless we make ourselves hermits, we 
shall necessarily influence each other’s opinions; so that the problem becomes how to fix belief, 
not in the individual merely, but in the community” (W3: 250). Although Peirce never said so, 
presumably, the same exception about becoming extreme recluses would allow the mystics to 
shut out all influences and repeat their private truths to themselves. Now I believe that Peirce, in 
the “Fixation,” had meant to stress both how the social impulse and experience show how we 
cannot help but recognize truth as something public. However, he did not fully spell out the 
argument. As I see it, he thought that experience was too strong for individuals to try to make 
truth private, and that the social impulse would add a further form of compulsion. It is these two-
pronged compulsive aspects that I believe require greater focus in what follows to elucidate 
Peirce’s view of truth as public. In sum, I hold that the problem of tenacity and its form of 
extreme epistemic individualism led Peirce to have to modify his arguments for why truth must 
be public.  
4.1.1 Truth and Inquiry 
Peirce tends to discuss truth in terms of its relation to the upshot of inquiry – or the conclusion of 
the inferential and communal process – rather than to talk about truth directly. It is common in 
the literature to cast Peirce’s account of truth in terms of the end or aim of inquiry. The 
terminology is apt, as Peirce relies on his theory of inquiry to make sense of truth, and then he 
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employs his pragmatism to clarify what we mean by truth. While I shall take up how he 
establishes the connection between his theory of inquiry and his pragmatism, to grasp why Peirce 
approaches the question of truth in a rather indirect way, it is worth turning to a few of his early 
statements about truth. For example, in the “Practical Logic” (1869-70), Peirce maintains the 
following:  
That which we seek in an investigation is called truth, but what distinct conception ought 
to be attached to this word is so difficult to say, that it seems better to describe the object 
of an investigation by a character which belongs to it and to it alone…a genuine 
investigation is undertaken to resolve the doubts of the investigator (W2: 355). 
In a further passage from the same work, Peirce offers a vivid description of the difficulty. 
We wish to ascertain truth, but what is truth? This is an indispensable inquiry if we so 
define the function of reason, yet it would plunge us at once into a sea of metaphysics 
from which we could not hope soon to emerge (W2: 357). 
Instead of entering “a sea of metaphysics” and running the risk of falling into confusion about 
what truth is, Peirce tends to look towards “the final settlement of opinion,” which would be the 
result of all possible experience and reasoning (W2: 352). Peirce’s cautionary use of the term 
metaphysics is deliberate, as we can tell from the following statement from “What Pragmatism 
Is” (1905): 
You only puzzle yourself by talking of this metaphysical ‘truth’ and metaphysical 
‘falsity’…Your problems would be greatly simplified, if, instead of saying that you want 
to know the ‘Truth,’ you were simply to say that you want to attain a state of belief 
unassailable by doubt (EP2: 336). 
By metaphysical truth, Peirce means that it is supposed to transcend the mind, so that it would be 
incognizable. For reasons that are difficult to spell out succinctly, Peirce rejects anything that we 
claim to be incognizable or a thing-in-itself, since he maintains that no meaning could attach to 
such an idea of such a thing. Accordingly, Peirce insists that a concept, to have meaning, must be 
cognizable, where that holds that it must be possible for it to relate to a mind. The issue is 
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difficult, but it should become clearer why Peirce insists on this constraint about cognizability 
when I turn to his pragmatic maxim in the final section of this chapter.  
Now to prevent a misconception, it is not Peirce’s view that we should dispense with 
metaphysics, even if he rejects a metaphysical view of truth and falsity. According to Peirce, the 
less we face up to the metaphysical assumptions that we make, the more likely we are 
unwittingly to assume unwanted metaphysical baggage. In a quotation that cancels any 
suggestion that Peirce intends to abandon metaphysics, he maintains the following view: “Find a 
scientific man who proposes to get along without any metaphysics and you have found one 
whose doctrines are thoroughly vitiated by the crude and uncriticized metaphysics with which 
they are packed” (CP 1.130).  
 Since Peirce’s theory of inquiry is a familiar theme from Chapter One, I will limit the 
following comments to only a few that set the contours that Peirce relies on when he aims to 
spell out truth in terms of the end of inquiry. While Peirce often says that the end of inquiry 
would be what all experience and reasoning would issue in, the theory reflects its core 
ingredients of belief and doubt. According to Peirce, the practical side of belief is of the nature of 
a habit, a disposition on which we are ready to act, and the sensational side of it reflects the state 
of satisfaction that we repose in when we are convinced. Likewise, a doubt interrupts belief and 
tends to be an erratic state, while it irritates us or makes us nervous. Peirce maintains that a 
surprise sparks inquiry and leads to real doubt, while a belief terminates inquiry. Accordingly, 
the following statement is representative of Peirce’s view: “Living doubt is the life of 
investigation. When doubt is set at rest inquiry must stop” (W3: 18). Such a statement explains 
why Peirce sometimes claims that the end of inquiry would correspond with a conclusion that is 
unassailable by all possible real doubt. But a more familiar statement that Peirce tends to make is 
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that the end of inquiry would be the fixation of belief; and such a state would be one where there 
could be no living doubt. In that sense, then, we can understand why Peirce looks to clarify our 
concept of truth in terms of the fixation of belief. However, to modify our current thinking as 
well as to inform it, Peirce looks to both experience and real doubt, though we need to be careful 
about what he means by these terms. 
4.2 Peirce on Experience: The Push towards Truth as Public 
About a decade and a half after the “Fixation,” in 1902, Peirce works on the manuscript for a 
book he plans to publish titled, “Why Study Logic?” where he discusses the nature of experience 
and its relation to truth. There, Peirce raises the question of what we mean by truth with an 
imagined interlocutor. The question takes the following form: “What do you mean by there being 
such a thing as Truth? You mean that something is SO – is correct, or just – whether you, or I, or 
anybody thinks it is so or not” (original emphasis; CP 2.132). In seeking to explicate the meaning 
of truth, he takes up the further question of what experience means.64   
 In the same manuscript, Peirce characterizes experience in the following terms: 
“Experience is that determination of belief and cognition generally which the course of life has 
forced upon man. One may lie about it but one cannot escape the fact that some things are forced 
upon his cognition” (original emphasis; CP 2.139). Often Peirce describes experience as an 
“outward clash,” as something that causes resistance – action and reaction – and something not 
of our own making (CP 8.41).65 According to Peirce, to put it roughly, experience involves a 
dyadic relation between the experiencer and the object experienced. To gain a better grasp of 
                                               
64 In the “Fixation,” Peirce mentioned in passing a prescientific sense of experience, ‘which can teach anything,’ and 
a more scientific sense of experience. As for the latter sense, Peirce associated it with Francis Bacon and the rise of 
experimental science (W3: 243).  
65 Bernstein offers the following helpful clarification of what Peirce meant by experience. “The feature of 
experience that Peirce most wants to emphasize…involves bruteness, constraint, ‘over-and-againstness.’” 
(Bernstein, 2010: 132). 
122 
 
what Peirce means by experience, consider a vivid example of his that I have slightly modified in 
what follows. Say, I am out for a walk and in a state of reverie, so that I am mostly unaware of 
my surroundings. In this dream-like state, there is no sense of compulsion or force (EP2: 4). Up 
ahead, without my being aware of it, a team of movers are frantically working and carrying a 
ladder. Suddenly – bang! – the ladder hits the back of my head. Even if it was an accident, and I 
did not mean to resist the ladder, Peirce maintains that, “you must have resisted with a force 
equal to that of the blow” (CP 5.45). In using the example of the ladder, Peirce means to 
illustrate how experience must involve action and reaction, an outward clash, which often results 
in surprise. To avoid a misconception, Peirce does not reduce all cognition to experience, so 
construed. According to Peirce, to do so is the great mistake of the nominalists, who maintain 
that the only real beings are concrete individual things, which sometimes crash into one 
another.66 To take a further example, Peirce says that if we seek to have a clear idea of what 
experience means, we can go to a doorframe and firmly push our shoulder against it (CP 5.45). 
In that case, we become aware of resistance and reaction, which are the marks of experience, 
according to Peirce. Along with the example of the ladder, this case illustrates the dyadic relation 
that Peirce says is distinctive of experience. 
 In his later writings, post-“Fixation,” and after the Illustrations series, Peirce relates what 
he means by experience to the question of truth. His examples above draw attention to the 
compulsive or forceful aspect of experience, which he relates to the compulsive character of 
truth. While Peirce is rather sure that his contemporaries will accept the points he is making 
about the compulsive aspect of experience, he is doubtful that they will regard truth in the same 
                                               
66 I am not assuming that nominalism is a theory about collision, but rather I am underscoring Peirce’s view that 
nominalists hold that only individual things are real, that such things do exist, and that such things can react to one 
another. 
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way. In the following passage from 1902, Peirce draws the comparison between experience and 
truth in a thought-provoking manner by bringing up the case of tenacious individuals who seek 
to shut their eyes to the compulsive and public character of experience and truth.   
The very opinion entertained by those who deny that there is any Truth, in the sense 
defined, is that it is not force, but their inward freedom which determines their 
experiential cognition. But this opinion is flatly contradicted by their own experience. 
They insist upon shutting their eyes to the element of compulsion, although it is directly 
experienced by them. The very fact that they can and do so shut their eyes confirms the 
proof that fact is independent of opinion about it (CP 2.138). 
In the passage, if the connection to experience, so construed, is not obvious, then consider the 
following statement that follows that passage: “Deceive yourself as you may, you have a direct 
experience of something reacting against you...The essence of truth lies in its resistance to being 
ignored” (CP 2.139).  
Now as I see it, in the “Fixation,” Peirce had wished to present such a line of evidence to 
show that the method of tenacity must fail and cannot make truth something private. That is, the 
tenacious individual’s attempt to shut out all evidence or act like the proverbial ostrich confirms 
that the tenacious individual is pretending to ignore what that individual can only ignore for so 
long. According to Peirce, our thoughts and beliefs need to be responsive to an external 
permanency or an external reality, which impinges on us. In conceding as much, we are 
admitting that we have experiences, in the sense that Peirce outlines, and that there is a source of 
such experiences, which is not of our own making. There is a compulsive element of experience, 
then, and Peirce maintains that it is something that cannot be private, however much even the 
most tenacious individual seeks to ignore it. Now the further reason I maintain that Peirce meant 
to deploy this sort of argument in the “Fixation” is that the initial push it provides towards a 
public conception of truth is more compelling than is his original argument. Recall that, in the 
“Fixation,” Peirce had argued that the social impulse would be enough to force the tenacious 
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individual to engage in communal inquiry. But Peirce had to admit that the argument could not 
apply to those tenacious individuals who were recluses or did not participate in social life. The 
argument above that rests on Peirce’s account of experience can apply to all tenacious 
individuals. Crucially, this argument preserves how Peirce presents his hypothesis of reality in 
the “Fixation,” where he holds that the method of scientific investigation assumes an external 
reality that is the source or origin of experience.67 
4.2.1 The Struggle against Real Doubt 
One of Peirce’s firm commitments in the “Fixation” and throughout his writings is that 
experience can be a source of surprise, which, in turn, tends to upset belief and leads to the 
struggle against real doubt. Peirce often defines inquiry in terms of such a struggle, claiming that 
when the struggle ceases, so too does the thinking or reasoning that accompanies inquiry. At the 
point where the struggle ends (unless the cause is the inquirer’s death), Peirce maintains that it is 
because belief supplants real doubt. Accordingly, since he elucidates our concept of truth in 
terms of the end of inquiry, Peirce considers whether a compulsory belief would be what we 
would arrive at if we were to reach the truth. The following passage helps to explicate what 
Peirce means by the fixation of belief. 
“Why dispute? To reach a final and compulsory belief is, therefore, what the reasonable 
disputant aims at. But what he aims at is the truth. Therefore, by the truth he means 
nothing more than a finally compulsory belief” (CP 2.29). 
 
                                               
67 I need to point out, however, that this is not the whole story. Peirce defends a view of reality that admits that there 
is an external permanence, but that looks to the upshot of a communal and inferential process that filters out all 
fiction, error, ignorance, and prejudice (i.e., anything that reflects the idiosyncrasies or vagaries or the individual). 
The process is one that inquirers carry out in the method of scientific investigation. The conclusion of that corrective 
process is what Peirce means by reality, and he regards that conclusion, for those who investigate, to be the most 
compelling conclusion they could reach. To be clear, Peirce does not deny that there is an external permanence; 
rather, he assumes that there is. However, he rejects the nominalist’s view of reality, which assumes that reality is 
the source or origin of our sensations, the concrete individual things themselves. In the body of this chapter, I take 
up these matters in further depth, so I will reserve a discussion of them where it is appropriate. 
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It helps to remember that, in this passage, Peirce assumes that he has already made a persuasive 
case, in the “Fixation,” for why the non-scientific methods could not result in a finally 
compulsive belief. That is, Peirce denies that tenacity, authority, or a priority could be the 
methods that lead to such a belief, because such methods cannot escape real doubt. 
I turn now to a passage from 1902 that elucidates what Peirce means by real doubt and 
the struggle that it creates. I take up this matter since it closely relates to the above points about 
experience and Peirce’s account of truth. Often Peirce talks about real doubt and says that it fuels 
inquiry, though there is the question of what he means by real doubt. The following passage 
elucidates what Peirce has in mind: 
Among the inner shapes which binarity assumes are those of the doubts that are forced 
upon our minds. The very word ‘doubt,’ or ‘dubito,’ is the frequentative of ‘duhibeo’--
i.e., duo habeo, and thus exhibits its binarity. If we did not struggle against doubt, we 
should not seek the truth (CP 2.84). 
A real doubt compels us to attend to it, as it causes, according to Peirce, the irritation of doubt. 
But equally noteworthy, Peirce regards a real doubt as not of our own making, which is why he 
can maintain that it is real.68 In the passage, Peirce draws a close comparison between a real 
doubt and experience, as both exhibit a dyadic or binary relation. Furthermore, similar to 
experience, Peirce maintains that real doubt modifies our current beliefs or present thinking.69 
However, the aim of inquiry, according to Peirce, remains the truth or the fixation of belief. For 
Peirce, the path towards such an aim must rely on the method of scientific investigation and what 
he refers to as the investigating intelligence. 
                                               
68 I am not denying that the contrast class to real doubt is fictitious doubt. Along with fictitious doubt, Peirce 
sometimes talks about paper or Cartesian doubts.  
69 “I call such forcible modification of our ways of thinking the influence of the world of fact or experience” 
(original emphasis; CP 1.321).”  
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4.3 The Investigating Intelligence: Clarifying Truth 
While Peirce is less than explicit about what he means by the investigating intelligence, a 
plausible interpretation is that he is referring to the process of development that comes from the 
inquirer employing the method of scientific investigation and how that development advances 
inquiry towards truth. Insofar as this interpretation is in line with what Peirce means, it further 
connects to his supposition that communal inquiry fuels the process of intellectual growth. With 
the method of scientific investigation in mind, Peirce claims that “all the followers of science are 
fully persuaded that the processes of investigation, if pushed far enough, will give one certain 
solution to every question to which they can be applied” (W3: 273). Even if the investigators fall 
short of reaching such a solution or conclusion, Peirce underscores the spirit of truth-seeking of 
such investigators and their cheerful hope – to borrow Peirce’s term – that such a conclusion 
would obtain if they were to continue investigating (W3: 272-273). 
     In seeking to allow the investigating intelligence to continue to develop as much as it 
could, Peirce aims to remove the barriers that tend to block the road of inquiry. In “The First 
Rule of Logic” from 1898, Peirce insists that, to make sure to leave the way open, we must admit 
general ignorance and cultivate the desire to learn. In the article, Peirce states the following:  
Upon this first, and in one sense this sole, rule of reason, that in order to learn you must 
desire to learn, and in so desiring not be satisfied with what you already incline to think, 
there follows one corollary which itself deserves to be inscribed upon every wall of the 
city of philosophy: Do not block the way of inquiry (added emphasis; EP2: 48).  
 
Expanding on the significance of this rule of reason and a genuine desire to learn, Peirce says 
that they are “for the sake of seeing how the truth may really be” (EP2: 48). This desire to learn 
and the march towards truth have a deep connection to one another, especially when we consider 
them in the context of Peirce’s communal inferentialism and the role of induction in it. For, as 
Peirce says, “The inductive method springs directly out of dissatisfaction with existing 
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knowledge” (EP2: 48). According to Peirce, induction aims at the truth: “The successes of 
modern science ought to convince us that induction is the only capable imperator of truth-
seeking” (8.209). If we ask why induction should have the role of seeking truth, it is because 
induction aims to take samples and to draw generalizations that would represent the facts. 
Crucially, though, the success of induction depends on a communal enterprise, since the 
community must take numerous samples over a vast period; and the number of samples and 
amount of time it would take to achieve so much far exceeds the best efforts of any individual. 
Given the requirements for the success of induction, Peirce insists that we must not obstruct the 
road of inquiry; that is, if we were to interfere with the process of induction, we would impede 
the march towards truth. 
In sketching this proposal for how to develop the investigating intelligence and how to 
move towards truth, Peirce draws attention to the assumptions that stifle such development. In 
particular, the assumptions that create such roadblocks, according to Peirce, include believing 
that there are inexplicable facts or that some facts are utterly unknowable. On this matter, Peirce 
mentions the French positivist Auguste Comte (1798-1857) and his notorious assumption about 
never being able to find out the composition of the stars. In “The First Rule of Logic,” Peirce 
states that, 
 
The second bar which philosophers often set up across the roadway of inquiry lies in 
maintaining that this, that, and the other never can be known. When Auguste Comte was 
pressed to specify any matter of positive fact to the knowledge of which no man could by 
any possibility attain, he instanced the knowledge of the chemical composition of the 
fixed stars; and you may see his answer set down in the Philosophie positive. But the ink 
was scarcely dry upon the printed page before the spectroscope was discovered and that 
which he had deemed absolutely unknowable was well on the way of getting ascertained 
(EP2: 49).  
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Similarly, in “How to Make Our Ideas Clear,” Peirce cites the same example about the stars to 
conclude that, “it is unphilosophical to suppose that, with regard to any given question (which 
has any clear meaning), investigation would not bring forth a solution of it, if it were carried far 
enough” (W3: 274). Pushing the inquiry far enough, however, would require the full 
development of our investigating intelligence and a supreme communal effort. Although Peirce 
tends to concentrate on induction and its role in truth-seeking, it is worth recalling that Peirce 
regards induction as one of three types of inference – the others being abduction and deduction – 
that comprise the communal and inferential process. Overall, Peirce holds that truth would relate 
to the state that would obtain if “inquiry were pushed to its ultimate and indefeasible issue” (CP 
6.485). 
 One way of tying together the threads explored so far is to consider how Peirce clarifies 
the meaning of truth in the companion piece to the “Fixation,” “How to Make Our Ideas Clear.” 
There, Peirce aims to provide a general technique or maxim to figure out what we mean by even 
our most abstract and philosophical terms. Although infrequently quoted, the following passage 
expresses Peirce’s basic motivation in “How to Make Our Ideas Clear”:  
The very first lesson that we have a right to demand that logic shall teach us is, how to 
make our ideas clear…To know what we think, to be masters of our own meaning, will 
make a solid foundation for great and weighty thought (W3: 260).  
 
To achieve such mastery or control of our ideas, Peirce outlines three grades of clarity, each of 
which builds on the next, so that we should not think that after we master the concept in a given 
grade that we can then dispense with it. The first grade is a tacit form of familiarity, where we 
have no hesitancy about how to apply the concept. To illustrate this grade, we can take up the 
example that Peirce uses, which is the concept of hardness. Even children, though they are likely 
to be unable to articulate it, are familiar with what it means for, say, a rock to be hard, and they 
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know that hard things can resist scratching or are not easy to break. As I mentioned above, Peirce 
applies the grades of clarity to our philosophical concepts too, and the one he tends to focus on in 
“How to Make Our Ideas Clear” is that of reality. Peirce claims that even children, at the tacit 
level, know how to apply this concept, since they have a sense of the difference between fictions 
or make-believe and reality. Roughly put, they have a strong hint that there are things that we 
make up and things that are not of our making. Things that are products of our imaginations or 
figments of the mind reflect the individuality of thought. The second grade of clarity is abstract 
definition or being able to formulate the essence of a concept into words. In the case of hardness, 
the definition might be the condition of something being firm and capable of resisting scratching. 
Peirce is eager to apply the second grade to the concept of reality, since he believes that it poses 
a good test to the application of this grade and since he formulates a view of reality that relates to 
his theory of inquiry or conceivable practical effects. Peirce writes,  
It would probably puzzle most men, even among those of a reflective turn of mind, to 
give an abstract definition of the real. Yet such a definition may perhaps be reached by 
considering the points of difference between reality and its opposite, fiction…Thus, we 
may define the real as that whose characters are independent of what anybody may think 
them to be (W3: 271).  
 
However, Peirce does not rest content with this grade as the highest, since we can distinguish 
verbal and real differences between things, and the empirical discoveries that we make to inform 
our concepts go beyond verbal or definitional matters.  
 The third grade of clarity is the pragmatic grade. Peirce spells it out by formulating the 
pragmatic maxim:  
Consider what effects, which might conceivably have practical bearings, we conceive the 
object of our conception to have. Then, our conception of these effects is the whole of our 
conception of the object (W3: 266).70  
                                               
70 Concerning the question of whether Peirce intends for his pragmatic maxim or procedure of attaining conceptual 
clarify to apply to every idea or sign, he limits its application to “…the meaning of intellectual concepts, of those 
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Turning again to the simple example of hardness, Peirce holds that if we were to grasp the sum 
of the conceivable practical effects of the concept, then, we would have a complete apprehension 
of the meaning of the concept. For example, if we were to press a knife’s edge against a 
diamond, then the object would resist scratching.71 If we were to spell out the concept in terms of 
such hypothetical conditionals and were to know what would obtain, we would have a complete 
sense of its meaning and our idea would be clear. But what would obtain would not be just an 
intellectual activity or exercise; rather, we would find that we have certain habits, predictions, 
and expectations that correspond with how to make our ideas clear. That is, we would find that 
we have certain beliefs, say, about what would happen if we were to apply the knife to a hard 
object. Now recall that, according to Peirce, a belief is of the nature of a habit, as it involves a 
disposition to act. Peirce draws quite a broad conclusion in “How to Make Our Ideas Clear,” 
where he states the following: “the whole function of thought is to produce habits of action…To 
develop [a thought’s] meaning, we have, therefore, simply to determine what habits it produces, 
for what a thing means is simply what habits it involves” (W3: 265). By spelling out all the 
conceivable practical bearings of a given concept and knowing the habits of action that would 
surround it or take root, Peirce maintains that we would attain the highest grade of clarity. While 
Peirce does not say so, at this point, it is worth noticing that the connection to habits of action 
and practical bearings reflects the public character of Peirce’s pragmatic grade of clarity. The 
                                               
upon which reasonings may turn” (CP 5.8). That is, Peirce excludes names, feelings, and sensations of colour such 
as of ‘green’ or ‘red,’ since they are not intellectual concepts. 
71 In “How to Make Our Ideas Clear,” Peirce sometimes suggests that the pragmatic test is about what will happen if 
we apply the test, so that it depends on what actually happens. For example, in the example of the knife’s edge, 
Peirce talks about actually applying it to a diamond. But Peirce does not mean to confine the application to what will 
happen, and he later expresses regret about having left that impression, since he regards it as nominalistic (see: CP 
8.191; CP 5.483). 
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procedure removes the obscurity or privacy of views that would aim to clarify our concepts in 
terms of sensations or observations that belong to the individual alone. 
 At this stage, though, we may wonder about the application of the third grade to the 
concept of reality, and then ask what the connection is to truth. Surprisingly, this matter 
concerning the application of the third grade of clarity receives less attention in the literature 
than we might expect given how crucial it is to Peirce’s project. If we ask about the conceivable 
practical bearings of the concept of reality, Peirce offers quite a simple answer: “The only effect 
which real things have is to cause belief” (W3: 271). Peirce says that “The question therefore is, 
how is true belief (or belief in the real) distinguished from false belief (or belief in fiction) (W3: 
271). In this case, Peirce is tracing out the consequences of his conclusion from the “Fixation,” 
where he had described the hypothesis that an external permanence or external reality impinges 
on our thoughts and provides us with sensations. Such a hypothesis, he says, figures into his 
method of scientific investigation. But given that Peirce does not align his view of reality with 
the simple hypothesis of an external reality but looks to the conclusion of a corrective process 
that filters out fiction, ignorance, and error, what he says here is not the whole of his account of 
reality or truth. That is, he clarifies our notions of reality and truth in relation to the upshot of the 
inferential and communal processes involved in the method of scientific investigation. Consider 
the textual evidence for the reading I am offering. In “How to Make Our Ideas Clear,” Peirce 
maintains that, “Now, as we have seen in the former paper [the “Fixation”] the ideas of truth and 
falsehood, in their full development, appertain exclusively to the scientific method of settling 
opinion” (W3: 272). As for their complete development, Peirce writes, “The opinion which is 
fated to be ultimately agreed to by all who investigate, is what we mean by the truth, and the 
object represented in this opinion is the real. That is the way I would explain reality” (W3: 273). 
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Admittedly, the way Peirce clarifies our concepts of truth and reality is quite compressed, but to 
see what he is doing, we need to keep in mind that he is looking to the conclusion of the 
corrective process of the method of scientific investigation. When Peirce refers to “all who 
investigate,” in the previous statement, he is alluding to the community of inquirers. To leave 
open the road of inquiry, the process of induction, and the path towards truth, Peirce holds that 
we must develop the investigating intelligence and the inferential and communal process (i.e., his 
communal inferentialism). The belief or opinion that we would reach at the end of this process, 
according to Peirce, would be compelling and would be public. In this way, Peirce clarifies our 
concept of truth in terms of the fixation of belief. 
4.4 Conclusion 
The chapter aimed to provide an account of Peirce’s view of truth as public, where I began with 
the problem of tenacity, since Peirce wrestled with that problem when he sought to articulate this 
view of truth. In the first section, I used the tenacious individual as a foil to show what Peirce 
considered deeply wrong about tenacity’s extreme form of epistemic individualism, and why he 
held that truth could not be private. In the context of his theory of inquiry, where real doubt is 
concerned, I spelled out what Peirce meant by experience. In the second section, I examined why 
Peirce, post-“Fixation,” said that experience was the initial push towards a public view of truth 
rather than to maintain his former argument, in the “Fixation,” that the social impulse provided 
that impetus. Finally, in the third section, I took up what Peirce likely meant by the investigating 
intelligence, and I pointed out its relation to his effort to clarify the pragmatic meaning of our 
concept of truth. Overall, in this chapter, I reconstructed an account of how the two compulsive 
components – experience and the investigating intelligence – work together to reveal why truth 
must be public, according to Peirce, and why epistemic individualism must fail.  
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CONCLUSION 
 
Peirce’s critique of epistemic individualism is an unexplored topic in the literature, though it 
concerns his fundamental aim to transform philosophy into a communal study. While there are a 
few accounts of this critique (Haack (1983); Forster (1992; 2011)), despite its importance, there 
is no in-depth treatment of the topic. Furthermore, in the brief accounts that we have, there is no 
close examination of how Peirce’s notion of the community ties into his inferential 
commitments. Over four chapters, I have defended the claim that Peirce’s communal 
inferentialism provides an illuminating framework in which to describe and evaluate the reasons 
he argues from in his critique of epistemic individualism. While the bulk of what I have to say 
about Peirce’s critique of epistemic individualism is in the preceding chapters, in these 
concluding sections, I will do three things. First, I will recall some significant points from the 
chapters. Second, I will reemphasize the crucial notion of the inferential and communal process, 
which drives much of Peirce’s project. Third, I will suggest some issues and areas for future 
work on topics that closely relate to the main theme of this dissertation. 
Overall, I have examined the central reasons that led Peirce to maintain that epistemic 
individualism is a philosophical dead-end. I defended the claim that we can best appreciate the 
rational support for Peirce’s critique when we see it through the lens of his communal 
inferentialism. Admittedly, communal inferentialism is not a term that Peirce used, and no single 
statement can capture its meaning; for, it designates an amalgam of Peirce’s key assumptions, 
which trace to the inferential roots of his system. To reiterate, the assumptions that comprise 
Peirce’s communal inferentialism include the following: that the activity of the mind is 
fundamentally inferential; that there are three patterns of correct inference; and his notion of the 
community. Peirce’s communal inferentialism is most apparent in his Cognition Series, though it 
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crops up in almost all of Peirce’s subsequent philosophical work, including his Illustrations 
Series, which contains “The Fixation of Belief” and “How to Make Our Ideas Clear.” 
Turning now to some key ideas from the chapters, as I explained in the General 
Introduction and at the end of Chapter One, Peirce denies that we have special cognitive faculties 
that could allow us to discover non-inferential truths. Instead of assuming that the mind has such 
special faculties and can make such a discovery, Peirce insists on a different set of assumptions. 
Two stand out. First, we need to begin with the beliefs that we actually have (many of which are 
likely to be prejudices). Second, we should begin with and adhere to the inferential and 
communal process that consists of the three patterns of correct inference (abduction, deduction, 
and induction). While the epistemic projects of early modern philosophy set out with the need to 
find a non-inferential and foundational starting-point for inquiry (i.e., to find a basic belief or 
primary truth), Peirce rejects that assumption. His rejection of it bears a deep connection to his 
denial of epistemic individualism. With the appropriate context in place, it is easy to see why. If 
the individual had such cognitive faculties, then the individual could discover such truths or 
basic beliefs; and hence, the individual could be the locus of knowledge. In reply, Peirce 
advances a probabilistic argument to support the claim that it is quite unlikely that we could 
discover such truths since it is very likely that we lack the requisite cognitive faculties to make 
such a discovery. This counterargument reflects, in large part, why Peirce rejects epistemic 
individualism. If the claim that we have such cognitive faculties is spurious, then the argument 
that the individual is the locus of knowledge collapses along with it.  
 In Chapter One, I reinvestigated Peirce’s case against Cartesian individualism, which 
many scholars consider the prime example of epistemic individualism. While I agree with that 
assessment, Peirce’s case is not problem-free or straightforward, especially in view of the 
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controversy that surrounds the case. As we saw, critics contend that Peirce misreads Descartes, 
and in particular, they claim that Peirce fails to grasp the purpose of Descartes’ method of doubt. 
In reply, I provided a set of evidence that supports the counterclaim that Peirce was carefully 
tracking the several functions of Descartes’ method of doubt. Recall that the first function of this 
method directly reflects Descartes’ preliminary to philosophy, which is for the individual to free 
the mind entirely from its prejudices (praejudicia). Relying on Peirce’s writings, I argued that 
Descartes’ need to start out by expunging all prejudices and disaccustoming the mind from its 
previous state is something that the individual cannot do. And Peirce’s reason for that, more 
specifically, concerns how the individual tends to be unaware of these prejudices or unable to 
correct them (since they often remain so convincing). In response to the need to remove 
prejudices, Peirce holds that we must form a community of inquirers and engage in a communal 
and inferential process, which offers us the best chance of prejudice-elimination. That is, as 
Peirce sees it, we need to begin with the prejudices we actually have, form such a community, 
have that community raise real doubts in us, and then seek to push the process as far as it could 
go. The product of the process, as I pointed out, would be complete prejudice-elimination, and 
that would involve the process of doubt-resolution.72 In both cases, the processes are communal 
and gradual as opposed to individualistic processes, which suppose the products of them to be for 
the individual here and now. 
 While the issue of how to find a way to remove prejudices is a major theme of Chapter 
One, I briefly described a similar process in Chapter Two with respect to Peirce’s aim of 
explicating our notion of reality. There, I took up Peirce’s response to the nominalist’s 
conception of knowledge, the primary target of the chapter, but I also touched on the contrast 
                                               
72 The reason is simply that prejudices (or long held beliefs), according to Peirce, require real doubt to unsettle them. 
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between the nominalist’s view and Peirce’s view of reality. The topic came up because the 
essence of nominalism states that reality relates only to concrete individual things. According to 
Peirce, the nominalist’s view of reality holds that what is real must relate to a res extra animam 
(viz., a thing external to the mind). In reply, Peirce maintains that our notion of reality is a 
communal notion that must relate to the mind or be cognizable. The motivation for his position 
comes from how he sees reality as standing in contrast to fictions or figments of the mind, and 
how such figments or fictions depend on the mind of the individual (or group of individuals) to 
be what they are. That is, according to Peirce, a fiction is the product of the individual’s mind 
(e.g., consider the belief, say, that elves are real. Such a belief reflects the idiosyncrasies of the 
person who believes that there are such creatures. Something real, though, is independent of 
what anyone in particular thinks about it). Again, the thing to notice about Peirce’s treatment of 
the topic of reality is that he regards fictions or figments as reflecting individuality, where Peirce 
associates individuality with fiction, ignorance, error, and negation. In contrast, Peirce takes our 
greatest epistemic concepts and achievements to be communal ones. Peirce endorses the view 
that reality must relate to the conclusion that the community would reach if inquiry or the 
inferential process were to continue as far as it possibly could. Accordingly, reality remains 
independent of what anyone in particular thinks about it, though Peirce maintains that our view 
of reality cannot transcend the mind or stand altogether apart from the communal and inferential 
process. In sum, according to Peirce, our notion of reality must be cognizable and communal.  
 The bulk of Chapter Two concerned what Peirce takes to be the nominalist’s view of 
knowledge and the nominalist’s conception of the mind. There, I presented the material in the 
form of what I referred to as the dilemma of epistemic individualism. The nominalist’s view of 
knowledge, which holds that the individual must gain knowledge through a set of private 
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sensations, faces the problem of skepticism about the external world (see: Forster, 2011). The 
nominalist’s view does not so much as state a positive view of knowledge as it underscores the 
need to find a way around this problem of skepticism. According to Peirce, if the nominalist is 
unwilling to concede skepticism, then one alternative is to maintain that the mind could mirror 
(i.e., non-inferentially picture) concrete individual things in the world, and having such a 
capacity would leave open the possibility of knowledge. However, I pointed out that the 
nominalist’s acceptance of such a conception of the mind generates the dilemma in a 
straightforward way: either the nominalist maintains that the mind could mirror the world, or the 
nominalist must concede skepticism (a position fatal to the possibility of knowledge). In Chapter 
Two, I stressed the first horn of the dilemma, since that alternative might make the nominalist’s 
view of knowledge remain viable. However, I showed that Peirce advances some strong 
arguments to reveal that the nominalist’s conception of the mind is erroneous. It becomes 
apparent how costly the alternatives are in the dilemma, for it now takes the following form: 
either the nominalist maintains a false conception of the mind, or the nominalist must concede 
skepticism. To be clear, the nominalist maintains that knowledge could only be for the 
individual, and the nominalist tends further to assume that the mind could gain non-inferential 
knowledge. Consequently, Peirce’s communal inferentialism is in direct conflict with the 
assumptions that the nominalist is making about knowledge and the mind. 
 There is an arc of development between Peirce’s attempt to put us in the position of 
optimal epistemic judges (Chapter One) and what he later refers to as the growth of our 
investigating intelligence (Chapter Four). Over his writings, Peirce places increasing stress on 
the role of experience. As he views it, experience tends to modify our thinking by providing us 
with surprises, and there is a range of different things that can break our expectations. The most 
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familiar form of surprise is something unexpected in our environment, but a surprise can also 
come from facing someone whose beliefs conflict with our own. As I explained in Chapter One, 
according to Peirce, surprise is what causes real doubt and interrupts a belief and the habit of 
action that corresponds with it. In whatever form the surprise takes, Peirce maintains that we 
must begin the inferential and communal process with abduction. There is a clear reason for 
having to start there: an abduction begins with a conjecture or hypothesis that aims to explain the 
surprise. After engaging in abduction, we are to deduce certain consequences from what we 
conjectured. Finally, there is induction, which concerns taking samples and testing, so that 
induction is what moves us towards the truth or to accurate representations. At some point, as we 
carry on the inductive process, the generalization we arrive at would represent the real ratio of 
the samples having a certain quality or character. To illustrate this complex inferential process, 
which features these three types of inference, I used the example of an imagined unsophisticated 
community that is seeking to figure out the cause of malaria in humans (Chapter One).  
 Although all three types of inference are essential to the process, it is the point about 
induction and its connection to truth that I intend to spell out in a future project. Again, with the 
way that Peirce seeks to clarify truth in terms of a fixed belief, we need to see how he does this 
with induction in mind. As I explained in Chapter Four, Peirce regards induction as the imperator 
of truth-seeking. For Peirce, induction moves us towards truth in a way that would eventually 
compel assent. Now there is a deep connection, as I suggested in Chapter Three, between 
induction and habit formation. Since induction is about taking samples and making specific 
observations, Peirce sees it as a form of fixing attention and developing habits. In Chapter Three, 
I further pointed out that the best way to know what Peirce means by a belief in “The Fixation of 
Belief” is to see that a belief always involves a habit of action – a belief is of the nature of a 
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habit. Now the project I have in mind is to explain Peirce’s notion of fixing belief in terms of 
fixing attention and fixing habits through a series of inductions. Peirce never explains the link 
between induction and the fixation of belief in quite this way in any single work of his; and there 
is no thorough account of it in the literature on Peirce. The project is especially worthwhile in 
light of the ongoing controversy over what Peirce means by truth and how he seeks to elucidate 
our idea of it. In Chapter Four, I laid down much of the basis for this work, where I provided an 
account of what Peirce means by his view of truth as public. In this way, the project I have in 
mind is to launch from the material I covered in both Chapter Three and Chapter Four. 
 One area of further interest is Peirce’s pragmaticism – his method for figuring out the 
meaning of our ideas and notions – which he continues to develop in his later writings. In 
Chapter One, I noted that Peirce holds that we need to begin with the prejudices we have, since 
many of them are likely to be so convincing that we cannot subject them to real doubt. In his 
later writings, Peirce refers to what he calls his critical common-sensism (CP 5.438). Broadly 
put, it is the view that many of our beliefs and inferences are rooted in common sense, and thus 
they have the status of being beyond our current doubts, control, or criticisms (e.g., our belief 
that fire burns). Though we may now be unable to challenge them, we may be able to challenge 
many of our beliefs as we proceed in our investigations. Again, to question them, we would have 
to experience surprise or real doubt that would unsettle our strong convictions in them. With this 
in mind, Peirce holds that his pragmaticism assumes the truth of critical common-sensism. His 
pragmaticism is a way to clarify the meaning of an idea or conception by relating it to our habits, 
purposes, or conceivable experiential consequences. Increasingly, Peirce views self-control as a 
key component of his pragmaticism. In 1905, he considers the absence of self-reproach to 
indicate whether we have done all we should have in our inquiries. In developing his 
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pragmaticism, Peirce regards it as “a method of reflexion having for its purpose to render ideas 
clear” (CP 5.13 n.1). By a method of reflexion, Peirce underscores how the method should allow 
us to see how our ideas could relate to possible experience and other familiar aspects of inquiry. 
By casting the method in terms of reflexion, Peirce aims to show why, “logical self-control is a 
perfect mirror of ethical self-control” (CP 5.419). That is, the more self-control we have, 
achieved in large part by thinking through the consequences of our ideas and preparing ourselves 
for the practical effects attached to them, the less self-reproach we will have. But now some 
questions crop up that require further research. How does Peirce’s references to self-control line 
up with his central notion of the community? Akin to that question, what role does the 
community have in Peirce’s pragmaticism and its emphasis on self-control? In a pair of thought-
provoking statements from “What Pragmatism Is” (1905), Peirce maintains the following: (1) 
that when we reason, we are trying to persuade a future, critical self; and (2) that our “circle of 
society” is “a sort of loosely compacted person,” which is, in many ways, more important than 
the individual (CP 5.421). Peirce holds these two statements to be “all-important to assure 
oneself and to remember” when evaluating the rational merits of his pragmaticism. Both of these 
statements, (1) and (2), require further study, and they closely relate to Peirce’s communal 
inferentialism. The normative dimension of self-control and its bearing on Peirce’s communal 
approach demand further attention, and so I intend to undertake a project that clarifies these 
matters in further depth. 
 Before I conclude this study, it is worth having a brief summary of the chief themes from 
each chapter. Chapter One provided a reassessment and defense of Peirce’s case against 
Cartesian individualism. Chapter Two offered a way to evaluate Peirce’s rejection of the 
nominalist’s view of knowledge. It showed that the nominalist faces what I called the dilemma of 
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epistemic individualism. Chapter Three returned to the main problem of the “Fixation,” which is 
about how to fix belief in the community, however much that community might grow. The 
chapter proposed an alternative reading of the “Fixation” based on Peirce’s communal 
inferentialism. Chapter Four offered a way to explain Peirce’s view of truth as public by relating 
it to his communal inferentialism. Overall, I maintain that the chapters provide strong support for 
the claim I have sought to defend in this dissertation, which is that Peirce’s communal 
inferentialism provides us with the best way to appreciate the central reasons that Peirce relies on 
in his critique of epistemic individualism.  
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